

PACKARD OPPOSED KISSINGER IN INDIA

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Ex-Defense Aide Questioned Steps to Help Pakistan, Anderson's Data Show NYTimes

By BERNARD GWERZMAN
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WASHINGTON, Jan. 14—The Deputy Secretary of Defense, David R. Packard, disagreed with Henry A. Kissinger's efforts during the height of the Indian-Pakistani war to aid the Pakistani cause, instead of remaining neutral, according to a newly published account of a secret White House strategy session.

The minutes of the meeting, held on Dec. 8, were released by the syndicated columnist

Text of memorandum from
Security Council, Page 6.

Jack Anderson today. They also showed that Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, was more skeptical than Mr. Kissinger of intelligence reports that India planned to carry the war to West Pakistan after the fighting in East Pakistan ended.

Mr. Anderson, who earlier made public the minutes of White House meetings held on Dec. 3, 4 and 6, has said that he received the documents from an unidentified informant along with "scores" of other classified papers. The minutes are classified "Secret Sensitive."

Mr. Anderson has printed excerpts from these documents in his daily column over the last month and supplied to newspapers the full minutes of the strategy sessions, as well as a cablegram critical of the Administration from Kenneth B. Keating, the United States Ambassador to India.

The New York Times, as well

quoted on Page 6, Column 7

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as other papers, had printed excerpts from the Dec. 8 session culled from Mr. Anderson's columns. Mr. Anderson made the full text available today, he said, because several newspapers had asked for it.

The record of the Dec. 8 meeting, held five days after the Indian-Pakistani war erupted into all-out fighting in East Pakistan, underscored Mr. Kissinger's deep concern that India would try to crush West Pakistan forces and seize territory in Pakistani-held parts of Kashmir, known to the Pakistanis as Azad (Free) Kashmir.

Mr. Kissinger, President Nixon's Special Assistant for National Security, often emphasized he was acting for Mr. Nixon. He sought to impress the other key officials with his view that the Indian-Pakistani war was of global significance and should not be regarded simply as a local conflict.

India Is Criticized

The minutes said that Mr. Kissinger, criticizing India, "stated that what we may be witnessing is a situation where in a country equipped and supported by the Soviets may be turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a vassal."

"We must consider what other countries may be thinking of our action," he was quoted as having said.

"We must consider what would be the impact of the current situation in the larger complex of world affairs," he was reported to have said at another point.

Group Discusses Crises

The White House meeting was one of several sessions of the top-level group, known as the Washington Special Action Group, or WSAG, called together to discuss grave world situations. It had met on the Pakistan problem from time to time since March 25, when West Pakistani forces began using force to crush the autonomy movement in East Pakistan. India supported the Bengali nationalists and eventually defeated the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan. The East Pakistan secessionists proclaimed the independent nation of Bangladesh. It has been recognized as a sovereign country by India, Bhutan and several Communist countries.

At the time of the Dec. 8 meeting of the Special Action Group the United States was considering various steps that could be taken to prevent the total disintegration of Pakistan.

It was a foregone conclusion to the Administration that East Pakistan would soon be overrun.

Opposition by Packard

Mr. Kissinger, aware of Pakistan's need for weapons, expressed unhappiness that because of an arms embargo the United States was unable to aid Pakistan, or even to arrange for other countries, such as Jordan, to send American equipment there.

A question before the group was whether to arrange for Jordan to send Pakistan some American F-104 jet fighter planes. Mr. Packard told Mr. Kissinger that "we could not authorize the Jordanians to do anything the United States Government could not do."

Mr. Kissinger was then quoted as having said that "if we had not cut the sale of arms to Pakistan, the current problem would not exist," and Mr. Packard agreed.

Perhaps the United States "never really analyzed what the real danger was when we were turning off the arms to Pakistan," Mr. Kissinger was reported to have said.

Several of the advisers pres-

ent argued against the value of sending the F-104's to Pakistan, but Mr. Kissinger said that King Hussein of Jordan should be kept in "a holding pattern" and his desire to aid Pakistan "not be turned off."

Mr. Packard, according to the record, "stated that the overriding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or doing nothing."

"If you don't win, don't get involved," he said. "If we were to attempt something it would have to with a certainty that it would affect the outcome."

Warning by Packard

"Let's not get in if we know we are going to lose," Mr. Packard was quoted as having said. "Find some way to stay out."

Three days later, on Dec. 11, Mr. Packard announced his resignation as Deputy Secretary of Defense, effective on Dec. 13. He cited "personal reasons," largely financial. There has been no indication that his long-planned resignation was connected with his views on the India-Pakistani war.

A major point of contention throughout and after the war was the White House's view that India's plans went beyond "liberating" East Pakistan and included a total victory over West Pakistan.

The Nixon Administration, after the war, asserted through its officials that the United States had unquestioned information that such were India's objectives, and that India was deterred as the result of American pressure on the Soviet Union, which used its influence on India.

Today the columnist Joseph Alsop, who has supported the Nixon Administration's policies during the crisis, asserted that the United States had "conclusive proof," obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency, that India had intended to crush the Pakistani army and dismember Pakistan. No Administration official has yet made public the source of this proof. The Indian Government has consistently denied ever planning to do more than liberate East Pakistan.

Nixon Expected Expansion

President Nixon, in an interview in the Jan. 3 issue of Time magazine, said that the Russians "deserve credit for restraint after East Pakistan went down, to get the cease-fire; that stopped what would inevitably have been the conquest of West Pakistan as well."

Asked to document this evidence, he said:

"I would not like to contend that the Indians had a deliberate plan to do that. But once these passions of war and success in war are set loose, they tend to run their course. It is my conviction, based on our intelligence reports as to the forces that were working in the Indian Government, that they would have gone on to reduce once and for all the danger that they had consistently seen in Pakistan."

Kashmir Seen as Issue

At the Dec. 8 meeting, Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, was quoted as having said that "Mrs. Gandhi has indicated that before heeding a U.N. call for a cease-fire, she intends to straighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir." He is said to have added:

"It is reported that prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities."

Mr. Kissinger was quoted as having suggested that "the key issue if the Indians turn on West Pakistan is Azad Kashmir."