

Excerpts From State of World Message

By United Press International

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9—Following are excerpts from "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace," President Nixon's third annual message to Congress on foreign affairs:

The Watershed Year

Taken together, the initiatives of 1971 constitute a profound change in America's world role.

The heart of our new conception of that role is a more balanced alliance with our friends—and a more creative connection with our adversaries.

Toward our two principal adversaries, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, we faced dissimilar problems. With China, the task was to establish a civilized discourse on how to replace estrangement with a dialogue serving to benefit both countries. With the Soviet Union, we already had the discourse. We had examined at great length the general principles upon which the policies of both countries must be based, if we were to move from the mere assertion to the harmonization of conflicting national interests. The task was to make this discourse fruitful by moving to the achievement of concrete arrangements of benefit both to the Soviet Union and ourselves.

Areas of Major Change

THE SOVIET UNION

We hope that what has been accomplished will prove to be the beginning of a transformation of the relationship between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

The first requirement for such a transformation is that we understand clearly the sources of our differences. They are profound and they do not spring from transitory causes, or from personalities or from some historical accident. Rather, they are rooted in the different ways our two countries have developed. They are exacerbated by tendencies which spring from our national personalities and our differing approaches to the conduct of international affairs:

¶Americans consider tensions in international relations abnormal and yearn to see them resolved as quickly as possible. We tend to believe that goodwill is a principal ingredient for their resolution and that our own goodwill is beyond question. We assume that if tensions persist, it is proof that our adversary is implacably hostile to us. The application of these attitudes to relations with the Soviet Union has led us to excessive and unjustified optimism during periods of détente and to uncritical acceptance of inevitable and unbounded hostility during periods of tension.

¶The U.S.S.R. tends to view external tensions as the inevitable corollary of conflicting social systems. Soviet diplomacy therefore is prepared to accept international tension as normal and, too often, to view negotiations with the United States as a form of harsh competition from which only one side can possibly gain advantage. In the past this attitude has often tempted the Soviets to treat the occasional improvement in our relations as a transitory opportunity to achieve narrow tactical advantages. It has led the Soviets to consider the intervening periods of hostility as inevitable, and the causes of that hostility as beyond resolution.

Both these attitudes reflect the national experiences of the United States and the Soviet Union and have worked for two decades to frustrate a better relationship between our two countries. They cause periods of détente to founder, and they protract and intensify the periods of hostility.

In Moscow we will have three central objectives. We want to complete work on those issues which have been carried to the point of final decision. We want to establish a political framework for dealing with the issues still in dispute. And we want to examine with the Soviet leaders the further development of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the years ahead.

The tasks ahead arise logically from the present state of relations:

¶An accord on an initial strategic arms limitation agreement or on the issues to be addressed in the second stage of the SALT negotiations.

¶A discussion of the problem of the Middle East and the reasons for the failure to reach a peaceful settlement there.

¶A discussion of the problem of European security in all its aspects and the identification of mutually shared objectives which will provide a basis for further normalization of intercourse between Eastern and Western Europe. No agreements in this area, however, will be made without our allies.

¶An exploration of our policies in other areas of the world and the extent to which we share an interest in stability.

¶An examination of the possibility of additional bilateral cooperation. The steps taken so far have been significant but are meager, indeed, in terms of the potential. There are a variety of fields in which U.S.-Soviet cooperation would benefit both. Our economic relations are perhaps the most obvious example. Bilateral cooperation will be facilitated if we can continue to make progress on the major international issues.

We do not, of course, expect the Soviet Union to give up its pursuit of its own interests. We do not expect to give up pursuing our own. We do expect, and are prepared ourselves to demonstrate, self-restraint in the pursuit of those interests. We do expect a recognition of the fact that the general improvement in our relationship transcends in importance the kind of narrow advantages which can be sought only by imperiling the cooperation between our two countries.

One series of conversations in Moscow cannot be expected to end two decades' accumulation of problems. For a long period of time, competition is likely to be the hallmark of our relationship with the Soviet Union. We will be confronted by ambiguous and contradictory trends in Soviet policy. The continuing build-up of Soviet military power is one obvious source of deep concern. Soviet attitudes during the

crisis in South Asia have dangerous implications for other regional conflicts, even though in the end the U.S.S.R. played a restraining role. Similarly, the U.S.S.R.'s position in the Middle East reflects a mixture of Soviet interest in expansionist policies and Soviet recognition of the dangers of confrontation.

In the past year, however, we have also had evidence that there can be mutual accommodation of conflicting interests, and that competition need not be translated into hostility or crisis. We have evidence that on both sides there is an increasing willingness to break with the traditional patterns of Soviet-American relations. A readiness to capitalize on this momentum is the real test of the summit.

CHINA

The following considerations shaped this Administration's approach to the People's Republic of China.

¶Peace in Asia and peace in the world require that we exchange views, not so much despite our differences as because of them. A clearer grasp of each other's purposes is essential in an age of turmoil and nuclear weapons.

¶It is in America's interest, and the world's interest, that the People's Republic of China play its appropriate role in shaping international arrangements that affect its concerns. Only then will that great nation have a stake in such arrangements; only then will they endure.

¶No one nation should be the sole voice for a bloc of states. We will deal with all countries on the basis of specific issues and external behavior, not abstract theory.

¶Both Chinese and American policies could be much less rigid if we had no need to consider each other permanent enemies. Over the longer term there need be no clashes between our fundamental national concerns.

¶China and the United States share many parallel interests and can do much together to enrich the lives of our peoples. It is no accident that the Chinese and American peoples have such a long history of friendship.

On this basis we decided that a careful search for a new relationship should be undertaken. We believed that the Chinese could be engaged in such an effort.

Both political and technical problems lay in the way of such a search. When this Administration assumed responsibility, there had been virtually no contact between mainland China and the American people for two decades. This was true for our Governments as well, although sterile talks in Geneva and Warsaw had dragged on intermittently since 1955. A deep gulf of mistrust and noncommunication separated us.

We faced two major questions. First, how to convey our views privately to the authorities in Peking. Second, what public steps would demonstrate our willingness to set a new direction in our relations.

Within two weeks of my inauguration we moved on both of these fronts. I ordered that efforts be undertaken to communicate our new attitude through private channels and to seek contact with the People's Republic of China.

This process turned out to be delicate and complex. It is extremely difficult to establish even rudimentary communications between two Governments which have been completely isolated from one another for 20 years. Neither technical nor diplomatic means of direct contact existed. It was necessary to find an intermediary country which had the full trust of both nations and could be relied upon to promote the dialogue with discretion, restraint and diplomatic skill.

The two sides began clarifying their general intentions through mutually friendly countries. After a period of cautious exploration and gathering confidence, we settled upon a reliable means of communication between Washington and Peking.

In February, 1969, I also directed that a comprehensive National Security Council study be made of our policy toward China, setting in motion a policy review process which has continued throughout these past three years. We addressed both the broader ramifications of a new approach and the specific steps to carry it out.

Drawing on this analysis, we began to implement a phased sequence of unilateral measures to indicate the direction in which this Administration was prepared to move. We believed that these practical steps, progressively relaxing trade and travel restrictions, would make clear to the Chinese leaders over time that we were prepared for a serious dialogue. We had no illusion that we could bargain for Chinese goodwill. Because of the difficulties in communication we deliberately chose initiatives that could be ignored or quietly accepted; since they required no Chinese actions, they were difficult to reject. We purposely avoided dramatic moves which could invoke dramatic rebukes and set back the whole carefully nurtured process.

We shall continue this process of consultation as we move forward in our relationship with the People's Republic of China. Our talks with our friends have focused on the longer term implications for U.S. policy. Questions have been raised which we have been careful to address publicly as well as privately.

How should our Asia friends interpret this initiative in terms of our commitments and their direct interests? There are, first of all, some general principles which apply to our relations with all concerned countries. Neither we nor the People's Republic asked, or would have accepted, any conditions for the opening of our dialogue. Neither country expects the other to barter away its principles or abandon its friends. Indeed, we have moved jointly in the conviction that more normal relations between us will serve the interests of all countries and reduce tensions in the Far East.

My conversations with the Chinese leaders will focus primarily on bilateral questions. Either side is free to raise any subject it wishes, and, of course, issues affecting the general peace are of bilateral concern. But we have made it clear to our Asian friends that we will maintain our commitments and that we will not negotiate on behalf of third parties. We cannot set out to

build an honorable relationship of mutual respect with the P.R.C. unless we also respect the interests of our long term friends.

Should our moves be read as shifting our priorities from Tokyo to Peking? They should not. With the Chinese we are at the beginning of a long process. With the Japanese we have enjoyed over two decades of the closest political and economic cooperation. It would be shortsighted indeed to exchange strong ties with a crucial ally for some mitigation of the hostility of a dedicated opponent. But it would be equally shortsighted not to seek communication and better understanding with a quarter of the world's people. We see no conflict in these two aims.

The preservation of our close relationship with Japan during this effort to broaden communications with China will call for wisdom and restraint on all sides. Each of us will have to avoid temptations to exacerbate relations between the other two. Despite the uneasy legacies of history, there can be more room for progress through cooperative interchange than through destructive rivalry.

What are the implications for our long-standing ties to the Republic of China? In my address announcing my trip to Peking, and since then, I have emphasized that our new dialogue with the P.R.C. would not be at the expense of friends. Nevertheless, we recognize that this process cannot help but be painful for our old friend on Taiwan, the Republic of China. Our position is clear. We exerted the maximum diplomatic efforts to retain its seat in the United Nations. We regret the decision of the General Assembly to deprive the Republic of China of its representation although we welcomed the admission of the People's Republic of China. With the Republic of China, we shall maintain our friendship, our diplomatic ties and our defense commitment. The ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the mainland is not a matter for the United States to decide. A peaceful resolution of this problem by the parties would do much to reduce tension in the Far East. We are not, however, urging either party to follow any particular course.

What does our China initiative mean for our relations with the Soviet Union? Our policy is not aimed against Moscow. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have issues of paramount importance to resolve; it would be costly indeed to impair progress on these through new antagonisms. Nevertheless, some observers have warned that progress toward normalization of relations with Peking would inevitably jeopardize our relations with its Communist rival. There is no reason for this to be the case. Our various negotiations with the Soviet Union, for example on Berlin and SALT, made major progress subsequent to the July 15 announcement; and the agreement to meet with the Soviet leadership in May, 1972, was announced on Oct. 12, 1971.

The Imperative of Security

The exact scope of the agreements derived from the commitment of May 20 [between the United States and the Soviet Union on limitations on strategic arms] is still under negotiation and I am obliged to protect the confidentiality of these talks. I can report that a consensus is developing on certain essential elements which provide a basis for further movement toward an agreement that accommodates concerns expressed by each side:

¶Comprehensive limitations should be placed on ABM systems. Deployments should neither provide a defense of the entire national territory nor threaten the over-all strategic balance. However, reaching agreement has been complicated because the existing Soviet system is designed to protect Moscow, in contrast with our initial ABM deployments which defend ICBM's located in less populous areas.

¶Since an ABM agreement will cover all aspects of limitations on ABM defensive systems, it should be a long-term commitment formalized in a treaty.

¶There should be an interim solution to the question of offensive controls. Certain offensive weapons should be frozen to prevent widening of numerical differentials to a point which would necessitate additional American countermeasures. An interim agreement would not be as comprehensive as the ABM treaty and further offensive limitations would be considered in a second phase of negotiations. Because it is only an interim measure, it is more appropriately concluded in a formal agreement of a different type.

¶An essential linkage between the substance and duration of the documents dealing with offensive and defensive aspects must be preserved.

The extent of the interim offensive agreement is still under intensive negotiation, reflecting the greater complexity of questions related to offensive systems. We must weigh the advantages of prolonging the current stage of negotiations in order to reach agreements on every offensive system against the consequences of allowing the current Soviet build-up to continue, perhaps for a considerable period. Considering the over-all balance of offensive systems, including our program of multiple warhead deployment, there will be no disadvantage for the U.S. in an interim freeze of certain systems. Moreover, Soviet willingness to limit the size of its offensive forces would reflect a desire for longer term solutions rather than unilateral efforts to achieve marginal advantages.

Achieving initial agreements to limit both offensive and defensive strategic programs will be a major step in constraining the strategic arms race without compromising the security of either side. On the other hand, if negotiations are protracted while the Soviets continue offensive missile deployments and development of new systems, the U.S. has no choice but to proceed with major new strategic programs. This is a reality of our competitive relationship. The SALT negotiations offer a constructive alternative to unlimited competition. I am confident that agreements limiting strategic arms are feasible and in the interests of both nations. Equitable agreements can only enhance mutual security.