

No Claim of Innovation Made for

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Ford's "new Pacific Doctrine" replaces a disputed doctrine that acquired a tainted name, the "Nixon Doctrine."

The six-point formula for U.S. policy in the Pacific, proclaimed by President Ford at Honolulu Sunday, is probably the first declaration Mr. Ford has labeled a doctrine.

He made no claim of bold innovation. Instead, he said, the "components of peace" in his policy for the Asian-Pacific region "are already evident."

As a result, few newspapers even listed President Ford's six points yesterday.

Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield, however, on the Senate floor yesterday

hailed the President's proclamation at the University of Hawaii's East-West Center as "a most important historical document." Mansfield said afterward, "Maybe it should be called 'The Honolulu Declaration—the Ford Doctrine.'"

Mansfield was being consistent. Six years ago he was among the first to laud the declaration made by President Nixon at Guam on July 26, 1969. Mansfield's praise did much to elevate those remarks to the status of "Nixon Doctrine," although President Nixon had initially required the press to report his remarks without direct quotation.

Then and now Mansfield was encouraging U.S. concentration on the Pacific, an end to American military entanglement on the land mass of Asia and recon-

ciliation with the nations of Asia.

The "Nixon Doctrine" literally disappeared from the U.S. government's official vocabulary with the collapse of the Nixon administration in

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the Watergate scandals and the U.S. policy debacle in Vietnam. The disappearance was virtually unnoticed.

In response to inquiries several months ago about the fate of the Nixon Doctrine, one senior State Department official said: "Anything labeled Nixon is damned," and "events made it passe."

Another said: "We don't use the 'Nixon Doctrine' for obvious reasons. Not just because his name got attached to it, but because...a lot of

people think it means an elegant excuse for 'bugging out,' while others, on the left, say it really is a cover for doing what we were doing before."

Others said that, in fact, many of the themes of the Nixon Doctrine remain imbedded in American foreign policy.

The Nixon Doctrine, in some respects, was an anti-doctrine, retracting the sweeping reach of the earlier Truman and Eisenhower doctrines for the aggressive containment of the Soviet Union and China.

In 1970, President Nixon said of his doctrine:

"Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot—and will not—conceive all the plans, design all the programs.

President's 'Pacific Doctrine'

execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest."

This was essentially the language of Henry A. Kissinger, who came to power in Washington as an academic champion of a more realistic, comprehensive, national strategic doctrine, to replace the Truman and Eisenhower formulations.

But Kissinger, too, has had his problems in producing any single, integrated, military, diplomatic and political global formula. His critics charge that he has none.

President Ford's "Pacific Doctrine" contains little language likely to grip contemporary listeners. Only the future can tell whether the doctrine will grow or disappear.

The six points appear unpretentious in the post-Vietnam climate:

—"The first premise of a new Pacific Doctrine is that American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific," but "...we recognize that force alone is insufficient to assure security. Popular legitimacy and social justice are vital prerequisites of resistance against subversion or aggression..."

—"The second basic premise...is that the partnership with Japan is a pillar of our strategy..."

—"The third premise...is the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China..."

—"A fourth principle of our Pacific policy is our continuing stake in the stability and security of Southeast Asia." Particularly singled out was support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, plus "old friends and allies," Australia and New Zealand.

—"A fifth tenet...is our belief that peace in Asia depends upon a resolution of outstanding political conflicts." U.S. readiness was pledged "to consider constructive ways of easing tensions" on the Korean peninsula, where American military forces in South Korea are a prime U.S. commitment.

"In Indochina, the healing effects of time are required," and American policy "toward the new (Communist-ruled) regimes will be determined by their conduct toward us."

—"The sixth point of our new policy in the Pacific is that peace in Asia requires a structure of economic cooperation reflecting the aspirations of all the peoples in the region."

This last point noted, as few Americans realize, that U.S. "trade with East Asia now exceeds our transactions with the European Community," and "is now increasing by more than 30 per cent annually—reaching some \$46 billion last year."