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SAIGON AP - The conviction is growino among U.S. officials here that serious shortcomings in intelligence, stemming partly from Vietnamization, cleared the way for successes North Vietnam's spring offensive has scored so far.

Where to place the blame is another matter, but in casting about critics mention the U.S. Air Force's sensor program, the Army's clandestine cross-border operations, certain aspects of Central Intelligence Agency surveillance, and analysts of various organizations who interpret material gathered in the field.

Among professional espionage officers attached to the military there is criticism of the Pentagon and of politicians back home. These are suspected of failing to read the signs and of putting too much faith in their own programs.

There appears to be a special bitterness about Vietnamization. No single, simple answer appears to explain how Hanoi's forces have achieved as much as they have in six weeks with a shaking impact on President Nguyen Van Thieu's government.

Last fall senior officials in Washington were saying a big push was coming. This was based on field reports of a buildup in the central highlands triborder area-a thing that has proved in the current analysis to be very accurate.

in the central highlands triborder area a thing that has proved in the current analysis to be very accurate. In January, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. Army chief of staff, foresaw an offensive either in the highlands or just below the demilitarized zone, or in both places. A month later, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, made an identical assessment. Asked how this offensive and those of past years might differ, he answered: Firepower.,

"If there was any falldown of intelligence in this respect," says one U.S. officer, "it certainly wasn't in failing to realize that they had these things. It may have been in failing to realize how much they had, and where." An example is the tanks that emerged from Cambodia to attack Loc Ninh and An Loc, 60 miles north of Saigon-an area where

Loc Ninh and An Loc, 60 miles north of Saigon-an area where the enemy had used no large-size equipment unless it was captured. The allied forces knew some tanks were in Cambodia's Chup rubber plantation, a North Vietnamese staging area 30 miles west of the border. But even Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Minh, commander of the 3rd Military Region, says he didn't know there were

as many as the enemy has used thus far. MORE

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