


Bloodbaths in Vietnam: The Reality and

By Robert F. Turner

STANFORD, Calif.—Administration spokesmen have argued that the United States cannot unilaterally withdraw from Vietnam without inviting a vast bloodbath. In support of this thesis, they assert that following the Communist takeover in North Vietnam in 1954 a massacre occurred resulting in the killing of more than 50,000 people and the indirect deaths of hundreds of thousands more. Critics of the Administration have recently charged that no bloodbath took place in the North—that President Nixon's apparent concern is founded on a myth.

I have been to Vietnam three times, twice working for the North Vietnamese Affairs Division of a branch of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. My duties included following the North Vietnamese radio and press, studying captured documents and interviewing important North Vietnamese and Vietcong defectors. Having a personal interest in the early days of the Communist regime in North Vietnam, I discussed the "bloodbath" with many defectors from various areas of North Vietnam who had been present during the period in question. It should be noted that several of these individuals had been Communist party members and active participants in the so-called "bloodbath"—either as specially trained cadres or as "people's court" judges.

On the basis of these interviews and other evidence accumulated during the past eight years, I am convinced that there was in fact a large-scale purge



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the Myth

Most Vietnam scholars, including Hoang Van Chi and the late Bernard Fall, accept the figure of 50,000 executions.

The "people's court" executions, however, accounted for only a small part of the total victims of the "land reform." Far more numerous were the "class enemies" who committed suicide rather than face Communist justice, and the wives and children of "landlords" who died of starvation under the "isolation policy."

The most thorough study of the "land reform" to date is Hoang Van Chi's excellent book, "From Colonialism to Communism," which concludes that the total victims of the purge numbered nearly 500,000. I have found nothing in my own research to dispute this estimate, and I am quite sure that the victims numbered in six digits.

All of the defectors are in agreement that a Communist "land reform" in South Vietnam would dwarf the bloodbath which occurred in the North. Captured Vietcong documents and statements by high-ranking defectors indicate that the Vietcong have between three and five million names on "blood debt" lists for punishment in the future. Two leading British authorities—P. J. Honey and Sir Robert Thompson—have estimated that a Vietcong bloodbath would result in over one million deaths. Unfortunately, the results of my own research support such an ominous conclusion.

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By D. Gareth Porter

ITHACA, N. Y. President Nixon now justifies continued United States military involvement in Vietnam in large part by portraying Vietnamese Communist leaders as bloodthirsty fanatics who would order a massive "bloodbath" against their former foes if they were to gain power in South Vietnam—one which would be even worse than the present daily bloodletting. In support of that argument, he has charged that the North Vietnamese Government carried out wholesale liquidations during the land reform from 1954 to 1956.

Nixon's charges, like similar allegations in secondary sources on the land reform, are based ultimately on a single source: the book "From Colonialism to Communism" by Hoang Van Chi. A native of North Vietnam who left for Saigon early in 1955, Mr. Chi has been presented to the American public as an authoritative source on the land reform, with intimate knowledge of Communist party policy. But a careful examination of his account and of the original documents in Vietnamese discloses a series of distortions and fabrications which totally misrepresents the land reform program.

On the basis of Hoang Van Chi's gross mistranslations of key passages, General Vo Nguyen Giap's speech on land reform errors in October, 1956, has been quoted frequently as proof of

of opposition elements following the Communist takeover in North Vietnam, and that its magnitude was sufficient to warrant the label "bloodbath." The purge took the form of a "land reform." However, it was clear to most observers that an incorrect political standpoint was as likely as economic prosperity to bring a death sentence.

It is difficult to determine the actual human cost of the "land reform" because no official figures are available and those witnesses who have escaped the Communist North seldom are knowledgeable about events outside of their own village or province. It is known that the party established a quota of at least five "landlords" for execution in each village.

To Van Xiem, a Communist party member since 1950 who served on the planning committee in Thaibinh Province, reports 31 executions out of 5,000 residents in Congtru village. These figures suggest one execution for every 160 to 170 people, which projected nationwide would suggest approximately 100,000 executions throughout North Vietnam. Actually, for reasons which are too complicated to detail here, the number of executions was probably smaller than that.

crimes were to be tried and punished under the party's policy. The majority of the landlords were to keep a parcel of land and to become productive citizens by their own labor.

Hoang Van Chi asserts in the book that the party leadership ordered an arbitrary minimum of five people executed in each village. But in The Washington Post interview, he admits that he based his allegations about the land reform on a single village in which one person was executed. On the basis of this one village, he "guesses" that 5 per cent of the population in the North was killed during the land reform, which President Nixon translated on July 27 into "a minimum of 500,000" people executed.

In contrast to the contradictory and wildly exaggerated account given by Mr. Chi, the documentary evidence, including partial statistics published by the Diem Government, suggests that the number of landlords executed was probably between 1,000 and 2,500.

The Nixon Administration's political exploitation of this unreliable account raises questions more fundamental than Mr. Chi's abuse of historical fact. For his writing on the land reform did not originate as an independent effort. On the contrary, it was part of a larger propaganda campaign against the land reform launched in 1956 by the Diem Government and later pushed by American agencies. Mr. Chi had been employed by both Diem's Ministry of Information and by the U.S. Information Agency (as a translator!) when he received a grant in 1960 from the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a covert recipient of C.I.A. funds, to write his book. The U.S.I.A. itself later admitted subsidizing the publication of the book for distribution abroad, thus also insuring that it would reach the American public as well.

It is no accident, therefore, that Hoang Van Chi's account has dominated the American interpretation of the North Vietnamese Government's behavior after the first Indochina war. For it was encouraged, financed and promoted by U.S. officials as a long-term investment in influencing U.S. and world opinion. This investment has paid off handsomely: Hoang Van Chi's wholly unsubstantiated charge of the calculated murder of innocent people, repeated and amplified year after year for a decade, has become a full-blown political myth—one of the few remaining to bolster the sagging American adventure in Vietnam.

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a reign of terror in the North. As translated by Mr. Chi, the speech appears to admit that terror, torture and execution of innocent people had been official policy. But in the original Vietnamese text, Giap says nothing of the sort. This complete alteration of Giap's statement was accomplished by no less than eight serious mistranslations in three sentences. This distortion by mistranslation was no mistake; Mr. Chi



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has now admitted, in an interview with The Washington Post, that he departed from an accurate translation in order to impart the "true meaning" of the documents in question.

In many cases, he has simply invented evidence to support his charges. For example, in order to prove that the purpose of the land reform was to physically destroy the landlord class, he quotes the main slogan of the land reform as exhorting cadres to "liquidate the landlords." But the slogan in question said, "Abolish the feudal regime of landownership in a manner that is discriminating, methodical and under sound leadership." In fact, only those landlords guilty of specific

Memo on other comments
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