NYTIMES

С

14

Separate story by James Reston, which includes Kissinger's comments on Watergate - filed Watergate.

75

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

24 APR

# Text of Kissinger's Talk at A.P. Meeting

Following is the text of an address delivered at the Wal-dorf-Astoria yesterday by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security, at a luncheon of The Associated Press:

security, at a tuncneon of The Associated Press: This year has been called the Year of Europe, but not because Europe was less im-portant in 1972 or in 1969. The alliance between the United States and Europe has been the cornerstone of all postwar foreign policy. It provided the political frame-work for American engage-ments in Europe and marked the definitive end of U. S. isolationism. It insured the sense of security that allowed Europe to recover from the devastation of the war. It reconciled former enemies. It was the stimulus for an un-precedented endeavor in European unity and the principal means to forge the common policies that safe-guarded Western security in an era of prolonged tension and confrontation. Our values, our goals and our basic interests are most closely identified with those of Europe. Nineteen Seventy Three is

Nineteen Seventy Three is the Year of Europe because the era that was shaped by decisions of a generation ago is ending. The success of those policies has produced new realities that require new approaches:

The revival of Western Europe is an established fact as is the historic success of its movement toward eco-nomic unification.

nomic unification. The East-West strategic military balance has shifted from American preponder-ance to near equality, bring-ing with it the necessity for a new understanding of the requirements of our common security.

requirements of our common security. ¶Other areas of the world have grown in importance. Japan has emerged as a ma-jor power center. In many fields "Atlantic" solutions to be viable must include Japan. ¶We are in a period of relaxation of tensions. But as the rigid divisions of the past two decades diminish, new assertions of national identity and national rivalry emerge. emerge.

Problems have arisen, un-foreseen a generation ago, which require new types of cooperative action. Insuring the supply of energy for industrialized nations is an example example.

## TUESDAY, APRIL 24, 1973

Here on U.S. Relations

#### 'Dramatic Transformation'

'Dramatic Transformation' These factors have pro-duced a dramatic transforma-tion of the psychological cli-mate in the West—a change which is the most profound current challenge to Western statesmanship. In Europe a new generation—to whom war and its dislocations are not personal experiences— takes stability for granted. But it is less committed to the unity that made peace possible and to the effort required to maintain it. In the United States decades of global burdens have fostered and the frustrations of the war in Southeast Asia have accentuated a reluctance to sustain global involvements on the basis of preponderant American responsibility. Inevitably this period of

sustain global involvements on the basis of preponderant American responsibility. Inevitably this period of transition will have its strains. There have been complaints in America that. Europe ignores its wider re-sponsibilities in pursuing eco-nomic self-interest too one-sidely and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occa-sionally severe criticism of us in the name of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our inde-

in the name of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our inde-pendent policies—also in the name of Atlantic unity. Our challenge is whether a unity forged by a common perception of danger can draw new purpose from shared positive aspirations. If we permit the Atlantic partnership to atrophy, or to erode through neglect, care-lessness or mistrust, we risk what has been achieved, and we shall miss our historic opportunity for even greater achievement. In the Forties and Fifties

In the Forties and Fifties the task was economic reconthe task was economic recon-struction and security against the danger of attack. The West responded with courage and imagination. Today the need is to make the Atlantic relationship as dynamic a force in building a new struc-ture of peace, less geared to crisis and more conscious of opportunities, drawing its in-spirations from its goals-rather than its fears. The At-lantic nations must join in a fresh act of creation, equal to that undertaken by the post-war generation of leaders of Europe and America. Europe and America.

## With Europe

'New Era of Creativity' New Era of Creativity' This is why the President is embarking on a personal and direct approach to the leaders of Western Europe. In his discussions with the heads of government of Britain, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, the Secretary General of NATO and other European leaders, it is President's pur-pose to lay the basis for a new era of creativity in the West. West.

His approach will be to deal with Atlantic problems

comprehensively. The politi-cal, military and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other. The solu-tions will not be worthy of the opportunity if left to technicians. They must be addressed at the highest level.

In 1972 the President transformed relations with our adversaries to lighten the burdens of fear and suspicion.

In 1973 we can gain the ame sense of historical same sense of historical achievement by reinvigorat-ing shared ideals adn common purposes with our friends.

The United States proposes to its Atlantic partners that, by the time the President travels to Europe toward the travels to Europe toward the end of the year, we will have worked out a new Atlantic charter setting the goals for the future — a blueprint that: ¶Builds on the past with-out becoming its prisoner. ¶Deals with the problems our success has cerated.

our success has cerated. Creates for the Atlantic nations a new relationship in whose progress Japan can

whose progress supar can share. We ask our friends in Europe, Canada and ultimate-ly Japan to join us in this effort. This is what we mean by the Year of Europe.

Atlantic Relationships

The problems in Atlantic relationships are real. They have arisen in part because during the Fifties and Sixties the Atlantic community or-ganized itself in different ways in the many different dimensions of its common enterprise.

¶In economic relations, the European Community has in-

not necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical.

An Absence of Harmony

In short, we deal with each other regionally and even competitively in economic matters, on an integrated basic and any and as matters, on an integrated basis in defense, and as nation-states in diplomacy. When the various collective institutions were rudimen-tary, the potential inconsist-ency in their modes of operency in their modes of oper-ation was not a problem. But after a generation of evolution and with the new weight and strength of our allies, the various parts of the construction are not always in harmony and some-times obstruct each other.

If we want to foster unity, we can no longer ignore these problems. The Atlantic nations must find a solution for the management of their diversity, to serve the com-mon objectives which under-lie their unity. We can no longer afford to pursue na-tional or regional self-interest without a unifying frame-work. We cannot hold to-gether if each country or region asserts its autonomy, whenever it is to its benefit and invokes unity to curtail the independence of others. We must strike a new balfor the management of their We must strike a new bal-nce between self-interest

ance and the common interest. We must identify interests and positive values beyond secu-rity in order to engage once again the commitment of peoples and parliaments. We need a shared view of the world we seek to build. No element of American

postwar policy has been more consistent than our support of European unity. We encouraged it at every

### The Roosevelt-Churchill Charter

The original Atlantic Charter—the inspiration for the "new Atlantic Charter" outlined by Henry A. Kissinger yesterday—was the eight-point unofficial joint declaration of peace aims by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, drawn up in a meeting at sea and made public on Aug. 14, 1941.

The declaration listed these principals and aims:

IRenunciation of territorial and other aggrandizement. ¶Opposition to territorial changes not in accord with

"the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." ¶Respect for all peoples to choose their form of government and restoration of sovereign rights to those

forcibly deprived of them. ¶A commitment to the easing of trade restrictions and equal access of all nations to raw materials.

**G**Fullest collaboration to secure better economic and social conditions for all.

A commitment to peace and freedom from fear and want. 

¶Freedom to travel on the high seas.

The abandonment of the use of force, the disarma-ment of aggressor nations and the endeavor to "lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burdens of armaments."

creasingly stressed its regional personality; the United States, at the same time, must act as part of and be responsible for a wider international trade and monetary system. We must reconcile these two perspectives.

¶In our collective fense, we are still organized on the principle of unity and integration, but in radically different, strategic condi-tions. The full implications of change have yet to be this faced.

**Q**Diplomacy is the subject Diplomacy is the subject of frequent consultations, but is essentially being con-ducted by traditional nation states. The U.S. has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have re-gional interests. These are

turn. We knew that a united Europe would be a more independent partner. But we assumed, perhaps too un-critically, that our common interests would be assured by our long history of co-operation. We expected that political unity would follow operation. We expected that political unity would follow economic integration, and that unified Europe working cooperatively with us in an Atlantic partnership would ease many of our interna-tional burdens. It is clear that many of these expectations are not being fulfilled. We and Europe have bene-

We and Europe have bene-fited from European eco-nomic integration. Increased trade within Europe has stimulated the growth of Euro-pean economies and the exUnited Press International

Paul Miller, chairman of The Associated Press, laughs at a remark by Henry A. Kissinger at reception here.

pansion of trade in both di-rections across the Atlantic. But we cannot ignore the fact that Europe's economic success and its transformation from a recipient of our aid to a strong competitor has produced a certain has produced a certain amount of friction. There has been turbulence and a sense of rivalry in international monetary relations.

Fear of Trade Obstacles

In trade, the natural eco-nomic weight of a market of 250 million people has pressed other states to seek special arrangements to pro-tect their access to it. The prospect of a closed trading system embracing the Euro-pean Community and a growing number of other na-tions in Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa appears to be at the expense of the United States and other nations which are excluded. In agriculture, where the Unit-ed States has a comparative advantage, we are particular-ly concerned that Community protective policies may re-strict access for our products.

This divergence comes at a time when we are experiencing a chronic and grow-ing deficit in our balance of payments and protectionist pressures of our own. Europressures of our own, nuro-peans in turn question our investment policies and doubt our continued com-mitment to their economic

The gradual accumulation of sometimes petty, some-times major economic disputes must be ended and be replaced by a determined commitment on both sides of the Atlantic to find cooperative solutions.

The United States will continue to support the unifica-tion of Europe. We have no intention of destroying what we worked so hard to help build. For us European unity is what it has always beennot an end in itself but a means to the strengthening of the West. We shall con-tinue to support European unity as a component of a larger Atlantic partnership.

This year we begin comprehensive trade negotiations with Europe as well as with Japan. We shall also continue Japan. We shall also continue to press the effort to reform the monetary system so that it promotes stability rather than constant disruptions. A new equilibrium must be new equilibrium must be achieved in trade and monetary relations. We see these negotiations

as an historic opportunity for positive achievement. They positive achievement. They must engage the top political leaders for they require above all a commitment of political will. If they are left solely to the average the solely to the experts, the in-evitable competitiveness of economic interests will domi-nate the debate. The influ-ence of pressure groups and special interests will become pervasive. There will be no overriding sense of direction. There will be no framework for the generous solutions or mutual concessions essential to preserve a vital Atlantic partnership.

'Larger Political Purposes'

Larger Political Purposes' It is the responsibility of national leaders to insure that economic negotiations serve larger political purposes. They must recognize that economic rivalry, if carried on without restraint, will in the end damage other rela-tionships. The United States intends to adopt a broad political

to adopt a broad political approach that does justice to our overriding political inter-est in an open and balanced trading order with both Europe and Japan. This is the spirit of the President's trade bill and of his speech to the International Monetary Fund last year. It will guide our strategy in the trade and monetary talks. We see these negotiations not as a test of strength, but as a test of joint statesmanship. Atlantic unity has always

come most naturally in the field of defense. For many years the military threats to Europe were unambiguous, the requirements to meet them were generally agreed on both sides of the Atlantic, and America's responsibility was pre-eminent and obvious. Today we remain united on

the objective of collective de-fense, but we face the new challenge of maintaining it under radically changed stra-tegic conditions and with the new opportunity of enhanc-ing our security through ne-gotiated reductions of forces. The West no longer holds

gotiated reductions of forces. The West no longer holds the nuclear predominance that permitted it in the fifty's and sixty's to rely almost solely on a strategy of mas-sive nuclear retaliation. Be-cause under conditions of nuclear parity such a strat-egy invites mutual suicide, the alliance must have other choices. The collective ability choices. The collective ability to resist attack in Western Europe by means of flexible responses has become central responses has become central to a rational strategy and crucial to the maintenance of peace. For this reason, the United States has main-tained substantial conven-tional forces in Europe, and our NATO allies have em-barked on a significant effort to modernize and improve their own military establish-ments. ments.

While the Atlantic alliance is committed to a strategy of lexible response in prin-ciple, the requirements of flexibility are complex and expensive. Flexibility by its nature requires sensitivity to new conditions and continual consultation among the allies to respond to changing cir-cumstances. And we must give substance to the defense posture that our strategy de-fines. Flexible response cannot be simply a slogan wrapped around the defense structure that emerges from lowest - common-denominator compromises driven by do-mestic considerations. It must be seen by ourselves and by potential adversaries as a credible, substantial and ra-tional posture of defense.

Much Still to Be Done

A great deal remains to be accomplished to give reality to the goal of flexible re-sponse:

There are deficiencies in important areas of our con-ventional defense.

There are still unresolved issues in our doctrine, for example, on the crucial ques-tion of the role of tactical nuclear weapons.

There are anomalies in NATO deployments as well as in its logistics structure.

To maintain the military balance that has insured sta-bility in Europe for 25 years, the alliance has no choice but to address these needs and to reach an agreement on our defense requirements. This task is all the more difficult because the lessening of tensions has given new impetus to arguments that it is safe to begin reducing forces unilaterally. And un-bridled economic competition bridled economic competition can sap the impulse for com-mon defense. All govern-ments of the Western Al-liance face a major challenge in educating their peoples to the realities of security in the realities of security the nineteen-seventy's.

The President has asked me to state that America re-mains committed to doing its fair share in Atlantic defense. He is adamantly opposed to unilateral withdrawals of U.S. forces from Europe. But we owe to our peoples a rational defense posture, at the safest minimum size and cost, with burdens equitably and shared. This is what the President believes must re-

President believes must re-sult from the dialogue with our allies in 1973. When this is achieved the necessary American forces will be maintained in Europe, not simply as a hostage to trigger our nuclear weapons as an essential contribution to an agreed and intel-ligible structure of Western defense. This too will enable us to engage our adversaries intelligently in negotiations for mutual balanced reduc-tions tions.

In the next few weeks, the United States will present to NATO the product of our own preparations for the negotiaforce reductions, which will begin this year. We hope that it will be a contribution that it will be a contribution to a broader dialogue on se-curity. Our approach is de-signed not from the point of view of special American but of general alliance interests. Our position will reflect the President's view that these negotiations are not a sub-terfuge to withdraw U.S. forces regardless of conse-quences. No formula for re-ductions is defensible—what-ever its domestic appeal or ever its domestic appeal or political rationale—if it un-dermines security. Our objective in the dia-

our objective in the dia-logue on defense is a new consensus on security ad-dressed to new conditions and to the hopeful new pos-sibilities of effective arms limitations.

New Phase of Diplomacy

We have entered a truly we have entered a truly remarkable period of East-West diplomacy. The last two years have produced am agreement on Berlin, a treaty between West Germany and the U.S.S.R., a SALT agree-ment, the beginning of ne-roticitions on a European Sa ment, the beginning of ne-gotiations on a European Se-curity Conference and on mutual balanced force reduc-tions, and a series of signifi-cant, practical bilateral agree-ments between Western and Eastern countries including a ments between Western and Eastern countries, including a dramatic change in bilateral relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. These were not isolated actions, but steps on a course charted in 1969 and carried forward as a collec-tive effort. Our approach to détente stressed that negoti-

ations had to be concrete, not atmospheric, and that con-cessions should be reciprocal. We expect to carry forward the policy of relaxation of tensions on this basis.

Yet this very success has created its own problems. There is an increasing un-easiness—all the more insidi-ous for rarely being made ex-plicit—that superpower di-plomacy might sacrifice the interests of traditional allies and other friends. When our and other friends. Where our allies' interests have been af-fected by our bilateral nego-tiations, as in the talks on the limitations of strategic arms, we have been scrupploue in limitations of strategic and, we have been scrupulous in consulting them; where our allies are directly involved, as in the negotiations on Mu-tual Balanced Force Reduc-tions, our approach is to pro-ceed jointly on the basis of agreed positions. Yet some of our friends in Europe have seemed unwilling to accord America the same trust in our motives as they received from us or to grant us the from us or to grant us the same tactical flexibility that they employed in pursuit of their own policies. The Unit-ed States is now often taken to task for flexibility where we used to be criticized for rigidity. All of this underlines the we have been scrupulous in

we used to be criticized for rigidity. All of this underlines the necessity to articulate a clear set of common objectives to-gether with our allies. Once that is accomplished, it will be quite feasible, indeed de-sirable; for the several allies to pursue these goals with considerable tactical flexibil-ity. If we agree on common objectives, it will become a technical question whether a particular measure is pursued technical question whether a particular measure is pursued in a particular forum or whether to proceed bilateral-ly or multilaterally. Then those allies who seek reas-surance of America's com-mitment will find it is not in verbal reaffirmations of

mitment will find it is not in verbal reaffirmations of loyalty but in an agreed framework of purpose. We do not agree on all policies. In many areas of the world our approaches will differ, especially outside of Europe. But we do require an understanding of what about be done jointly and of the limits we should impose on the scope of our autonomy. The Contribution by the U.S.

We have no intention of buying an illusory tranquillity at the expense of our friends. at the expense of our friends. The United States will never knowingly sacrifice the inter-ests of others. But the per-ception of common interests is not automatic; it requires constant redefinition. The re-laxation of tensions to which we are committed makes al-lied cohesion indispensable, yet more difficult. We must

insure that the momentum of détente is maintained by common objectives rather than by drift, escapism or complaceency. The agenda I have outlined

The agenda I have outlined here is not an American pre-scription but an appeal for a joint effort of creativity. The historic opportunity for this generation is to build a new structure of international re-lations for the decades ahead. A revitalized Atlantic part-nership is indispensable for it.

The United States is pretion:

The second secon common defense. ¶We shall continue to pur-

We shall continue to pur-sue the relaxation of tensions with our adversaries on the basis of concrete negotiations

basis of concrete negotiations in the common interest. We welcome the participation of our friends in a constructive East-West dialogue. ¶We will never consciously injure the interests of our friends in Europe or in Asia. We expect in return that their policies will take seri-ously our interests and our responsibilities. ¶We are prepared to work

their policies will take seri-ously our interests and our responsibilities. TWe are prepared to work cooperatively on new com-mon problems we face. En-ergy, for example, raises the challenging issues of assur-ance of supply, impact of oil revenues on international cur-rency stability, the nature of common political and stra-tegic interests and long-range relations of oil-consuming to oil-producing countries. This could be an area of com-petition; it should be an area of collaboration. "Just as Europe's autonomy is not an end in itself, so the Atlantic community cannot be an exclusive club. Japan must be a principal partner in our common enterprise. We hope that our friends in Europe will meet us in this spirit. We have before us the example of the great acom-plishments of the past dec-ades—and the opportunity to match and dwarf them. This is the task ahead. This is how in the nineteen-seven-ties the Atlantic nations can truly serve our peoples and the cause of peace.