

# Nixon's Plan in Bombing:

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The Nixon administration's bombing strategy is part of a deep game designed to exploit the differences between the hawks and the doves in the Krem-

## News Analysis

lin, in order to maneuver Moscow into bringing about a peace settlement in Vietnam.

The first move in the game was to hold out to the Soviet Union the prospects of a series of massive trade deals, of a kind which those in the Kremlin supporting "peaceful coexistence" have repeatedly urged for many years, going back even to the times of former Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

The second move, having aroused their appetites with the carrot, was to apply the stick. The bombing is de-

signed to convince them not only that there can be no trade deal so long as there is no peace in Vietnam, but that the United States is willing to go to the other extreme, and risk a confrontation with the Soviet Union over its supply of arms to Hanoi.

The administration evidently hoped at first that the carrot alone would suffice. United States businessmen, starting with grain dealers and ending with manufacturers of computers which are still on the embargo list, have been encouraged to go to Moscow with offers that would tempt a saint, though there was always a hint that the saint would have to surrender his virtue first.

In the past year, more United States businessmen have visited Moscow than during the whole of the preceding 20 years. They found

a responsive audience among the Moscow doves, centered mainly around Premier Alexei Kosygin and his influential son-in-law, Gherman Gvishiani, the man in charge of Russia's advanced technology who knows better than any one else how desperately the Soviet Union needs United States know-how in this field.

As seen at the highest levels in both Washington and Moscow, the proposed trade deal would not be a simple commercial bargain, but the basis of a whole new relationship between the two superpowers, the very foundation of a new "generation of peace."

As seen in Washington, a Vietnam peace settlement would have to precede any such arrangement. The soft-peddaling of the Vietnam issue by the Kremlin in recent months has given the administration some reason

to believe that its strategy was working.

The Kremlin doves were aware of the administration's view, voiced publicly by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, that both the United States and the Soviet Union should restrict their arms supplies to South and North Vietnam respectively as part of a peace settlement.

The administration evidently believes that, left to its own devices, Hanoi would not be able to continue a war which has now moved from the guerrilla to the conventional warfare phase, with aircraft, tanks and missiles.

## Resistance To Doves

But there have been signs in the Soviet press that the doves have not been having it all their own way. At least some of the Soviet leaders appear determined to resist the idea of "linkage" be-

# To Tempt, Press Moscow

tween trade and the other issues which Mr. Nixon is preparing to raise at the summit.

There is every reason to believe that Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, who has moved much closer to the "coexistentialist" faction than he once was, is under pressure from the hawks, represented by the military and by their allies in the politburo, to stand firm against what they see as American blackmail.

## Breakdown of Summit

If he is pressed too hard by the United States, he will find himself between the hammer and the anvil—as did Khrushchev in similar circumstances. It is now generally accepted that the manner in which Khrushchev was made to withdraw his missiles from Cuba by the Kennedy administration so weakened his position in

the struggle with the Kremlin hawks that it contributed to his eventual fall.

After the overflight of the Soviet Union by the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft on the eve of the 1960 summit meeting, Khrushchev found himself similarly under pressure from the Kremlin hawks. They insisted that he call off the summit unless President Eisenhower met certain conditions.

The administration's refusal, and the breakdown of the summit, was due mainly to its failure to recognize the strength of the Kremlin opposition to Khrushchev. He had just committed himself, during his 1959 visit to the United States, to a policy of coexistence expressed in his grandiose plan for "a world without arms and without war."

The Kremlin hawks believed that the plan was unrealistic and, indeed, dan-

gerous to the Soviet Union, and they now believe that the talk about a "generation of peace" is equally risky.

The development of massive East-West trade dealings, the wholesale importation of advanced United States technology, know-how, and even consumer goods, all of which are now under discussion, would certainly bring palpable material advantages to the Soviet Union.

But it also—as the hawks have argued—bring about a massive growth of East-West contacts, greater ideological penetration by the West, and a danger of moral disarmament which could be fatal to the Soviet system.

## Kremlin May Resist

There are signs that the strength of these people in the Soviet bureaucracy may be great enough to cause

the Kremlin to resist the tempting offers from the White House, to make it turn nasty in response to the Hanoi bombing, and put a stop to President Nixon's march toward a "generation of peace," as the hawks once put a stop to Premier Khrushchev's march toward a world "without war."

Washington officials have argued, since the resumption of the bombings, that the Kremlin has "bigger fish to fry" during the Moscow summit, and that it will not therefore take a tough stance.

Moscow's comparatively mild first reactions to the bombing were taken in Washington to confirm the correctness of this analysis but that is likely to prove as wrong as the analysis of the relationship of forces in the Kremlin on the eve of the 1960 summit