

ASIANS URGING U.S. NOT TO WITHDRAW

In Talks With Rogers, They
Appear to Reject a Basic
Point in Nixon Doctrine

JUL 9 1970

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

TOKYO, July 8—South Vietnam and Cambodia, and South Korea, Thailand and Philippines as well, have told Secretary of State William P. Rogers that the United States must not reduce its military, political and economic commitments in the Pacific region in any serious way.

That view, shared by Australia and New Zealand, appears to be basically in conflict with the Nixon doctrine for Asia, which calls for a gradual decline in the American presence as the Asian countries develop the ability to defend themselves.

'Readjustment' Deplored

Mr. Rogers attended conferences on Southeast Asia in Manila and Saigon and then came to Tokyo, where he has found that Japan, the strongest power in Asia, has serious doubts about any reduction in the United States presence—this despite the mounting trade rivalry and political differences between the Japanese and the

Mr. Rogers has been forced to reiterate that the United States intends to remain a Pacific power and that the Nixon doctrine does not mean isolationism but simply readjustment to the new realities of

Continued on Page 6, Column 4

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

world and domestic politics.

The Asians are clearly uncomfortable even about words like "readjustment," fearing that such moves may pave the way to what they think would be a dangerous thinning out of the American forces and a disastrous curtailment in the flow of economic assistance—direct or resulting from military spending.

The Asians say they have no quarrel with the doctrine when it speaks of a "low profile" for the United States. They have noted that they are under the protection of the United States nuclear shield.

Inasmuch as there is little expectation in Asia of a Communist nuclear onslaught, the Asians indicate that they take a dim view of the second part of the Nixon doctrine: that the United States will bolster them to face conventional warfare, "wars of liberation" or insurgency but will not become directly involved in the fighting.

The assurances by Mr. Rogers that the United States will not abandon Asia have not reduced the disquiet.

Two Immediate Problems

A year after President Nixon proclaimed his doctrine as he toured Asia, the Administration finds itself caught between Congressional limitations on military and economic aid to the Asians and their real or imagined needs.

Even assuming that Vietnamization is successful and that Mr. Nixon can meet his schedule of withdrawing 150,000 American combat troops by next spring, the fact is that the South Vietnamese economy is in grave disarray and that all indicators point to a further deterioration, from which only the Communists could profit.

The Administration is making more funds available to Saigon—\$100-million worth of additional commodities this year from aid funds and high-protein rations for the army to be financed by the Pentagon—but they are considered only a pittance.

Cambodia is an even more immediate problem in some respects. Having withdrawn from there 10 days ago after two months of allied operations that just about ruined the economy, the United States now must decide how to save the government from a Communist takeover.

Domestic pressures prevent the Administration from assuming a formal commitment to defend Cambodia, but it is apparent that she cannot survive alone. South Vietnam is providing some troops but Thailand is unwilling to do likewise—a demonstration, according to some observers, that the Nixon doctrine's notion of "Asians helping Asians" remains largely a myth.

The alternative, if the United

States is prepared to turn to it, is described as what amounts to clandestine assistance. While officially providing limited amounts of arms and money, the United States continues bombing Communist supply lines and troop concentrations, the stated reason being to protect American troops across the border in South Vietnam. American officials indicated that the chances are that the bombing will increase if the North Vietnamese become more menacing.