

U.S. ENVOY IN INDIA DISPUTED POLICIES BACKING PAKISTAN

Keating Said Explanation of
Nixon's Stand Was Hurting
Americans' Credibility

FACTS ALSO QUESTIONED

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Ambassador's Cable Bared
by Columnist, Who Also
Replies to Kissinger
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WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—Kenneth B. Keating, United States Ambassador to India, complained in a secret cablegram to Washington during the Indian-Pakistani war that the Nixon Administration's justification for its pro-Pakistan policy detracted from American credibility and was inconsistent with his knowledge of events.

The secret message to the State Department was made

Anderson documents, Page 16;
Keating cable, Page 17.

available to The New York Times at its request by the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, who says he has received from unidentified United States Government informants "scores" of highly classified documents relating to the conflict last month.

Today Mr. Anderson—asserting that he was irked by a comment from Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security disputing the accuracy of some of his recent columns—released the Defense Department's record of three top-level White House strategy sessions held at the start of the two-week war.

'Secret Sensitive' Reports

The reports of the meetings of Dec. 3, 4 and 6, were classified "secret sensitive." A low-key investigation is underway to ascertain who leaked the documents to Mr. Anderson. He said today that he was ready, if necessary, for a battle with the Government. [Details on Page 17.]

The documents provide an unusual look into the thinking and actions of Mr. Nixon and his advisers on national security affairs at the start of the crisis, which eventually led to the Indian capture of East Pakistan and the establishment of a breakaway state there under the name Bangladesh.

Because the White House Security Action Group, known here as WSAG, did not have a formal structure, the language of Mr. Kissinger and the other participants was often looser, more piquant and franker than that in public statements by Mr. Kissinger and other Administration spokesmen at the time.

On Dec. 3, the day that full-scale fighting broke out, Mr. Kissinger told the White House strategy session, according to one document:

"I am getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He

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wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise."

The group included John N. Irwin, under secretary of state; Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The next day, Dec. 4, the United States called for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to discuss the war and to press India for a withdrawal. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, told newsmen that the United States believed that India bore "the major responsibility" for the fighting.

The decision by the Administration to attach blame to India came as something of a surprise in Washington since most diplomats and officials had expected a more neutral stance.

Disagreed With 'Tilt'

Critics of the Administration such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, had been complaining about Mr. Nixon's failure to criticize Pakistan for her bloody repression of the East Pakistani autonomy movement and the arrest of its leader, Sheik Mujibur Rahman.

Mr. Anderson has indicated that the documents in his possession were leaked by officials who disagreed with the Administration's "tilt" toward Pakistan. Ambassador Keating is also understood to have argued since March, when the repression began, for a statement against Pakistan.

Mr. Keating's cable, dated Dec. 8, was in response to the United States Information Agency's account of a briefing given by Mr. Kissinger at the White House on Dec. 7, setting forth the Administration's justification for its policy.

That briefing also became a source of contention between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Anderson. In it Mr. Kissinger said that the United States was not "anti-Indian" but was opposed to India's recent actions. Mr. Anderson, seizing on the denial, sought to prove that the Administration was "anti-Indian," and therefore lying.

Dispute Over Relief

In his briefing Mr. Kissinger said, among other things, that the United States had allocated \$155-million to avert famine in East Pakistan at India's "specific request."

Mr. Keating said that his recollection from a conversation with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh was that India "was reluctant to see a relief program started in East Pakistan prior to a political settlement on grounds such an effort might serve to bail out" Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, then President of Pakistan, who was displaced after the loss of East Pakistan.

The Ambassador noted that the briefing said that the Indian Ambassador in Washington, L. K. Jha, was informed on Nov. 19 that the United States and Pakistan were prepared to discuss a precise schedule for political autonomy in East Pakistan but that India had sabotaged the efforts by starting the war.

"The only message I have on record of this conversation makes no reference to this critical fact," Mr. Keating said.

Mr. Kissinger said at the briefing, that when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was in Washington in early November, "we had no reason to believe that military action was that imminent and that we did not have time to begin to work on a peaceful resolution."

"With vast and voluminous efforts of intelligence community, reporting from both Delhi and Islamabad, and my own decisions in Washington, I do not understand statement that 'Washington was not given the slightest inkling that any mili-

tary operation was in any way imminent,'" Mr. Keating responded. He said that on Nov. 12 he sent a cable "stating specifically that war is quite imminent."

The record of the White House strategy sessions indicated that intelligence information on the situation in South Asia was quite thin, at least in the early stages.

Mr. Helms and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—while agreeing that India would win in East Pakistan—disagreed on the time it would take. Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, came close by saying it would take one to two weeks, but there is no sign yet that he was correct in predicting that the Russians would push for permanent use of a base at Visag, on India's east coast.

Often Mr. Helms simply read rival claims by Pakistan and India, without making any judgment on their accuracy—indicating that the United States had no independent information.

Fears for West Pakistan

By Dec. 6, when it was clear that the Indians would win in East Pakistan, Mr. Sisco said that "from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from extinguishing West Pakistan."

After the war was over Mr. Nixon said in an interview in Time magazine that the American intelligence community had reason to believe that there were forces in India pushing for total victory but that under pressure from the United States the Soviet Union convinced India to order a cease-fire once East Pakistan surrendered.

This version of events has been officially denied by New Delhi, which said it had no plans to invade West Pakistan.

But in the period covered by the documents made public by Mr. Anderson there seemed considerable confusion in the Administration. At one point Mr. Kissinger said that Mr. Nixon might want to honor any requests from Pakistan for American arms — despite an American embargo on arms to India or Pakistan.

It was decided at the Dec. 6 session to look into the possibility of shipping arms quietly to Pakistan. But the State Department said today that no action was taken.

Carrier Sent to Rejoin

"It is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated," Mr. Kissinger said, apparently referring to the possibility of the loss of West Pakistan.

Later on in the crisis the United States sent the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise into the Indian Ocean, apparently as a show of force to deter any attack on West Pakistan, sources said at the time.

Mr. Kissinger asked at the Dec. 3 meeting for clarification of a "secret special interpretation" of a March, 1959, United States-Pakistani accord by which the United States would come to Pakistan's aid in case of attack. Later, Administration officials said that the United States was bound only to come to Pakistan's aid in case of attack by a Communist country.

Much of the discussion revolved around tactics in the United Nations. Mr. Kissinger indicated some frustration with the powerlessness of the world body to take action because of the Soviet veto.

"If the United Nations can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end and it is useless to think of United Nations guarantees in the Middle East," he said on Dec. 3. Today the State Department, asked about that gloomy prediction, sought to diminish its importance by saying that the United Nations could be effective in specific situations.

Many ideas were raised only

to be dropped. Despite strong talk about cutting off aid to India, she only lost military aid and development loans; food products and so-called "irrevocable loans" were not stopped.

Mr. Kissinger, reflecting the President's anger, said that "henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level." An Indian spokesman said today that Mr. Jha had not sought or been invited to an interview with a high official since the crisis.