

Henry Kissinger's First Big 'Tilt'

By Jack Anderson

From classified documents and dozens of interviews, we have now learned that Henry Kissinger guided President Nixon in January, 1970, along a tightrope between black and white Africa, with a secret tilt toward the white supremacist nations.

It was Kissinger's first big "tilt."

The Kissinger proposals were submitted to the former President as part of a massive review of U.S. policy toward southern Africa, our sources say. Prepared by Kissinger's National Security Council staff and stamped SECRET on every page, the review is known as "National Security Study Memorandum 39." Its existence has been previously reported, but we have obtained a copy.

NSM 39 offered five "options" for dealing with the explosive black-white confrontation on southern Africa. Supposedly, it was left to Mr. Nixon to choose the final policy. To this day, only a handful of Kissinger's closest associates know that he personally recommended the course he thought should be pursued.

Without exception, Mr. Nixon accepted Kissinger's recommendations. Here's what Kissinger proposed and Mr. Nixon adopted:

• As a "general posture," Kissinger called for a "balancing" act in southern Africa; he

wanted to "straddle" the black-white issue. With an emphasis on keeping it "quiet," he urged a "partial relaxation" of the chill toward the white regimes and an accompanying "modest" increase of aid to the black states. His objective, inside sources told my associate Joe Spear, was to convince the blacks that the United States sympathized with them while fostering a secret kinship with the whites.

• Kissinger advocated a slight relaxation of the stern U.S. posture toward white-ruled Rhodesia, an outlaw nation cut off diplomatically from the rest of the world. United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia were penalizing American firms, Kissinger contended, because other nations ignored them. He suggested, therefore, that the United States should prepare plans to "loosen" enforcement of economic sanctions.

• Kissinger also wanted the United States to retain its consular office in Salisbury, Rhodesia. This was opposed by William P. Rogers, then Secretary of State, who argued strenuously that the office should be closed. But Kissinger's wishes prevailed until the British, who had accredited the consulate, demanded that it be shut down.

• The United States should not take sides, Kissinger suggested, in the Portuguese colonial wars. But he urged a "quiet loosening" of the American arms embargo against Portu-

gal's African colonies. The new policy, Kissinger advised Mr. Nixon, should permit the shipment to the Portuguese of "non-lethal" equipment with "dual" civilian and military use.

• Kissinger also recommended that the arms embargo against South Africa be "relaxed" to permit the sale of non-lethal equipment "intended" for civilian use. The United States should also increase "military contacts" with South Africa, Kissinger advised, as long as it could be done "inconspicuously."

• The delicate question of South Africa's control over South West Africa, with its overwhelming black population, should be avoided if at all possible, Kissinger pleaded. It should not be permitted, he argued, to become an issue in Washington's "bilateral relations" with South Africa.

• As a sop to the black nations of southern Africa, Kissinger proposed a modest increase in foreign aid of about \$5 million.

• Trade between the United States and the white regimes should be encouraged, Kissinger advocated. But he stressed again that it should be done quietly. The services of the Export-Import Bank, he added, should be extended to South Africa and the Portuguese colonies.

Kissinger's recommendations were based largely upon "Option 2" in the NSSM 39 policy review. As spelled out in the secret document, this options

called for "broader association with both black and white states" on the "premise" that "the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them."

Under Option 2, the United States would "maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states." Among the "operational examples" listed under Option 2 are these:

• "Enforce arms embargo against South Africa but with liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes."

• "Remove constraints on EXIM Bank facilities for South Africa; actively encourage U.S. exports and facilitate U.S. investment."

• "Conduct selected exchange programs with South Africa in all categories, including military."

• "On Rhodesia, retain consulate; gradually relax sanctions (e.g. hardship exemptions for chrome) and consider eventual recognition."

• "Establish flexible aid programs in the black states of the region; respond to reasonable requests for purchase of non-sophisticated arms."

This was the course that Kissinger chose and that Mr. Nixon followed.

Footnote: We have invited comment from the State Department which, at this writing, hasn't responded.