

Hanoi Eyes 'Concessions' To Stir Trouble in U.S.



WASHINGTON —

From intelligence reports and captured documents, it is now possible to anticipate the enemy's next moves in Indochina: 1.

The North Vietnamese probably will make what one report calls "a cosmetic concession" this summer. They might accept the Democratic Policy Council's call for a complete U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 18 months, offering American troops safe conduct out of the country. The intention would be to cause political mischief in the U.S. by making the Democratic appeal an issue in the November election campaign.

2. President Nixon's aim that the Cambodian operation would bring pressure upon Hanoi to negotiate an "honorable peace" appears to have backfired. The intelligence reports indicate that Hanoi has been less impressed with U.S. military successes in Cambodia than with the domestic upheaval the operation has caused in America. The antiwar clamor in Congress and upon the campuses probably has encouraged the North Vietnamese to hold out for a settlement on their terms. All the available intelligence suggests that they don't intend to engage in meaningful negotiations in Paris but look upon the truce talks as a device to extract concessions from the U.S.

No More Sanctuaries?

3. Contrary to press speculation, the North Vietnamese aren't expected to return to their Cambodian sanctuaries after the Americans clear out. The losses were so staggering that the North Vietnamese won't likely risk storing their supplies in large centers again. Instead, they are expected to keep their forces in Cambodia dispersed and to store their supplies in scattered, small caches.

4. The Communist hold on the South Vietnamese countryside already had deteriorated before the Cambodian adventure. The destruction of their supply centers should create severe shortages that will hamper Viet Cong operations around Saigon and in the Mekong Delta. To mask this weakness, the Communists probably will step up their shellings and hit-and-run attacks in the northern sectors. They are also expected to increase their military pressure upon the Lon Nol government in Cambodia.

At the same time, the South Vietnamese Army has been bolstered by their successes in Cambodia, as President Nixon has happily reported. This may turn out, however, to be a mixed blessing. For the exhilarated South Vietnamese generals have become more gung-ho than ever. The Nixon Administration may find it difficult to restrain them from widening the war, even more difficult to get their agreement to any political settlement.