

# Reporter's Notebook: Party Leaders Shun Frills But Take Over in Substantive Talks With Nixon

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Special to The New York Times

WARSAW, May 31—Presidents and emperors don't seem to mind going to the airport to greet the Nixons, but secretaries general of Communist parties do, it seems.

Like Leonid I. Brezhnev in Moscow, Edward Gierek of the Polish United Workers party took refuge in a strict interpretation of the orders of protocol by skipping the landing ceremony and having the President call on him. The party leaders are clearly in charge of their nominally collective leaderships, but they left the frills of summitry to their Premiers and titular chiefs of state.

In a small way, they seem to be following the example of Mao Tse-tung, who reigned godlike over the Nixon visit to Peking in February, after allowing one audience that gave his blessing to the entire negotiation. But there was no pretense in Moscow on matters of substance. Mr. Brezhnev signed the all-important arms limitation treaty without any justification in protocol, and it was Mr. Gierek who scheduled himself for the substantive conversations with the President.

Perhaps the Communist leaders are only slightly ahead of the times, anticipating an era when presidents, too, engage in periodic conversations with their partners in power without descending upon other societies like imperial potentates, with hundreds of staff members and hundreds of newsmen, scattering wreaths at a bewildering number of tombs and accepting the saber salutes of a dozen indistinguishable high-stepping honor guards.

Now that President Nixon has been to China and Russia, the drama may finally have been drained from summit meetings—at least until it comes to the now unimaginable missions to Hanoi and the moon. World leaders, and particularly the managers of rival nuclear establishments, are never likely to abandon their curiosity about the men at the far end of the hot lines, but there is a universal craving for a more business-like and less elaborate routine.

Saving time from the normal delays of bureaucracy, and therefore compressing serious negotiations, is held to be the most important justification for summitry by the American delegation. For instance, the judgment of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser, every 20 minutes of high-level talk in Moscow was the equivalent of one diplomatic note—thus permitting the work of several months to be done in a single week.

In the diplomatic season now ending, the championship for summitry and versatility—even before a belly-dancer dropped into his lap at a Teheran party before dawn today—is Mr. Kissinger, the President's international Poo-Bah.

He has spent more hours in private conversation with the Soviet, Chinese and, of course, American leaders than any of them have had with each other. He has simultaneously squeezed in many more hours with foreign ministers and other officials. He has coached the President for his talks and analyzed the results, supervised the instructions for all other negotiators, composed many of the communiqués and proclamations and then defined them for public understanding at hundreds of formal and informal press briefings.

In the last week alone Mr. Kissinger gave more news conferences than President Nixon held all year, and he set something of a record for the sweep and lucidity and even humor of his articulation of policy issues.

Some samples:

On the triangular diplomacy with Moscow and Peking—"We will not discuss one of them in the capital of the other. We recognize that they have serious differences with each other on a number of issues—one of them being the border dispute, the other being an ideological conflict over the interpretation of Leninist doctrine, with respect to which our competence is not universally recognized."

On the desirability for change in big-power diplomacy—"In traditional diplo-

macy, the aim was, through an accumulation of small advantages, to gain a qualitative edge over other countries. In the nuclear age, the most dangerous thing to aim for is a qualitative edge over your major rivals. Therefore the constant attempt to accumulate petty advantages creates such an atmosphere of insecurity and such an enormous danger that the world may not be able to live with it."

On the reliability of Soviet pledges of restraint—"We have laid out a roadmap. Will we follow this road?" I don't know. Is it automatic? Absolutely not. But it lays down a general rule of conduct which, if both sides act with wisdom, they can, perhaps, over a period of time, make a contribution. At this point it is an aspiration. We would not have signed it if we did not believe there was a chance for implementing this aspiration."

On the Soviet feeling about American mining of North Vietnamese harbors, without betraying summit confidences—"We did not ask for the approval of the Soviet leaders, and had we asked it, my instinct is that there would not have been a unanimity of views."

On the hazards of explaining the arms treaty with previously classified information—"The Soviet Union has been building missiles at the rate of something like 250 a year. If I get arrested here for espionage, gentlemen, we will know who is to blame."

On defending a nuclear

treaty with philosophy instead of by scorecard—"Neither nation will possibly put its security and its survival at the hazard of its opponent, and no agreement that brings disadvantage to either side can possibly last and can possibly bring about anything other than a new cycle of insecurity. Therefore, the temptation that is ever present when agreements of this kind are analyzed as to who won is exceptionally inappropriate."

The Russians, like the Chinese, made no effort to hide their admiration for Mr. Kissinger's contributions and talents. When the President's aide had to leave the meeting of the top leaders in Moscow last week for a side negotiation on the arms treaty, Mr. Brezhnev said he had instructed his own staff to be very conciliatory, so that failure would be Mr. Kissinger's fault. Mr. Nixon joined in the banter by remarking that if the session fail, "we will send him to Siberia." Whereupon the Soviet leader quickly replied, "We will let him come to Siberia."

Only one serious passage of the Kissinger news conferences has been mysteriously dropped from the official White House transcripts. This is the section in which he explained an informal agreement under which the United States planned to make a that the conversion of any "unilateral statement" saying that the conversion of

any land-based nuclear missiles to mobile land missiles would be regarded in Washington as contrary to the spirit of the new accord, which limits the number and types of offensive weapons.

Mr. Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev spent considerable time on this subject, exchanging observations that conversion to mobile missiles that could be moved about on railroad tracks was tantamount to the construction of forbidden defense. It would make the land weapons comparable to the now limited submarine-based missiles in that they would be difficult to locate.

For some unexplained reason, the Russians refused to write this prohibition into the agreements, although they signaled no intention to build mobile missiles. It was finally agreed that Mr. Nixon would make a special stipulation of the American interpretation of the accords.

A White House spokesman said Mr. Kissinger's revelation of this arrangement was omitted from the transcripts by mistake. Other officials, however, said the agreement stipulated that the American declaration would be made only when the accord is presented to the Senate for approval. No text of the one-sided addendum was provided with the treaty, the agreement and the special protocol that together constitute the arms-control package.

No one talked about it out loud here today, be-



Associated Press

**RELAXING IN TEHERAN:** Henry A. Kissinger, Presidential adviser, wearing glasses, admiring the art of Nadia Parsa, a belly dancer, early yesterday morning at a dinner party given for journalists and government officials

after the day's business ended. At left is Amir Abbas Hoveida, Iranian Premier, and to Mr. Kissinger's right is Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant State Secretary. Miss Parsa plopped in Mr. Kissinger's lap after cameras were barred.

cause it isn't really flattering to the Communist world, but President Nixon and his aides believe that Poland deserves some of the credit for the new Soviet interest in agreements and summitry.

This season of high-level negotiation really began, the

White House believes, in the wake of the Polish workers' uprisings in December, 1970. The violence, centered in the city of Gdansk and sparked by low wages and rising food prices, led to the change in leadership that made Mr. Gierek the party chief. In Moscow, the bloodshed, com-

ing so soon after the attempted liberalization in Czechoslovakia, was a vivid reminder of the political instability that can result from economic backwardness.

The White House traces a new Soviet flexibility to those events, speculating that they persuaded the Soviet

leaders to enlist the United States and West Germany in a new effort to ratify Communist rule and frontiers in Europe and to increase trade with the West to hasten economic development and distribution of consumer goods in the Soviet Union.