

# VIETCONG DEMAND FULL U.S. PULLOUT

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Charge American Military  
Has 25,000 in Vietnam  
Disguised as Civilians

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Special to The New York Times

PARIS, April 16—The representative of the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government issued a call here today for "immediate and permanent" withdrawal of what he said were 25,000 American military personnel "disguised as civilians" in South Vietnam.

In a series of statements and at a press conference, he said there would be "no difficulty, no obstacle" placed in the way of their departure.

"If the U.S. really wants to save their lies," a statement said, "it should withdraw them totally and immediately."

But Dinh Ba Thi, interim head of the government's mission here, would not respond to efforts by reporters to determine exactly what would happen to Americans and other foreigners if they remained in areas that fell under Vietcong control. He referred only to a previous statement saying their lives and property would be protected if they obeyed "the policy of the revolutionary power."

The statements accused "the Ford Administration of advancing plans for evacuations from Vietnam only as a 'pretext for renewed American military intervention.'"

The prediction by Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger that the lives of 200,000 South Vietnamese would be endangered if they remained in their country was denounced as "a pure fabrication" and a cal-

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# Vietcong Aides in Paris Demand Total Pullout by U.S. in Vietnam

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umny."

Ambassador Thi avoided direct answers for the most part, repeating continuously the words in the statements. He said he had "no precise information" on whether the Da Nang airport would be opened to shipment of relief supplies piling up in Vietiane, Laos.

He confirmed that his government had agreed "in principle" to permit French relief flights into Da Nang, but said that if "technical difficulties" made that impossible, "the P.R.G. will find other means" of receiving the contributions.

## Overruling Indicated

It has been reported from Vientiane that a new demand was issued for the supplies to be flown into Hanoi, then sent through North Vietnam by road. This would appear to be a North Vietnamese decision overruling the Vietcong agreement with the French.

Mr. Thi would not say whether the Vietcong government was prepared to enter negotiations with the United States for evacuation of American citizens and whether it would negotiate with Gen. Duong Van Minh if he set up a new Saigon Government.

General Minh's son, Duyen Minh Duc, held a press conference here earlier today in which he said his father, known to Americans as Big Minh, called for "the departure of President Nguyen Van Thieu" and "urgent formation of a peace government—to resume negotiations with the P.R.G."

He indicated that his father was willing to head such a government and considered after contacts with the Vietcong that "such a negotiation is possible."

## Many Talks Held

While he has the rank of ambassador, Mr. Thi is widely considered to have less authority than some Vietcong officials in Paris who have been engaged in an intensive contacts over the last few weeks with antiwar Americans, French officials, West European diplomats and French and Vietnamese scholars.

Some of these people have

also met with North Vietnamese representatives here. They report that the Communists all stress the desire to take up negotiations provided under the 1973 Paris agreements for a coalition council in South Vietnam to be followed by elections. They also report an expressed reluctance to press for a forceful and complete Communist take-over of Saigon.

The non-Communists and anti-Communists who have been involved in these conversations offer several explanations of why they think the Communists still want a negotiated political settlement when they may have a military victory within their group.

These include the following:

¶ Awareness that great numbers of South Vietnamese are frightened of a Communist victory and thus might panic and cause overwhelming problems of civil control once the war ends.

¶ A desire to avoid the fierce battle and devastation that could be caused by an effort to conquer Saigon.

¶ Awareness that chances for postwar aid would be affected by whether the Vietcong set up their own Saigon government or join a three-way coalition as provided by the Paris agreements.

¶ A nationalist desire to move away from dependence on Moscow and Peking by achieving the kind of full international recognition and implied guarantees that could be expected to follow adherence to the Paris agreements.

¶ A feeling in Hanoi that Mao tse-tung erred by marching into Peking in 1949, thus enabling Chiang Kai-shek and two million followers to flee and establish a rival government on Taiwan. Hanoi is said to feel that the error led to the long isolation of Peking and to the continuing problem of having two Chinese governments.

Whatever the reasons advanced, all those who have talked with the Vietnamese Communists said they were convinced that the Communists preferred a negotiated settlement and at least a period of coalition government to outright military victory.