

By FLORA LEWIS

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Sept. 4—The nomination of Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary of State has raised some hopes in Europe that United States embassies will regain an effective role.

Though little noticed in Washington, the period of almost total foreign policy concentration at the White House while Mr. Kissinger worked there as President Nixon's adviser on national security resulted in as much paralysis and demoralization in American embassies as it did in the State Department.

In some ways the effect on the embassies was even worse for foreign officials and for American diplomats abroad. In Washington top foreign diplomats could bypass the State Department on important issues and take their problems to Mr. Kissinger at the White House.

Foreign ministers and other top officials found that they had to work through their

### **They See Prospects He Will Revive Use of U.S. Embassies**

own Washington envoys or hope for one of Mr. Kissinger's lightning trips if they wanted useful face-to-face talks on United States policy because the American ambassadors in their capitals were seldom fully informed.

In two recent sets of negotiations, Europeans even came to the conclusion that United States negotiators were getting separate and contradictory instructions—regular and routine policy advice from the State Department, and, when a crunch came, different orders from Kissinger's shop."

This happened toward the end of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation in Helsinki, a prelude to working negotiations to open in Geneva this month.

The American delegation

kept a "low profile," making sure to work closely with European allies and accepting their view that bargaining should proceed with great care and, if necessary, slowly.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers appeared for the formal conclusion of the conference in early July and seemed to endorse this approach.

But later, European officials said, they got word through their embassies in Washington that this was not the way the White House wanted the coming working sessions to go.

They heard that signals had been switched to rush through the Geneva sessions and, if possible, come up with a document that could be the basis for a large-scale East-West summit conference during President Nixon's expected European tour.

That caused renewed tension in Europe-American rela-

Continued on Page 10, Column 4

Continued From Page 1, Col. 6

tions. A jointly agreed strategy for Geneva still has to be reached.

A similar situation developed during the Vienna preparatory talks for the mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe. The formal sessions of these complex negotiations are to open Oct. 30. No one expects that they can work quickly, and most West European governments want to make sure that the Geneva security talks do not get too far ahead of Vienna.

#### **Belgian Aide Exasperated**

During the final preparations, European diplomats say, the American delegation suddenly pressed for a quick wind-up in Vienna, so that an announcement about the talks could be made during the trip to the United States by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader.

At one point, the Belgian delegate grew so annoyed with what appeared to be an American switch to fullspeed ahead without concern for details that he walked out of the Western caucus and threatened to support the Rumanians.

Another example of the exclusion of embassies from even ordinary diplomatic business came after Mr. Kissinger's speech in April proposing a "new Atlantic charter." Foreign governments were intensely eager to learn the background of the speech and to have certain passages explained, but United States embassies could not provide that usual service.

At least one European government was intrigued by an obscure passage calling for "joint understanding to limit the scope of our autonomy." It did not even bother to ask the American embassy accredited to it, having learned to assume that this would be unproductive, but told its ambassador in Washington to find whether the passage was to be taken as innocuous rhetoric or a hint of sweeping new proposals.

A week later, when the ambassador managed to get a

White House appointment, the answer came: The passage was rhetoric.

The isolation of the State Department from White House policy-making had a secondary effect. Embassies are also supposed to report other countries' views to Washington.

Mr. Kissinger's National Security Council staff in the White House has no foreign reporting service of its own, and relies upon information from the regular agencies. But, as one diplomat put it, "you can't get a very firm idea of how another government is going to react to Washington's decisions when you haven't been told what they really are."

Some American envoys reacted passively. This was taken as Washington's approved posture by some when they noticed that a large number of United States ambassadorial posts had been left unfilled for long periods.

For example, there has been no American representative in the Organization for European Cooperation and Development for almost a year, although the organization is a crucial preparatory ground for the important world trade talks to open in Tokyo this month.

One major hope among both American diplomats and for-

eign governments is that Mr. Kissinger will now use his special influence at the White House to fill the many vacancies, and with people qualified by more than their campaign contributions.

There have also been cases of American ambassadors finding their own solution to the State Department impasse. One diplomat, who headed a negotiating team with representatives from several departments and who also operated under a White House committee, got himself named head of the committee.

He would send normal reports to the State Department, but he also drafted his own instructions for the National Security Council, then had them approved and returned to him to follow abroad.

"Of course," one of the team members noted, "our subject doesn't happen to be one of Kissinger's immediate interests. It's easier when they aren't paying too much attention."

If Mr. Kissinger, as Secretary of State, decides to use the machinery of the State Department, diplomats feel that the embassies may also regain the lost sense of contributing directly to the making of foreign policy. But they are waiting to see how things will work.