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# Experts fear Peking has a coup while Nixon has a great risk

WASHINGTON — The possibility of a Peking filing America's 1972 election screens is now also being discussed by experts here with alarm that China's Communist government has executed a momentous political coup, at the cost to itself but great risk to Richard M. Nixon.

That alarm, though by no means universal, is not restricted to official policy-makers. It rests on an assumption that the sympathetic portrayal of Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, as viewed by the American public in their living rooms, leads to overblown expectations that could dangerously limit Mr. Nixon's freedom of action in the Far East.

For example, some fear no less an expert than Prof. John K. Fairbank of Harvard, who allowed himself this heated assessment of Mao's "Mao: The Great Leader" last Sunday: "Mr. Nixon has been taken in by the Cold War, the great achievement, by this means of going to Peking."

It is already such widespread doubts that have surrounded Far Eastern affairs since the Nixon team's announcement last Monday that they had returned for a personal power with Peking by ending the longstanding personal enmities between the two nations.

To those who regard the Nixon administration as a break from the long, cautious foreign policy of the Eisenhower and Kennedy eras, the instructions to regularize relations with China, announced last week, are seen to point up the possibility of a change in American behavior to Peking, and the five reply articles in the early spring of 1970, Peking wanted to receive a high level mission.

Both the State Department and the White House had tentatively agreed that the mission should be headed by Marshall Green, assistant secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs, or possibly a lower-rank official.

But tentative Chinese agreement blew up when Mr. Nixon ordered the Cambodian invasion in May 1970. All contacts in Warsaw temporarily ceased. Then, a full year after the Cambodian incursions,

Mr. Nixon's administration had a change of heart. The President's personal mission to Peking, announced last week, was seen as a bold move, a personal risk, a move that could be seen as Nixon's own.

No one who is close to the President knows the exact nature of the tactical elevation of the presidential mission, even after Mr. Nixon's foreign policy advisers, who are his advisers, strongly urged that the mission be kept "quiet" and that it be done or no television.

The political advisers, however, saw their potential in the move, and were watching every move of the President's partner in the move. They argued that the move could be a disaster, however, if the President himself became involved to get their message, or if the move was controlled or supervised by the "hawks" in the administration.

Moreover, the move could be seen as a break from the long, cautious foreign policy of the Eisenhower and Kennedy eras, and as a move that could be seen as a personal risk, a move that could be seen as Nixon's own.

The reaction here was a mixture of surprise and concern. The move was seen as a bold move, a personal risk, a move that could be seen as Nixon's own.

All this could have been avoided if the President had kept to his original plan for a more modest emissary in this first essential step toward detente with Peking. But now, having invested so much, Nixon may soon find that he has dangerously mortgaged his future action.