

Text of Hanoi Communiqué

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Jan. 31—Following, as issued in English today by the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris talks, is the text of a communiqué in response to President Nixon's disclosure of the private peace negotiations. Included with it by Hanoi are the texts of the nine-point North Vietnamese peace plan presented at the private sessions on July 26 and of the version of the eight-point United States plan that Hanoi says it received at those sessions. On the American text the North Vietnamese have indicated [with asterisks and a footnote] discrepancies from the version made public by the United States last Tuesday. Also included with the communiqué are the texts of an exchange of messages on a private meeting set for Nov. 20 but canceled by the United States.

The text of the United States plan made public by the White House, which was included with the communiqué, appeared in *The New York Times* last Wednesday. Also included was the text of the seven-point plan of the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, or Vietcong, made public July 1 and published in *The Times* the next day.

Hanoi Communiqué

In the peace negotiation on the Vietnam problem, the government of the DRVN [Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam], with its constant goodwill, has always held that it was important to reach a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem on the basis of the guarantee for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and that the form of negotiation, public sessions or private meetings, was not important. Starting from that point of view, the Government of the DRVN, with the full agreement of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, has accepted to hold private meetings on the request of the U.S. Party in order to peacefully settle the Vietnam problem.

The Government of the DRVN is of the view that the substance of the negotiations between the two parties should be made known to the public. However, as wished by the U.S. party, the Government of the DRVN agreed to the decision that the parties would refrain from publicizing the substance of the private meetings, yet President Nixon, in his Jan. 25, 1972, statement, and Mr. H. Kissinger at his Jan. 26 press conference, unilaterally divulged the substance of the private meetings between the U.S. and the DRVN; they even distorted the fact.

In so doing the Nixon Administration wants to make believe that it has goodwill and to shift onto the DRVN party the responsibility for the deadlock of the negotiations. The fact is just the contrary. The U.S. Government has broken its engagements and created serious obstacles to the negotiations. For its part, the DRVN party has always shown goodwill, which has been evidenced at the private meetings as well as at public sessions. However, the Nixon Administration has so far not answered to the two fundamental points mentioned in the proposals of the DRVN and the P.R.G. of the RSVN.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1972

Disclosing Peace Plans

Offered at Private Sessions

The just position of the DRVN is perfectly illustrated by the nine-point proposal presented to the U.S. party at the June 26, 1971, private meeting. This proposal is fully conforming to the July 1, 1971, seven-point position of the P.R.G. of the RSVN on the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem.

With regard to the problem of Laos and Cambodia, the Government of DRVN has already made known its invariable position. i.e.: The U.S. must respect the Geneva agreements of 1954 on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos, end its aggression and intervention in the Indochinese countries, and let the Indochinese peoples settle themselves their own affairs; the problems existing among the Indochinese countries will be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. This position is conforming to the spirit of the joint declaration of the Indochinese peoples' summit conference held in April, 1970.

With regard to the cancellation of the private meeting on Nov. 20, 1971 between the DRVN and the U.S.:

At some of the private meetings held until now, Mr. Le Duc Tho and Mr. Xuan Thuy met with Mr. H. Kis-

singer at others, only Mr. Xuan Thuy conferred with Mr. Kissinger. On Oct. 11, 1971, Mr. H. Kissinger proposed a meeting to be held on Nov. 20, 1971, which was accepted by the U.S. party. On Nov. 17, 1971, the DRVN party informed the U.S. party that Mr. Le Duc Tho was taken ill and could not go to Paris, but Minister Xuan Thuy was prepared to meet with Mr. Kissinger on Nov. 20, 1971, as agreed upon. Yet, on Nov. 19, 1971, the U.S. party cancelled this meeting. Thus, it was the U.S. party that cancelled the Nov. 20, 1971, meeting, but it is now trying to distort the fact.

Of late world public opinion has condemned the U.S. Paris conference on Vietnam and its repeated escalations of the air war against the DRVN.

In deciding now to unilaterally making public the substance of the private meetings between the DRVN and the U.S., the Nixon Administration has further laid bare its fallacy. This way of doing is aimed at deceiving public opinion in the U.S. and in the world, at serving Mr. Nixon's political objectives in this election year and at allowing him to pursue the "Vietnamization" of the war, and not "to serve in the best way the cause of peace," as he claims.

In the face of this situation, the Government of the DRVN is determined not to permit the U.S. party to mislead public opinion. In consequence, the delegation of the DRVN to the Paris conference deems it necessary to make public the following documents:

1. The full text of the nine points presented by the DRVN at the June 26, 1971, private meeting; the full text of the July 1, 1971, seven points of the P.R.G. of the RSVN.

2. The full text of the eight points handed by the U.S. to the DRVN on Oct. 11, 1971; the full text of the eight published by the White House on Jan. 25, 1972 and presented at the Paris conference on Vietnam on Jan. 27, 1972.

3. The three messages of the U.S. party and the two messages of the DRVN party related to the cancellation of the private meeting scheduled for Nov. 20, 1971. Paris, Jan. 31, 1972.

9-Point Hanoi Plan

[1]

The withdrawal of the totality of U.S. forces and those of foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam and other Indochinese countries should be completed within 1971.

[2]

The release of all military men and civilians captured in the war should be carried out parallel and completed at the same time with the troop withdrawal mentioned in Point 1.

[3]

In South Vietnam, the United States should stop supporting Thieu-Ky-Khiem so that there may be set up in Saigon a new administration standing for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam will enter into talks with that administration to settle the internal affairs of South Vietnam and to achieve national concord.

[4]

The U.S. Government must bear full responsibility for the damages caused by the United States to the people

of the whole Vietnam. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam demand from the U.S. Government reparations for the damages caused by the United States in the two zones of Vietnam.

[5]

The United States should respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. It should stop its aggression and intervention in the Indochinese countries and let their peoples settle by themselves their own affairs.

[6]

The problems existing among the Indochinese countries should be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. As far as it is concerned, the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam is prepared to join in resolving such problems.

[7]

All the parties should achieve a cease-fire after the signing of the agreements on the above-mentioned problems.

[8]

There should be an international supervision.

[9]

There should be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese peoples, the neutrality of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and lasting peace in this region.

The above points from an integrated whole.

8-Point U.S. Plan

The United States agrees to the total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces and other foreign forces allied with the Government of South Vietnam. This withdrawal will be carried out in the following manner:

¶All American and allied forces, except for a small number of personnel needed for technical advice, logistics and observance of the cease-fire mentioned in Point 6, will be withdrawn by July 1, 1972, provided that this statement of principles is signed by Dec. 1, 1971. The terminal date for these withdrawals will in no event be later than seven months after this statement of principles is signed.*

¶The remaining personnel, in turn, will be progressively withdrawn beginning one month before the presidential election mentioned in Point 3 and simultaneously with the resignations of the incumbent President and Vice President of South Vietnam also provided for in Point 3. These withdrawals will be completed by the date of the presidential election.*

[2]

The release of all military men and innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina will be carried out in parallel with the troop withdrawals mentioned in Point 1. Both sides will present a complete list of military men and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day this statement of principles is signed. The release will begin on the same day as the troop withdrawals and will be completed by July 1, 1972, provided this statement is signed by Dec. 1, 1971. The completion of this release will in no event be later than seven months after this statement is signed.*

[3]

The following principles will govern the political future of South Vietnam:

The political future of South Vietnam will be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

There will be a free and democratic presidential election in South Vietnam within six months of the signature of the final agreement based on the principles in this statement.* This election will be organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam, which will assume its responsibilities on the date of the final agreement. This body will, among other responsibilities, determine the qualification of candidates. All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates. There will be international supervision of this election.

One month before the presidential election takes place, the incumbent President and Vice President of South Vietnam will resign. A caretaker administration, headed by the chairman of the Senate, will assume administrative responsibilities except for those pertaining to the election, which will remain with the independent election body.

The United States, for its part, declares that it:

¶Will support no candidate

*Paragraphs having a content different from that of the eight points made public by the White House on Jan. 25, 1972, and advanced at the Paris conference on Vietnam on Jan. 27, 1972.



United Press International

Nguyen Than Le, North Vietnamese spokesman, at news session in Paris.

and will remain completely neutral in the election.

¶Will abide by the outcome of this election and any other political processes shaped by the South Vietnamese people themselves.

¶Is prepared to define its military and economic assistance relationship with any government that exists in South Vietnam.

Both sides agree that:

¶South Vietnam, together with the other countries of Indochina, should adopt a foreign policy of neutrality.*

¶Reunification of Vietnam should be decided on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam without constraint and annexation from either party, and without foreign interference.

[4]

Both sides will respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. There will be no foreign intervention in the Indochinese countries and the Indochinese peoples will be left to settle by themselves their own affairs.

[5]

The problems existing among the Indochinese countries will be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's affairs. Among the problems that will be settled is the implementation of the principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers.

[6]

There will be a general cease-fire throughout Indochina, to begin when the final agreement is signed.* As part of the cease-fire, there will be no further inflow of outside forces into any of the countries of Indochina.

[7]

There will be international supervision of the military aspects of this agreement, including the cease-fire and its provisions; the release of prisoners of war and innocent civilians, and the withdrawal of outside forces from Indochina.*

[8]

There will be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese peoples, the neutrality of all the countries in Indochina* and lasting peace in this region.

Both sides express their willingness to participate in an international conference for this and other appropriate purposes.

Exchange of Messages

U.S., OCT. 11, 1971

At the Sept. 13 meeting, Minister Xuan Thuy stated that the U. S. side should review the various suggestions made by the North Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese side has also said that it would be forthcoming if a generous proposal is made by the U. S. side. The U. S. believes that this new proposal goes to the limits of possible generosity and fully takes into account North Vietnamese propositions. The United States hopes that the North Vietnamese response will reflect the same attitude. Dr. Kissinger is pre-

pared to meet on Nov. 1 with Mr. Le Duc Tho or some other appropriate official from Hanoi together with Minister Xuan Thuy. He will be prepared at that meeting also to take into account other points that have been discussed in previous meetings in this channel.

In the interim, is expected that both sides will refrain from bringing pressure from public statements which can only serve to complicate the situation.

The U. S. side is putting forth these proposals as one last attempt to negotiate a just settlement before the end of 1971.

HANOI, OCT. 25, 1971

The DRVN party wishes to answer the U. S. Government's Oct. 11, 1971, proposal of a private meeting to be held on Nov. 1, 1971, between special adviser H. A. Le Duc Tho and Minister Kissinger and special adviser Xuan Thuy.

Special adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy are prepared to meet with special adviser H. A. Kissinger at the place of the previous meeting, 10:00 hours A.M., Nov. 20, 1971. We propose the above date and time because special adviser Le Duc Tho is being busy with some work in Hanoi. Moreover, Minister Xuan Thuy is under medical treatment for health reason.

U.S., NOV. 3, 1971

Dr. Kissinger agrees to private meeting with special adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy to be held on Nov. 20, 1971, at 11:30 hours A.M. at the usual place.

The U. S. side expects that the other side will make no public proposal for negotiation before the meeting takes place. For its part, the U. S. side will refrain from making any proposal of this kind.

HANOI, NOV. 17, 1971

The other day the D.R.V.N. party informed you that Minister Xuan Thuy and special adviser Le Duc Tho were prepared to meet with special adviser Henry Kissinger privately on Nov. 20, 1971.

Today I inform you that, to our regret, special adviser Le Duc Tho is suddenly taken ill and cannot attend the proposed meeting. Minister Xuan Thuy is, however, ready to hold a private meeting with special adviser H. Kissinger on Nov. 20, 1971, at 11:30 hours, as agreed upon.

U.S., NOV. 19, 1971

On Oct. 11, 1971, the U. S. side made a comprehensive proposal designed to bring a rapid end to the war on a basis just for all parties. The United States proposal took fully into account the propositions of the North Vietnamese side, including all the concerns raised at the last private meeting on Sept. 13, 1971.

The United States side further indicated that it would be prepared to take account of other points that had been discussed in previous meetings in this channel. The U. S. proposed a meeting on Nov. 1, 1971, between Dr. Kissinger and special adviser Le Duc Tho or some other appropriate official from Hanoi, together with Minister Xuan Thuy.

The North Vietnamese, in an Oct. 25, 1971, message, said that special adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy agreed to meet Dr. Kissinger on Nov. 20, 1971. The U. S. accepted this date.

On Nov. 17, 1971, the North Vietnamese side informed the U. S. side that special adviser Le Duc Tho was now ill and unable to attend the Nov. 20 meeting. The U. S. side regrets his illness. Under these circumstances, no point would be served by a meeting.

The U. S. side stands ready to meet with special adviser Le Duc Tho or any other representative of the North Vietnamese political leadership, together with Minister Xuan Thuy, in order to bring a rapid end to the war on a basis just to all parties. It will wait to hear recommendations from the North Vietnamese side as to a suitable date.