

FORD AD

Ford Impact Is Uncertain In Foreign Policy So Far

NYTimes

AUG 9 1975

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8—When Gerald R. Ford took over as President, he pledged to pursue the same foreign policies that had brought wide respect to Richard M. Nixon. A year later, Mr. Ford has not altered those policies significantly or left a discernible imprint of his own on international affairs.

Reflecting his caution and inexperience in foreign affairs, Mr. Ford has stressed continua-

This is the second in a series of three articles assessing President's Ford's first year in office.

tion rather than innovation. He has relied heavily on the guidance of his Secretary of State and national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, the major figure who has served in both the Nixon and Ford Administrations.

The fact that Mr. Ford has not produced a personal foreign-policy program has worried some of his White House aides who are looking toward the 1976 elections.

They contend, however, that this was probably inevitable,

given Mr. Ford's strong reliance on Mr. Kissinger and the need last August to demonstrate to friends and foes abroad that Mr. Nixon's resignation did not presage a sharp change in American policies.

They insist that Mr. Ford has since begun to play a more important role in foreign policy-making and is showing more confidence in it. They say they expect that by this time next year, a Ford program will have emerged. Mr. Ford is also praised by State Department officials as willing to run political risks in defense of what they regard as American na-

Continued on Page 6, Column 3

NEWS INDEX

	Page		Page
Antiques	14	Going Out Guide	9
Art	15	Movies	8-9
Books	15	Music	8-9
Bridge	14	Notes on People	14
Business	23-31	Obituaries	120
Chess	14	Op-Ed	17
Churches	23	Sports	10-13
Crossword	15	Theaters	8-9
Editorials	16	Transportation	32
Family/Style	7	TV and Radio	33
Financial	23-30	Weather	32

News Summary and Index, Page 19

CALL THIS TOLL-FREE NUMBER FOR HOME DELIVERY OF THE NEW YORK TIMES—800-325-6400.

Continued From Page 1, Col. 2

tional interests.

Despite the political impact of the strong lobbies for Israel and Greece, the President has publicly criticized the Israelis as inflexible in the American-sponsored Middle East negotiations and has accused Greek-Americans of hurting American interests by blocking his efforts to lift the embargo against arms sales to Turkey.

He has also shown a readiness to disregard his right-wing supporters and back the moves toward detente with Moscow and Peking initiated by Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger.

Mr. Ford's willingness to make unpopular decisions—including the huge request for military aid to Saigon before it fell—has won him praise here. His general image in Washington, however, remains that of a neophyte in foreign policy.

Look Toward Kissinger

Most diplomats and politicians believe that Mr. Kissinger makes the principal American moves in foreign affairs.

Mr. Kissinger sees Mr. Ford almost every morning for at least an hour. Carrying a black-bound loose-leaf book, the Secretary briefs the President on foreign policy developments and important intelligence reports.

Yesterday, for instance, Mr. Kissinger discussed with Mr. Ford developments in Turkey, Argentina, Egypt, Greece and Mozambique.

These briefings have taken a new form since the early days of the Administration. At first Mr. Kissinger used them to tell the President of secret aspects of relations with various countries. It has been described as a sort of elementary course in modern diplomacy. Now Mr. Ford can deal with issues without having to be thoroughly briefed on the background of every problem, aides say.

Concerned With Tactics

Mr. Ford is said to lack Mr. Nixon's "strategic" interest in foreign policy. The former president often originated policy departures; Mr. Ford is more concerned with tactical, day-by-day decisions.

In the last year Mr. Ford has at times seemed almost desperate for some conspicuous foreign policy achievement that he could count as his own. Yet in a gradual, almost imperceptible manner, he seems to have improved American ties with Western Europe and Japan.

The President's supporters also believe that he should be praised for having handled the Indochina debacle calmly.

Impact of Mayaguez

The handling of the Cambodian seizure of the Mayaguez and the American regarding of her, highly-publicized at the time, seems now more a footnote to the Indochina collapse than a major action. But it had the effect at the time of giving many Americans something to applaud when other events were grim.

Mr. Ford's perseverance in seeking a Middle East agreement and helping to avert an explosion from frustration there has also won him praise from diplomats.

Lacking Mr. Nixon's openly strong anti-Castro bias, Mr.

Ford supported the lifting of the 11-year-old trade and diplomatic embargo against Cuba by the Organization of American States.

The action, taken in Costa Rica recently, will not automatically improve the climate between the United States and Cuba. But it did remove a highly contentious issue from the O.A.S. agenda and is expected to ease Washington's problems in the hemisphere.

International Economics

With the President's support, Secretary Kissinger has moved energetically into international economics and has given at least rhetorical support to the idea of seeking conciliation with the third world.

The United States has also taken the lead in the new oil consumers organization, the International Energy Authority, a development viewed positively here.

Despite growing criticism of gestures toward the Soviet Union, Mr. Ford has pressed energetically ahead in the strategic arms limitation talks. The accord announced at Vladivostok last November, putting ceilings on the number of offensive strategic weapons, is being negotiated into a treaty. If an agreement is reached and survives what will be tough scrutiny in the Senate, Mr. Ford will have achieved a major breakthrough.

Despite long service in Congress, however, Mr. Ford has been unable to get full support on Capitol Hill on key foreign-policy matters.

Diego Garcia Approved

Construction of a United States naval base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean was approved. But Congress has refused to yield on aid to Turkey, thereby causing

problems for Western security and American bases in the eastern Mediterranean.

Recent Administration efforts to sell 14 batteries of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Jordan were also set back because of Congressional opposition.

The Crisis over the division of Cyprus was the first foreign-policy crisis of the Ford Administration. It remains unsolved, in part because of the Congressional refusal to sell arms to Turkey and the Turks' decision to stand tough on negotiations with Greece about the future of Cyprus.

When Mr. Ford took office, Mr. Kissinger had just begun preliminary talks looking to-

ward a further interim accord in the Middle East, pending a final peace settlement. Earlier interim accords between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria had won Mr. Kissinger wide acclaim and Mr. Nixon a highly favorable tour of the Middle East in June, 1974.

Problem of Even-Handedness

Frustratingly for Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger, the United States is still trying to put together that further accord. The negotiations were delayed last year to allow Mr. Ford time to assure the Arabs that despite his pro-Israeli voting record in Congress, he would be even-handed.

Now, because of his friend-

ship with oilmen, Mr. Ford must also convince the Israelis of even-handedness.

The negotiations have floundered for a variety of reasons. To avoid a political disadvantage if no accord is reached, Mr. Ford has used his influence to squeeze concessions from the Israelis and some modifications from the Egyptians.

It now seems more likely that an accord can be reached but it could cost the President some Jewish support in the United States.

Skepticism in U.S.

Relations with the Russians have deteriorated, partly because of the insistence of Congress on linking trade concessions to Soviet emigration policies and partly because of a general uneasiness in the United States about the value of detente.

While not disputing Mr. Kissinger's contention that detente is necessary to avoid nuclear war, many Americans have become skeptical about such well-publicized but, they feel, hollow events as the Apollo-Soyuz joint space mission and the recent 35-nation European Security Conference in Helsinki.

Mr. Ford, who in Congress was staunchly anti-Communist, found himself as President defending Soviet actions on arms limitations and on the drafting of the security conference document, which confirmed post-war boundaries in Europe and the existence of Communist governments.

A well-conceived and scrupulously drafted accord on strategic arms and a more liberal Soviet policy on emigration and on human rights in general

may improve relations. At the moment, however, the tentatively planned visit of Leonid I. Brezhnev to the United States in a few months seems like a political liability for President Ford.
