

# Excerpts From Speech by Secretary

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 11  
—Following are excerpts from the official text of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's speech in Boston today. In his actual delivery of the speech, Mr. Kissinger made some minor changes.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the world's fears of catastrophe and its hopes for peace have hinged on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In an era when two nations have the power to visit utter devastation on the world in a matter of hours, there can be no greater imperative than assuring that the relationship between the superpowers be managed effectively and rationally.

This is an unprecedented task. Historically, a conflict of ideology and geopolitical interests such as that which characterizes the current international scene has almost invariably led to conflict. But in the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality, humanity could not survive such a repetition of history. No amount of tough rhetoric can change these realities. The future of our nation and of mankind depends on how well we avoid confrontation without giving up vital interests and how well we establish a more hopeful and stable relationship without surrender of principle.

We therefore face the necessity of a dual policy: on the one hand, we are determined to prevent Soviet military power from being used for political expansion; we will firmly discourage and resist adventurist policies. But at the same time, we cannot escalate every political dispute into a central crisis; nor can we rest on identifying foreign policy with crisis management. We have an obligation to work for a more positive future. We must couple opposition to pressure and irresponsibility with concerned efforts to build a more cooperative world.

History can inform—or mislead—us in this quest.

## Munich Remembered

For a generation after World War II, statesmen and nations were traumatized by the experience of Munich; they believed that history had shown the folly of permitting an adversary to gain a preponderance of power. This was and remains a crucial lesson.

A later generation was chastened by the experience of Vietnam; it is determined that America shall never

again overextend and exhaust itself by direct involvement in remote wars with no clear strategic significance. This too is a crucial lesson.

But equally important and too often neglected is the lesson learned by an earlier generation. Before the outbreak of the first World War, there was a virtual equilibrium of power. Through crisis after crisis nations moved to confrontation and then retreated to compromise. Stability was taken for granted until—without any conscious decision to overturn the international structure—a crisis much like any other went out of control. Nation after nation slid into a war whose causes they did not understand but from which they could not extricate themselves. The result was the death of tens of millions, the destruction of the global whose consequences still torment mankind.

There is no question that order and domestic upheavals peace rests, in the first instance, on the maintenance of a balance of global stability. Without the ultimate sanction of power, conciliation soon becomes surrender. Moderation is a virtue only in those who are thought to have a choice.

## Warning on Exaggeration

No service is done to the nation by those who portray an exaggerated specter of Soviet power and of American weakness, by those who hesitate to resist when we are challenged, or by those who fail to see the opportunities we have to shape the U. S.-Soviet relationship by our own confident action. Soviet strength is uneven; the weaknesses and frustrations of the Soviet system are glaring and have been clearly documented. Despite the inevitable increase in its power, the Soviet Union remains far behind us and our allies in any over-all assessment of military, economic, and technological strength; it would be reckless in the extreme for the Soviet Union to challenge the industrial democracies. And Soviet society is no longer insulated from the influences and attractions of the outside world, or impervious to the need for external contacts.

The great industrial democracies possess the means to counter Soviet expansion and to moderate Soviet behavior. We must not abdicate this responsibility by weakening ourselves either by failing to support our defenses or refusing to use our power in defense of our interest; we must, along with our allies, always do what is necessary

to maintain our security.

It is true that we cannot be the world's policeman. Not all local wars and regional conflicts affect global stability or America's national interest. But if one superpower systematically exploits these conflicts for its own advantage, and tips scales decisively by its intervention, gradually the over-all balance will be affected. If adventurism is allowed to succeed in local crises—an ominous precedent of wider consequence is set. Other nations will adjust their policies to their perception of the dominant trend. Our ability to control future crises will diminish. And if this pattern is not broken, America will ultimately face harder choices, higher costs and more severe crises.

But our obligation goes beyond the balance of power. An equilibrium is too precarious a foundation for our long-term future. There is no tranquility in a balance of terror constantly contested. We must avoid the twin temptations of provocation and escapism. Our course must be steady and not reflect momentary fashions; it must be a policy that our adversaries respect, our allies support and our people believe in and sustain.

## Efforts to Cooperate

Therefore, we have sought with the Soviet Union to push back the shadow of nuclear catastrophe—by settling concrete problems such as Berlin so as to ease confrontations, and negotiating on limitation of strategic arms so as to slow the arms race. And we have held out the prospect of cooperative relations in the economic and other fields if political conditions permit their implementation and further development.

It goes without saying that this process requires reciprocity. It cannot survive a constant attempt to seek unilateral advantage. It cannot, specifically, survive any more Angolas. If the Soviet Union is ready to face genuine coexistence, we are prepared to make every effort to shape a pattern of restraint and mutual interest which will give coexistence a more reliable and positive character making both sides conscious of what would be lost by confrontation and what can be gained by cooperation. And we are convinced that when a vigorous response to Soviet encroachment is called for, the President will have the support of the American people—and of our allies—to the extent that he can demonstrate that the crisis was imposed upon us; that it did not



# Kissinger in Boston on



Associated Press

In Boston, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger received World Affairs Council award for improving international relations from Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman.

result from opportunities we missed to improve the prospects of peace.

No policy will soon, if ever, eliminate the competition and irreconcilable ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor will it make all interests compatible. We are engaged in a protracted process with inevitable ups and downs. But there is no alternative to the policy of penalties for adventurism and incentives for restraint. What do those who speak so glibly about one-way streets or pre-emptive concessions propose concretely that this country do? What precisely has been given up? What level of confrontation do they seek? What threats would they make? What risks would they run? What precise changes in our defense posture, what level of expenditure over what period of time, do they advocate? How concretely do they suggest managing the U.S.-Soviet relationship in an era of strategic equality?

It is time we heard answers to these questions.

In short we must—and we shall—pursue the two strands of our policy towards the

Soviet Union: firmness in the face of pressure and the vision to work for a better future. This is well within our capacities. We owe this to our people, to our future, to our allies and to the rest of mankind.

It is the West—and overwhelmingly this nation—that has the resources, the technology, the skills, the organizational ability and the good will that attract and invite the cooperation of the developing nations. In the global dialogue among the industrial and developing worlds the Communist nations are conspicuous by their absence and, indeed, by their irrelevance.

Yet at the very moment when the industrial democracies are responding to the aspirations of the developing countries, many of the same countries attempt to extort what has in fact been freely offered. Lopsided voting, unworkable resolutions and arbitrary procedures too often dominate the United Nations and other international bodies. Nations which originally chose nonalignment to shield themselves from the pressures of global

coalitions have themselves formed a rigid, ideological, confrontational coalition of their own. One of the most evident blocs in the world today is, ironically, the almost automatic alignment of the nonaligned.

The United States remains ready to respond responsibly and positively to countries which seriously seek justice and an equitable world economic system. But progress depends on a spirit of mutual respect, realism and practical cooperation. Let there be no mistake about it: Extortion will not work and will not be supinely accepted. The stakes are too high for self-righteous rhetoric or adolescent posturing.

## Values We Share

Our efforts to build peace and progress reflect our deep-seated belief in freedom and in the hope of a better future for all mankind. These are values we share with our closest allies the great industrial democracies.

The resilience of our countries in recovering from economic difficulty and in consolidating our cooperation has an importance far beyond our immediate well-being. For while foreign policy is unthinkable without an element of pragmatism, pragmatism without underlying moral purpose is like a rudderless ship.

Together, the United States and our allies have maintained the global peace and sustained the world economy for more than 30 years. The spirit of innovation and progress in our societies has no match anywhere, certainly none in societies laying claim to being "revolutionary." Rarely in history have alliances survived — let alone flourished — as ours have in vastly changing global and geopolitical conditions. The ideals of the industrial democracies give purpose to our efforts to improve relations with the East, to the dialogue with the third world and to many other spheres of common endeavor.

Our ties with the great industrial democracies are therefore not alliances of convenience but a union of principle in defense of values and a way of life.

## Concern About Red Role

It is in this context that we must be concerned about the possibility of Communist parties coming to power—or sharing in power—in governments in NATO countries. Ultimately, the decision must, of course, be made by the voters of the countries concerned. But no one should expect that this question is not of concern to this Government. Whether some of the Communist parties in Western Europe are in fact independent of Moscow cannot be determined when their electoral self-interest so overwhelmingly coincides with their claims. Their internal procedures — their Leninist

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## U.S. Foreign Policy



principles and dogmas—remain the antithesis of democratic parties. And were they to gain power they would do so after having advocated for decades programs and values detrimental to our traditional ties. By that record, they would inevitably give low priority to security and Western defense efforts, which are essential not only to Europe's freedom but to maintaining the world balance of power. They would be tempted to orient their economies to a much greater extent toward the East. We would have to expect that Western European governments in which Communists

play a dominant role would, at best, steer their countries' policies toward the positions of the nonaligned. The political solidarity and collective defense of the West, and thus NATO, would be inevitably weakened, if not undermined. And in this country, the commitment of the American people to maintain the balance of power in Europe, justified though it might be on pragmatic, geopolitical grounds, would lack the moral base on which it has stood for 30 years.

We consider the unity of the great industrial democracies crucial to all we do in the world. For this reason we have sought to expand our cooperation to areas beyond our mutual defense—in improved political consultation; in coordinating our approaches to negotiations with the East; in reinforcing our respective economic policies; in developing a common energy policy; and in fashioning common approaches for the increasingly important dialogue with the developing nations. We have made remarkable progress in all these areas. We are determined to continue. Our foreign policy has no higher priority.

The challenges before us are monumental. But it is not every generation that is given the opportunity to shape a new international order. If the opportunity is missed, we shall live in a world of chaos and danger. If it is realized we will have entered an era of peace and progress and justice.

#### A Need for Unity

But we can realize our hopes only as a united people. Our challenge—and its solution—lies in ourselves. Our greatest foreign policy problem is our divisions at home. Our greatest foreign policy need is national cohesion and a return to the awareness that in foreign policy we are all engaged in a common national endeavor.

The world watches with amazement—our adversaries with glee and our friends with growing dismay—how America seems bent on eroding its influence and destroying its achievements in world affairs through an orgy of recrimination.

They see our policies in Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, in Latin America, in East-West relations—undermined by arbitrary congressional actions that may take decades to undo.

They see our intelligence system gravely damaged by unremitting, indiscriminating attack.

They see a country virtually incapable of behaving with the discretion that is indispensable for diplomacy.

They see revelations of malfeasance abroad on the part of American firms wreak grave damage on the political structures of friendly nations. Whatever wrongs were committed—reprehensible as they are—should be dealt with in a manner consistent with our own judicial procedures—and with the dignity of allied nations.

#### Charges Are Dangerous

They see some critics suddenly pretending that the Soviets are 10 feet tall and that America, despite all the evidence to the contrary, is becoming a second-rate nation. They know these erroneous and reckless allegations to be dangerous, because they may, if continued, persuade allies and adversaries of our weakness, tempting the one to accommodation and the other to adventurism.

They see this Administration—which has been condemned by one set of critics for its vigorous reaction to expansionism in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa—simultaneously charged by another group of opponents with permitting unilateral Soviet gains.

The American people see all this, too, and wonder when it will end. They know that we cannot escape either our responsibilities or the geopolitical realities of the world around us. For a great nation that does not manage events will soon be overwhelmed by them.

If one group of critics undermines arms control negotiations and cuts off the prospect of more constructive ties with the Soviet Union; while another group cuts away at our defense budgets and intelligence services and thwarts American resistance to Soviet adventurism, both combined will, whether they have intended it or not, end by wrecking the nation's ability to conduct a strong, creative, moderate and prudent foreign policy. The result will be paralysis, no matter who wins in November. And if America cannot act, others will, and we and all the free peoples of the world will pay the price.

#### Unprecedented Challenges

So our problem is at once more complex and simpler than in times past. The challenges are unprecedented but the remedies are in our own hands. This Administration has confidence in the strength, resilience and vigor of America. If we summon the American spirit and restore our unity, we will have a decisive and positive impact on a world which, more than ever, affects our lives and cries out for our leadership.

Those who have faith in America will tell the American people the truth:

¶That we are strong and at peace.

¶That there are no easy or final answers to our problems.

¶That we must conduct a long-term and responsible foreign policy, without escape and without respite.

¶That what is attainable at one moment will inevitably fall short of the ideal.

¶That the reach of our power and our purpose has its limits.

That nevertheless we have the strength and determination to defend our interests, and the conviction to uphold our values.

¶And finally that we have the opportunity to leave our children a more cooperative, more just and more peaceful world than we found.

In the bicentennial year, we celebrate ideals which began to take shape around the shores of Massachusetts Bay some 350 years ago. We have accomplished great things as a united people. There is much yet to do. This country's work in the world is not a burden but a triumph—and the measure of greatness yet to come.

Americans have always made history rather than let history chart our course. We, the present generation of Americans, will do no less. So let this year mark the end of our divisions. Let us usher in an era of national reconciliation and rededication by all Americans to their common destiny. Let us have a clear vision of what is before us—glory and danger alike—and go forward together to meet it.