

after the election. "The first thing they did was take a good, decent and fine man like Barry Goldwater and kidnap his mind and force upon him many convictions which I think normally and on reflection, he might not have willingly conceived of himself."

But Scott is proud of much of the Party's recent record. He is most fond of Vandenberg's "policy of containment" which he says was "the only policy that could have worked." He also praises the "policy of containment" which he says was "the only policy that could have worked."

### Wanted: Team The Brain

*The Review of the American People*, No. 1, p. 1, 2, pp. 30, 31, is a defense of the Central Intelligence Agency and a letter executed directly to the review of the intelligence for that day. It is a long and detailed political statement.

### BY FAREX, HON. J. HANSON

The most significant one was the American government in the Central Intelligence Agency. Ever since its creation by Congress in 1949, this supposedly secret agency has been and one of the leading causes of suspicion, doubt, or confusion in the public mind. It has done little to justify its existence. Collect and summarize intelligence for government agencies pursuing its own foreign policy. And there are those who see an organization that is not only a waste of money but also a danger to the country.

Believed to be the only one who has not wanted to see the CIA plan stand up. Few are qualified to make positive identifications. Like Kirkpatrick, he is qualified indeed, his knowledge should argue that of any person set to publish on the subject. Kirkpatrick served in CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, during World War II and was on hand at CIA when he was executive assistant to General Walter Bedell Smith, CIA's director in its most important formative years and Kirkpatrick rose through the agency to the rank of lieutenant by a crippling polio which in 1952 he became inspector for all the eight years. As executive

director he was No. 3 man in the agency's high command until he resigned in 1965 to teach political science at Brown University.

In *The Real CIA* Kirkpatrick traces the evolution of the U.S. intelligence system, as well as the progress of his own career. Only in America could someone with his privileged security knowledge publish such a book. Kirkpatrick's purpose is to set straight the general record. At least that part of it open to dispute. He is convinced that most of the information about the CIA has been either exaggerated or distorted. Although not meant to be a criticism of the CIA, from its inception through its various stages, he argues against those who would alter radically the central mission, concept or change the assignment of disparate functions to the CIA.

Most of the information Kirkpatrick provides here was already in the public record. The book's greatest value is its validation of certain facts about the CIA's rather obscure organizational history. And this insider's view, much to be learned about the intricate mingling and departmental jealousies. We are not to blame, how the CIA due for a major reorganization. It is one of the two most powerful agencies in government, and for years because his protocol book in Washington, D.C., was distributed. This, writes Kirkpatrick, could actually affect the willingness of people to listen to him in important meetings. Although the director's rank has recently been elevated, the authority of Kirkpatrick's views are still those who try to reduce the role of

the director of Central Intelligence.

Kirkpatrick's opinions and observations deserve serious consideration because they derive from a thoughtful mind and unique experience. Nevertheless there are important and perhaps crucial questions on which he offers little enlightenment. How did an agency set up by Congress in 1947 to perform intelligence (information) activities come to undertake secret political operations? Did Congress ever intend the CIA to overthrow foreign governments or secretly subsidize American domestic institutions? Here the book falls short of the promise of its title. In his brief discussion of covert political action Kirkpatrick makes clear that he thinks it wise to combine "action" and "intelligence" under the CIA roof. He believes, however, that covert political action should be used "only in the most serious national emergency, and as a last resort before the use of military power."

One can quickly agree with Kirkpatrick that "a strong intelligence organization is an essential element of our national security, provided that it is effective, objective and properly controlled." Most quickly would this reviewer agree that these provisos have been met, or that we have the information to so assume. It has been easier to create committees for control than to effectuate real control of secret operations. The *Los Angeles Times* incident may be an example of continuing deficiencies in the CIA. And with respect to effectiveness, the Southeast Asian crisis may be a tragic example of another colossal American intelligence failure.



Scott  
"It wants to buy us out."