

SF Examiner

# N. Viet to Outlast US, Nixon Told

WASHINGTON — (UPI) — A secret study ordered by President Nixon the day after he took office said it would take up to 13 years to complete pacification of South Vietnam and that the Communists were capable of outlasting the Allies indefinitely.

The study was conducted by Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security affairs adviser, who compiled the results in a memo entitled "Responses to National Security Study Memorandum 1."

Excerpts of the document were published for the first time this week, but today Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) was blocked by Senate Republican Whip Robert P. Griffin of Michigan in an effort to insert it into the Congressional Record.

## 'Reckless Policy'

The Alaska Democrat told newsmen later that from a close study of the documents he concluded President Nixon "is pursuing a reckless, immoral policy which is doomed to failure."

Only four senators were present when Gravel, who read the Pentagon Papers last summer at a midnight hearing of an obscure subcommittee he heads, made his attempt.

Griffin quickly objected and said:

"I don't know what the documents involve, but I

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think it unfortunate that the senator from Alaska would take it upon himself to declassify government documents."

Griffin also said that if Gravel tried to read from his speech further, he would move to put the Senate into closed session.

"I feel that there is no information that would jeopardize the internal security of this country," Gravel told Griffin.

In his Senate speech and later at a news conference, Gravel read fragments of the memo that he said already had appeared in print.

"We are killing hundreds of thousands of people to save the face of one individual," Gravel said. By one individual, he made clear, he meant Nixon.

## State Dept. Reply

State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray III said Gravel's criticism of Nixon's renewed bombing of North Vietnam was neither fair nor accurate because the military situation in 1972 was substantially different than 1969, when the memo was prepared.

He said that by employing more conventional battle tactics, the North Vietnamese were now presenting "individual targets which were rarely available in earlier years."

## Vietnamization

And now the South Vietnamese army is now through Vietnamization, much better equipped and able to handle its defense.

At one point, Gravel accused Nixon of "malfeasance in office."

He said the Central Intelligence Agency told Nixon that three years of daily bombing had totally failed to achieve its objective.

"The major effects of the bombing of North Vietnam were extensive damage to the transport network, widespread economic disruption, greatly increased manpower requirements and the problems of maintaining the morale of the people in the face of personal hardships and deprivation," Gravel quoted the CIA.

## 'Able to Cope'

"Hanoi was able to cope effectively with each of these strains so that the air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam."

"Nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam's military defense capability or

Hanoi's determination to persist in the war."

In the document, Gravel said, the State Department concluded:

"There is little reason to believe new bombing will accomplish what previous bombings failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity and readiness to defy criticism and risk of escalation."

## 'Most Damaging'

Gravel said the memo represents "the most damaging information against Nixon since he's taken office."

Gravel said it showed Nixon was guilty of "malfeasance of office" and he charged that Griffin was "part of the plot with the White House" to keep information from the American people.

Parts of the Kissinger study were published this week by Newsweek magazine and columnist Jack Anderson, and the Washington Post published the memo in today's editions.

The documents show Nixon received "profoundly different" judgments from government agencies on the state of the Indochina War and the actions he should take.

## Conflicting Views

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the American military command in Vietnam, the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and the commander in chief of Pacific Forces tended to take a "hawkish" and optimistic view.

A more skeptical and pessimistic slant was taken by the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department.

Advisers differ sharply about the validity of the "domino" theory, the effectiveness of B52 strikes, the length of time it would take to "pacify" the Vietnamese countryside, and the prospects for shutting off military aid to North Vietnam from China and the Soviet Union.

The Kissinger memorandum said, however, there was "general agreement" that the South Vietnamese armed forces "alone cannot now, or in the foreseeable future, stand up to the current (1969) North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces."

## 'Outlast Allies'

It also said it was uncertain the South Vietnamese government and other non-Communist groups "will be able to survive a peaceful competition with the NLF (Viet Cong) for political power in South Vietnam."

Kissinger's memorandum said there also was a con-

sensus that "under current rules of engagement the enemy's manpower pool and infiltration capabilities can outlast allied attrition efforts indefinitely."

It said the Communists were still capable of launching major offensives despite their losses during Tet 1968.

The survey showed that optimists and pessimists differed about how long it would take to complete pacification in South Vietnam but that both concluded there would not be "anything close to complete success within several years."

#### Major Points

Other points made in the memorandum:

- There was general agreement in early 1969 that Hanoi was participating in the Paris talks for a variety of motives "but not primarily out of weakness."

- Military strategists generally accepted the "domino" theory that a Communist takeover in Vietnam would lead to further Communist inroads elsewhere in Asia. Civilian analysts, however, believed that while Laos and Cambodia would be endangered rather quickly, Vietnam's loss would "not necessarily un- hinge the rest of Asia."

- Military theorists believed that if all imports of military equipment by sea into North Vietnam were de-

nied and land routes through Laos and Cambodia effectively interdicted, the North Vietnamese could not obtain enough supplies to continue. In contrast, the CIA and Office of Defense concluded land routes from China alone could supply the North Vietnamese despite "unlimited bombing."

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated 41,000 enemy troops were killed in 1968 by B52 bombers. The office of the Secretary of Defense set the figure at "as few as 9000 . . ."

- No agency clearly forecast a "victory" over the Communists. The military stressed the need for continued U.S. support. The OSD and State Department said only a compromise settlement was possible. The CIA stated progress in South Vietnam "has been sufficiently slow and fragile that substantial U.S. disengagement in the next few years could jeopardize all recent gains."

- All agencies agreed that the South Vietnamese armed forces "could not either now or even when fully modernized handle both the VC and a sizable level of NVA (North Vietnamese Army) forces without U.S. combat support in the form of air, helicopters, artillery, logistics and some ground forces."