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Kissinger Defends Detente

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger yesterday defended detente with the Soviet Union and support of authoritarian regimes against critics who have branded American foreign policy as "excessively pragmatic" or "insensitive to moral values."

Continuing his quest for public support of a policy on which Congress is imposing increasing constraints, Kissinger spoke yesterday in Minneapolis, his sixth in a series of speeches being delivered in cities around the nation.

In a world of "nuclear peril," he said, "there is no alternative to coexistence" with the Soviet Union, even though Americans may find abhorrent Soviet repression of its own people.

"Since the dawn of the nuclear age," Kissinger said, "the world's fears of holocaust and its hopes for a better future have both hinged on the relationship be-

tween the two superpowers . . . In such conditions the necessity of peace is a moral imperative."

In his address to the Upper Middle West Council, Kissinger said: "It is time to face the reality of our situation. Our choice is not between morality and pragmatism. We cannot escape either, nor are they incompatible. This nation must be true to its own beliefs or it will lose its bearings in the world. But at the same time it must survive in a world of sovereign nations and competing wills."

At a news conference later Kissinger said that he felt his subject, "the Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy," was particularly appropriate for an audience in Minnesota because of its "idealistic tradition and its senators and congressmen who have paid such particular attention to the range of problems" he was addressing.

Kissinger has been under attack in Congress for failing to demand, as the price of detente, some relaxation in Moscow's

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emigration policies and in its repression of intellectuals.

He has been criticized for failing to try to end the suppression of human rights in Chile and in South Korea and for demonstrating excessive warmth toward the now deposed military junta, all in the name of strategic imperatives.

With the Soviet Union, Kissinger said, "our immediate focus is on . . . international actions . . . because it is the sphere of action that we can most directly and confidently affect. As a consequence of improved foreign policy relationship," Kissinger argued, "we have successfully used our influence to promote human rights. But we have done so quietly, keeping in mind the delicacy of the problem and stressing results rather than public confrontation."

Congress, through the Jackson amendment limiting the U.S.-Soviet trading relationship unless Moscow eases its emigration policies, said in effect, that Kissinger did not do enough.

Kissinger said that the question of human rights raises a more general question: "To what extent are we able to affect the internal policies of other governments and to what extent is it desirable?"

Recommending his own policy to his listeners, Kissinger said: "We do not and will not condone repressive practices . . . We have used, and we will use, our influence against repressive practices. Our traditions and our interests demand it.

"But truth compels also a recognition of our limits. The question is whether we promote human rights more effectively by counsel and friendly relations . . . or by confrontation propaganda and discriminatory legislation?"

Kissinger appeared to be trying to explain away the U.S. failure to mitigate the repressive practices of South Korea's President Park Chung Hee and, before that, of South Vietnam's Nguyen Van Thieu, by saying that "in many countries—especially in Asia—it is the process of American disengagement that has eroded the sense of security and created a perceived need for greater internal discipline—and at the same time diminished our ability to influence domestic practices."

In a veiled plea to restore military aid to Turkey, a NATO ally, Kissinger said that "alliances and political relationships serve mutual ends . . . they are not favors to other governments . . . they should be withdrawn only when our interests change and not as punishment for some act with which we do not agree." Congress, requiring compliance with U.S. law, banned military aid to Turkey when it used American arms not for alliance purposes but for the invasion of Cyprus.

Tracing the American experience, Kissinger recalled that following World War II, "our success and the pre-eminent position it brought convinced us that we could shape the globe according to American design."