# Foreign Policy: Pentagon Also Encounters Rebuffs

Following is the fourth in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

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civilian leaders of the Penta-endorsement of his actions. gon, the State Department and Central dent as often as they are ac-

While President Lyndon B. Though the Defense Department Johnson was jealous of the preremains the largest, richest and rogatives of Presidential power, most formidable Government he usually took pains to invoke agency, it, like other agencies, military support for his tough has lost to the Nixon White decisions, whether on Vietnam House some of its influence on force levels or on the kind of antimissile missile he wanted Senior military men have the to build. President Nixon, in satisfaction of sitting as equals contrast, seldom seems to feel on all major policy boards with the need for a public military

Even when the Defense De Intelligence partment can present a united Agency. They get their views front of civilian and military directly to the President, unplanners pushing a project, the filtered by civilians. But those White House has shown no reviews are rejected by the Presi-luctance to impose its own

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solution. Mr. Nixon overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they argued against the unilateral elimination of stocks of biological weapons. He overruled them

when they urged that the Russians be offered a package sians be offered a package proposal on nuclear-arms control that would not prevent construction of a full 12-site Safeguard antimissile system; the offer, instead, was either for no missile defense or for one limited to protecting only the capitals of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Moreover, on at least two occasions when the military chiefs prevailed on a major policy matter at the White House, it was in counseling restraint on a President inclined toward bold action.

That happened in the spring

toward bold action.

That happened in the spring of 1969, following the shooting down of an unarmed spy plane off the coast of North Korea, when the military strssed the paucity of forces available in the face of Mr. Nixon's initial inclination to bomb some North Korean airfields. As the military slowly moved air and sea reinforcements toward Korea, his anger cooled and he decided against retaliatory raids. During the recent Jordanian crisis, after hundreds of Syrian tanks had gone into Jordan to support the Palestinian guerrillas against the troops of

tanks had gone into Johan to support the Palestinian guerrillas against the troops of King Hussein, the Joint Chiefs, supported by officials of the State and Defense Departments, urged caution lest a misstep trigger a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, on issues in which the White House, for strategic reasons, was receptive to tough options offered by the military for essentially tactical reasons — as in the case of the Cambodian invasion and the heavy bomb strikes on airdefense sites and supply dumps in North Vietnam — hard-line military policy was supported.

An Impression Unsupported

Mr. Nixon's stand has some-times given rise to the impression that military men are in the ascendancy. Early last the ascendancy. Early last month, after two intensive air strikes on North Vietnam and a commando-type raid on a pris-

a commando-type raid on a prisoner-of-war camp near Hanoi Senator J. W. Fulbright as serted that the Pentagon was "taking over the primary rolin our foreign policy."


Since those hard-line action seemed to break a pattern of more than a year's duration in which the Administration appeared to be fulfilling its pledge of negotiation rather than confrontation, the Arkansas Democrat's allegation may have struck a responsive chord around the nation.

may have struck a responsive chord around the nation.
However, it prompted a ranking Administration official to say that he had missed the point on the ground that it is not that the Pentagon has "inordinate influence on our foreign policy but rather that the Administration is itself more inclined to a hard-line bias in its decision-making."

An assessment of the policy position and influence of military and civilian Defense Department leaders in the foreign-policy arena makes it clear that the stereotypes of hawks in the

bolicy arena makes it clear that the stereotypes of hawks in the Pentagon and doves elsewhere no longer prevail. Nowadays a variety of shifting alliances in variety of shifting alliances in the Administration sometimes pair the Joint Chiefs and the State Department against the Pentagon's civilian leaders; at other times civilians are arrayed against the military; then again, key White House staff men may be pushing for bold moves, against opposition from the diplomats and the military leaders. leaders.

To gain some insight into the considerable shift of Pentagon influence in foreign policy, one



An M-55 nerve-gas rocket. Though Chiefs of Staff argued against the elimination of biological arms, President Nixon prevailed.

must turn to the beginning of the nineteen sixties, when Robert S. McNamara was John F. that was obviously lacking on negotiated

Namara succeeded in gaining virtual autonomy over policy decisions, even those with large foreign - policy implications. And in a world in which the United States has commitments to more than 40 countries, there is little the Pentagon does or contemplates that lacks ramifications abroad.

It was Secretary McNamara

Into that setting stepped Mr.
Laird, a smooth, politically shrewd Congressman from Wisconsin who had gained his knowledge of defense matters during more than a decade on the House Military Appropriations Subcommittee.

He de-emphasized the importance of civilian analysts and returned to the military a substantial role in the making of defense policy. Although he cut billions from the defense budget, to which Mr. McNamara had added billions, he won the regard of the brass because they felt like brass because He de-emphasized the impor they felt like full partners in the hard choices required by

shrinking budgets.

One reason for the relation ship is the mutual respect and warmth between the Defense Secretary and the Joint Chiefs

During the long tenure of Mr. McNamara and the briefer one of Mr. Clifford, the Office of International Security and Security and Security and Successful Resistance of International Security Allasts
—roughly 300 specialists who advise the Secretary of Defense on foreign policy — included some of the brightest and most assertive officials in Washing-

### Laird Urged Pullout

Now, according to people in other agencies who deal with them, the current staff, with a few notable exceptions, is weaker. A senior State Department official commented: "In the McNamara era State dealt with I.S.A. because that's where the strong men were at Defense. Now we tend more and more to deal with the Joint Staff and the services."

On the large stage of policy, Mr. Laird has chosen a limited number of key positions and lobied hard for their acceptance, both in the Administration and in Congress.

One was his insistence that, in 'addition to the stress by the White House and State Department on trying to persuade Saigon and Hanoi to come to a limited what new strategic bomber to build and to turn them over to a special White House committee chaired by Mr. Kissinger.

The panel, the Defense Programs Review Committee, was set up to apply a blend of political, economic and diplomatic assessments to defense budgeting and force levels. In practice its principal role has been to work out broad budgetary guidance, and little else.

Even in those selective instances when Secretary Laird makes a determined fight, he loses battles too. Some weeks ago, in an effort to save money and to mollify growing Congressional pressure for substangent in the American ment on trying to persuade Saiforce of nearly 300,000 men gon and Hanoi to come to a lin Western Europe, he urged

It was Secretary McNamara rather than the President or the Secretary of State who each January published a "posture statement" outlining worldwide problems and how the United States intended to deal with one of Mr. Clifford the Office.

riers to be maintained and what new strategic bomber to

settlement, the that 20,000 to 40,000 supply troops be brought home. De-

the nineteen sixties, when Robert S. McNamara was John F. Kennedy's Secretary of Debth sides during the McNafense. The Pentagon of Secreman aera.

Nonetheless, Mr. Laird has derived and substance, from the establishment molded over a seven-year dividing the budget among stayed through most of Mr. Johnson's Presidency.

Brilliant But Abrasive

Mr. McNamara, a brilliant but Abrasive manager, organized a team of bright young civilian analysts who helped him take decision-making from the armed services and only then is it determined by the armed services and only then is it determined size it in his office. In the prosess the views of military men swere consistently brushed aside, or so the military felt.

With the notable exception of Vietnam strategy, Mr. McNamara succeeded in gaining virtual autonomy over policy decisions, even those with large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications and aircraft carriers that the process of the world in which the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy implications and aircraft carriers that the large foreign policy implications. And in a world in which the large foreign policy imp



Sending U.S. forces into Cambodia was a move on which White House and Pentagon agreed. Melvin R. Laird pressed withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam, below.



On another major issue-the supply of additional F-4 longrange fighter-bombers to Israel - political considerations prevailed despite a solid negative stand by Pentagon civilian

tive stand by Pentagon civilian and military experts. A decision to provide the jets, though far fewer than had been requested, was made by Mr. Nixon.

"By keeping down the number of planes," an official explained, "we not only frustrate potentially ambitious offensive plans but we maintain future leverage since we know Israel will be back for more."

Though the popular view may

Though the popular view may Though the popular view may type represents the military as a consistently bellicose lobby in moments of crisis, their demeanor in the recent Jordanian crisis demonstrates otherwise. The Joint Chiefs, in solid phalanx with Defense and State Department leaders, then treminding the President

and State Department leaders, kept reminding the President of the dangers of a misstep. In an effort to put pressure on Syria to remove her tanks from Jordan and to persuade the Soviet Union that the United States was increasing its options for possible action, a decision was made to mount a dramatic show of force.

Troops were alerted in also dispatched and transport

## U.S. Colonel in Saigon Faces Marijuana Trial

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 20 (UPI)—A United States Air Force colonel is to be tried by general court-martial Feb. 8 on marijuana charges, Air Force spokesmen announced today.

The spokesmen said the colonel, believed to be the highest ranking officer to be held on marijuana charges here, was charged with use and possession of marijuana, and "solicitation for illegal transfer" of the drug.

They identified him as Col. Gerald V. Kehrli, 46 years old, of Willmar, Minn., who commanded a detachment of the Military Airlift Command at Tansonnhut Air Base out-

planes were moved forward to . Turkey.

At the same time the President was warned that the alerted airborne brigade in West Germany was so short of trained men that it would make a poor choice if troops were required. Even the 82d Airborne Division, supposedly the best prepared "fast-reaction" unit in the United States, could muster only two of its three brigades because of manpower shortages. The Navy warned that in a show-down between the American and Soviet fleets in the Mediterranean, in which the Russians fired first, no clear assurances of the outcome could be given. ident was warned that the could be given.

could be given.

Despite the gloomy assessments, officials involved in around-the-clock White House meetings during the crisis say, Mr. Nixon was unwilling to rule out the direct use of force.

"He would not rule out the use of tactical air power at any stage," a general recalled. "The decision to get a third carrier out there quickly was in part an attempt to keep that option open."

Tomorrow: U.S. intelligence agencies under scrutiny.