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NIXON GIVES STAND ON CUTS IN FORCES

Outlines Three Approaches
to the NATO Talks With
Soviet Bloc Next Fall

WASHINGTON, May 3 — President Nixon disclosed for the first time today the basic American approach to the talk between the North Atlantic alliance and the Soviet bloc on Mutual reductions of in Central Europe.

The talks are to begin in the fall after the current preliminary sessions in Vienna agree on agenda and other details. Up to now, the United States has been vague about its plans for the talks.

In his State of the World report, Mr. Nixon outlined three approaches to the reduction of forces.

Henry A. Kissinger, his national security adviser, said at a news conference today that the United States had just informed his allies on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of its thinking in the hope of getting a common position before the talks begin.

"Different political viewpoints shape the attitude of each ally, especially if its forces or territory may be involved," Mr. Nixon said in his report. "Issues of this magnitude could become divisive if there were no common concept. The alliance must approach force reductions from the standpoint of military security in a period that may be marked by a further amelioration of tensions."

The approaches he outlined were as follows:

① "Proportionately equal reductions. Each side would apply a common percentage to reduce its forces. This appears to be a simple but equitable approach. If applied to all forces, however, it could create an imbalance because it would favor the offense and because of the geographical advantages of the Warsaw Pact."

"Reductions to equal levels. This would in effect produce a common ceiling for Central Europe. There would be some unequal cuts in absolute numbers, but the residual capabilities would be more balanced and offensive potential would thereby be reduced."

"Mixed, asymmetrical reductions. This means reductions would be made by different amounts in various categories of weapons or manpower. It could prove extremely complex to define equivalence between different weapons systems."

In summary, Mr. Nixon seemed to be saying that a straight, across-the-board reduction in forces by some fixed percentage would be a disadvantage to the West since American forces would have further to go than the same percentage of Soviet forces.

He appeared to be giving support to the idea of reaching a fixed, equal level of forces in Europe between the two pacts, with the side with the larger force having to take the bigger cut.

Mr. Nixon also devoted considerable attention to the problems of defining more precisely "what we mean by an adequate NATO defense."

Questions of how future wars might be fought must be re-examined, he said.

"When, in what way, and for what objective should we use tactical nuclear weapons?" He asked as an example of the problems. "How do independent national nuclear forces affect alliance decisions? Do we require different institutions to examine such overriding issues within the alliance?"

He also asked what the relationship should be between the effort to increase the defense potential of NATO and the simultaneous diplomatic drive to reduce forces.

Representatives from NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been engaged in procedural debate in Vienna on what nation should participate in the fall negotiations.