
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## A Distillation of Official Views On the Main Concerns of Critics

## NYTimes

By MAX FRANKEL APR 2.0 1972 Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 19-Of all the many questions raised here in recent days about the current United States role in the Vietnam war, perhaps a dozen best summarize the major concerns of members of Congress and other critics. Below are what appear to be the Government's composite replies,

Analysis from the general testimony of Sec-retary of State William P. Rogers and Secre-tary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and from the private comments of other top Administration officials.

**Q.** What is the jurisdiction for any continuing American involvement in the Indochina war?

To redeem an already costly American commitment to protect South Vietnam against military conquest; to protect the program of gradual Ameri-can withdrawal so that the Sai-gon Government can survive gon Government can survive under a political system of the South Vietnamese people's choosing; to force the return of American prisoners of war; through such a genrally "hon-orable" end of the involvement to demonstrate the fidelity of the United States' commitments other allies and dependent nations.

## Q. What is the purpose of intensified American bombing in North and South Vietnam?

A. To protect the remaining American troops in the war zone; to protect the program of troop withdrawals; to help the South Vietnamese resist a ma-jor frontal attack; to render on slaughts in the months to come more difficult or even im-pacible; to retain for viola possible; to retaliate for viola-tion of a 1968 "misunderstand-ing" forbidding troops to cross the demilitarized zone along the demilitarized zone along the border between North and South Vietnam; to demonstrate the continuing American power that can be applied in the war; to neutralize some of the ad-vanced equipment supplied to Hanoi by Moscow.

Q. Why bomb Hanoi and Haiphong at this time, and why will the bombing of North Vietnam be more effective now than it was be-tween 1965 and 1968?

A. Because the current high-

lv mechanized North Vietly mechanized North Viet-namese attack differs from past enemy offensives; because the tanks, personnel carriers, mo-bile missiles and other weapons bile missiles and other weapons and vehicles are more depend-ent on fuel and replacements that could be moved quite quickly to the front; because raids against the main supply depots in the major cities in-flict the greatest damage on those essential items.

Q. Why was Congress not consulted on the escalation?

A. Because the President alone determines tactics, and he needs surprise when he strikes.

Q. Why not protect American troops by with-drawing them immediately?

A. Because air support and other logistic and advisory services are still needed by the South Vietnamese; because some combat troops are still needed to protect the American bases; because the presence of some troops will be used to negotiate the release of American prisoners of war.

Q. If Vietnamization is working why do the South Vietnamese need South Vietnamese neeu such extensive American

such extensive American air power while the North Vietnamese fight without anything comparable? A. The first objective of Vietnamization was to relieve Americans of the high casual-ties resulting from ground combat operations. Now the South Vietnamese are begin-ning to assume logistic and tactical air power, but this gives them capacity to fight only in their part of Vietnam and not reach up to the supply routes and centers in the North. On the other hand, the Russians have equipped the North Vietnamese for offensive operations far from home base. Q. Does Vietnamization fight

Q. Does Vietnamization provide for the end of American strategic and tactical air strikes?

A. The Saigon Government is to assume tactical air re-sponsibilities on an undisclosed schedule, but American strikes against enemy troop concentra-tions and supplies will be con-ducted whenever Saigon's ducted whenever Saigon's forces appear to need help. For the time being nothing is ruled out except the increase in American troop strength and the use of nuclear weapons.

Q. What would happen if the United States stood aside and let North and South Vietnam fight it out?

South Vietnam fight it out? A. Current estimates are that the South Vienamese forces would suffer serious reverses, perhaps even a rout, particu-larly in the region around Sai-gon and in he Central High-lands. American air power has been less directly necessary— or useful—in defending the northern sectors of South Viet-nam.

Q. Do the diminished number of American troops really need protection?

A. It is thought that major North Vietnamese break-throughs would cause American bases to be overrun, but in can pases to be overrun, but in any case the protection of American troops is the only constitutional authority avail-able to the President for the military operations he is con-ducting

Q. Why is the Adminis-tration taxing the Soviet Union with responsibility for Hanoi's offensive?

for Hanoi's offensive? A. Because Moscow should bear some responsibility for of-fensives made possible by its arms even if it does not plan them; because a policy and counsel of Soviet restraint may still be necessary to diminish the fighting and negotiate the end of the war; because the United States and the Soviet-Union cannot expect to profit from détente and agreements from détente and agreements in some areas while they in-duce military challenge to each other and their allies elsewhere.

Q. Is not American help to South Vietnam vastly greater than Soviet help to North Vietnam?

A. Yes, but the American, help is for the purpose of de-fending South Vietnam while Soviet help is for the purpose of invasion and conquest.

Q. How serious are the American threats of min-ing the Haiphong harbor or otherwise blockading North Vietnam against So-viet and other foreign sup-ply ships?

A. Those measures are recog-nized as extreme steps that would have only long-range ef-fect on the battle in South Vietnam while immediately con-fronting the Russians and other Naval suppliers with a direct, American challenge. But they, have not been ruled out and will not be ruled out until there is evidence of greater straint" in Hanoi. "re-