

NIXON URGES SUPERVISED TRUCE IN VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND LAOS AND A WIDER PEACE CONFERENCE



President Nixon with Melvin R. Laird, right, Defense Secretary, and William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, before speech

The New York Times (by Mike Lien)

STANDSTILL ASKED

President Says Offer Has No Conditions— Two Elements New

Text of President's address
is printed on Page 18.

By **ROBERT B. SEMPLE JR.**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 — President Nixon asked North Vietnam and the Vietcong tonight to join the allies in a standstill cease-fire throughout Indochina to "break the logjam" in the Paris peace negotiations.

While conceding the difficulty of maintaining the cease-fire in guerrilla war that has no conventional front lines, he offered a proposal for an internationally supervised standstill "without preconditions," and added:

"An unconventional war may require an unconventional truce; our side is ready to stand still and cease firing."

'Our Primary Forum'

As a second new proposal, Mr. Nixon called for an expanded Indochina peace conference, which he said was necessary to deal with a conflict that embraces Laos and Cambodia as well as South Vietnam. He said the present Paris talks would remain "our primary forum" for reaching a settlement until "a broader international conference produces serious negotiations."

Administration officials portrayed the speech as a new set of proposals designed to replace Mr. Nixon's original eight-point peace initiative of May 14, 1969, but the only really new elements were the standstill cease-fire — the President termed it "a cease-fire in place" — and the proposal for expanded peace talks.

On two crucial questions that have been dividing the two sides—troop withdrawals and the composition of the Saigon leadership—Mr. Nixon essentially restated earlier positions that the North Vietnamese have consistently rejected in Paris.

Unspecified Timetable

On the subject of troops, Mr. Nixon offered the eventual withdrawal of all United States forces on an unspecified timetable. Such a timetable, he said, could be a subject for negotiations.

But White House officials said that Mr. Nixon would still require withdrawals by the North Vietnamese as well, whereas the North Vietnamese have consistently demanded the United States' withdrawal alone as a condition for settlement.

On the question of the composition of the Saigon government, Mr. Nixon once again stated his willingness to accept a political solution "that reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people" and "the existing relationship of political forces."

By that, White House officials implied, Mr. Nixon would be willing to accept administrative and political control by the Vietcong over areas in South Vietnam in which they now have military superiority.

However, the enemy negotiators in Paris, in making their own political demands, have consistently called for a share in the political power at the national level and for the

Continued on Page 18, Column 1

NIXON ASKS TRUCE IN ALL INDOCHINA

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

ouster of the top leaders of the top leaders of the present government as a further condition for a broader settlement.

In addition, Mr. Nixon proposed the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides—including the prompt release of all journalists and other "innocent civilian victims of the conflict."

In his proposals of May 14, 1969, the President called for the release of prisoners of war "at the earliest possible time", his inclusion of journalists and other civilians represented a new element.

Of all the proposals, Mr. Nixon's call for a standstill cease-fire was clearly designed to attract the most attention at home as well as in Paris. He listed five "general principles" that should apply to any standstill cease-fire.

Effective Supervision

First, he said, a cease-fire must be effectively supervised not only by the parties themselves but by international observers. He did not offer detailed supervising machinery, but White House officials said that if the other side was prepared to accept the idea in principle, the United States would come forth with detailed and concrete recommendations.

In addition, he said, a cease-fire should not be used by either side to improve its military position. The cease-fire would embrace all kinds of warfare, including bombing and acts of terrorism, and added, bodia and Loas as well as South Vietnam.

Finally, he said, the cease-fire "should be part of a general move to end the war in Indochina."