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American military men were operating on the ground in Cambodia and Laos as early as 1966-'67, and U.S. tactical fighter-bombers were raiding far deeper into supposedly neutral Cambodia in 1970 than official reports indicated, senators heard yesterday.

Testimony by former servicemen to the Senate Armed Services Committee broadens still further the clandestine and falsely documented U.S. air and ground activity in Indochina that has been spilling out since the senators opened their investigation last month.

The continuing revelations have compelled the Pentagon on several occa-

sions to correct inaccurate war statistics it gave Congress.

Yesterday, a Pentagon spokesman said more errors had been found showing that 180 B-52 missions in 1971-'72 reported as having taken place in South Vietnam or Cambodia actually were flown against targets in northern Laos.

Also, in a letter to the senators, the Pentagon yesterday reported 156 more previously undisclosed fighter-bomber strikes into Cambodia in April and May, 1970.

The description of clandestine ground operations across the borders of Cambodia and Laos came from three former

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members of the Army's Special Forces (Green Berets). It was the first testimony of its kind in public before a congressional committee.

Reconnaissance crossings of the Cambodian border were conducted with especially tight secrecy, said former Special Forces Capt. Randolph C. Harrison, 29, of Altamont Springs, Fla.

On his arrival in South Vietnam in 1968, Harrison said, he learned that Special Forces teams had been "running these missions for at least a year." The maximum degree of penetration permitted into Cambodia, said Harrison, "was about 30 miles."

Unlike the recently admitted American B-52 or fighter-bomber strikes into Cambodia in 1969-70, which are said to have been ordered with the tacit consent of Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk, there is no U.S. claim that any Cambodian leader acquiesced in border crossings by GIs in the 1966-1968 period.

U.S. troops openly crossed the Cambodian border in May, 1970, following the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in March of that year. When those U.S. forces were withdrawn, President Nixon said on June 30, 1970: "We have scrupulously observed the 21-mile limit on penetration of our ground combat forces into Cambodian territory."

A former sergeant in the Special Forces, Thomas J. Marzullo, 24, of Stamford, Conn., told the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday that American military units also continued to operate in Laos after Mr. Nixon said they were gone.

In 1971, Marzullo said, "at the time the President said there were no Americans in Laos whatsoever, we had two teams inserted on the ground."

At other times, said Marzullo, Special Forces teams "launched missions out of Thailand," which would "then refuel in Laos at a CIA base," before going into action inside Laos.

Special Forces were in operation in Laos "at least as early as 1966," said a third witness, former Special Forces Sgt. John S. Meyer, 27, of Trenton, N.J. Meyer also testified that he took part in a mission inside Laos in February, 1970, which Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) noted was after Congress in December, 1960, barred funds for the use of "American ground combat troops" in Laos.

Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) sought to emphasize that the Special Forces were not "combat troops," but primarily reconnaissance units.

Whether this action "literally violated the law or not," said Sen. Harold E. Hughes (D-Iowa), "it clearly violated the intent of Congress."

Marzullo testified that when missions were sent into Laos, there was "guaranteed combat."

He cited an operation in Laos composed of 33 Special Forces men, armed with 90 mm. recoilless rifles, 81 mm. mortars and flamethrowers, sent to interdict a pass. This could hardly be considered non-combat, said Marzullo.

Normal missions cross the Laos and Cambodia borders, the senators were told, were for reconnaissance, "prisoner snatches," making wire taps, trying to cut fuel lines, planting sensing devices to detect the movement of troops and equipment, or planting "bad ammunition" designed to misfire.

It was the constant official position through both the Johnson and Nixon administrations that the United States was fully respecting the neutrality of Cambodia. The testimony yesterday did not reach back into the Kennedy years.

"In Cambodia we were not permitted to use any other forces to get our forces out of trouble," except for the helicopters that "inserted" and "extracted" them, said former Capt. Harrison. Helicopters and men, he said, were camouflaged and carried no identification.

The first Special Forces team of "two Americans and 11 or 12 Vietnamese" sent into Cambodia after the first B-52 strikes against Communist sanctuaries there in March, 1969, was "slaughtered," said Harrison.

"We did most fervently desire these base areas to be hit, especially by B-52s," he said, because they were "blatant examples" of the presence of North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.

The American-led units "literally went in before the dust had settled from the bombing," said Harrison.

The men were told that the B-52 strikes would be "totally devastating," said Harrison, "and if there is anyone left he will be so stunned that all you have to do is pick him up and put him in the helicopter."

Instead, he said, the Special Forces teams met withering fire each time, resulting in high casualties. In Laos, Meyer said, every U.S. mission encountered heavy fire and none was "a completely successful mission."

At times, to cope with densely defended enemy areas where intelligence data were urgently required, "search, locate and annihilation missions" were employed, comprising "from 50 to 100 men," Meyer testified.

Other types of armed reconnaissance missions with 15 to 20 men were known as "hatchet forces," the witnesses said. Meyer said that "any mission that we went on, a secondary mission was always a POW snatch." While a bonus of \$100 and five days' leave for all members of a team was supposedly available or the capture of a prisoner, he said, "we never captured a prisoner alive."

Yesterday's disclosures of secret air activity were less dramatic than last month's initial revelations that a massive White House-ordered bombing campaign involving 3,630 B-52 strikes had been successfully hidden behind false statistics.

But it provided for the first time indications that the same dual reporting system was applied to fighter-bomber operations as well.

The principal testimony came from ex-Air Force Capt. George R. Moses.

Moses, who lives in Falls Church, Va. and is now a staff assistant to Rep. Robert Leggett (D-Calif.), served in Vietnam from September, 1969 to June, 1971, as an intelligence officer with the 31st Tactical Fighter Wing at Tuyhoa Air Force Base in South Vietnam.

Subsequent to the May, 1970, invasion of Cambodia by U.S. and South Vietnamese troops, Moses said, a secret message came in saying that air strikes "flown in an area roughly west of the Mekong River were not to have coordinates reported as struck."

Instead, he said, when pilots came back from missions in these areas, the intelligence officers were instructed to call the 7th Air Force Tactical Air Control Center in Saigon. There, the officer on duty would "select at random" a set of coordinates from a pre-selected, unpopulated area close to the border which was well within the normal operating area of the 7th Air Force in Cambodia, and those false coordinates would be used in the operations report.

"The transaction took place over the telephone and took a matter of a minute," Moses said.

Though the secret orders were "confusing," Moses said, there was no doubt what was being done, since "I either observed or participated in this procedure" at three different bases in South Vietnam.

Another Air Force officer, Capt. Maurice O'Connell, 28, who served in a similar job and is still on active duty, corroborated the general accuracy of what Moses told the committee.

But O'Connell, who said he was testifying against his wishes, described the false coordinates filed on the operations reports as "almost immaterial." These reports are used for keeping track of bomb requirements, and fuel not for intelligence information, he said. He assumed the correct information was being provided by a forward air controllers in a separate reporting system.

Sen. Hughes read four major public statements by President Nixon on U.S. actions in Cambodia and then asked Moses about each of them.

In a June 30, 1970, speech on Cambodia, Mr. Nixon said U.S. "ground combat forces" had "scrupulously observed the 21-mile limit on penetration." Asked if U.S. aircraft went beyond that, Moses indicated they did.

Moses also said the air strikes were not limited simply to interdiction missions against North Vietnamese supply lines heading toward South Vietnam and Communist bases along the border, as had also been stated on June 30.

Moses, under questioning by Hughes, also told of U.S. air strikes in support of South Vietnamese and Cambodian forces inside Cambodia after June 30, which also appeared to contradict presidential statements which Hughes read into the hearing record.