

Kissinger-C.I.A. Conflict In Chile Hearings Cited

By SEYMOUR M. HERSK

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The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported yesterday that during its hearings there had been conflicts in testimony between Henry A. Kissinger and the Central Intelligence Agency about the extent of White House authorization for the agency's role in a Chilean kidnapping plot in October 1970.

Mr. Kissinger, who was then president Nixon's national security adviser, told the committee in secret testimony last August that he and his deputy, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, had turned down a specific C.I.A. proposal to organize a military coup d'etat aimed at preventing Salvador Allende from becoming President of Chile.

Agency officials testified, however, that their subsequent involvement in the kidnapping and assassination of a high-level Chilean general loyal to Mr. Allende came, as the Senate report put it, "with the knowledge and approval of the White House."

The Senate report concluded that while the United States' policy was to seek a military coup, there was no evidence that any American official specifically planned an assassination or expected that a kidnapping attempt would lead to a shooting.

Two Attempts Failed

The Senate testimony revealed that Richard M. Helms, who was then Director of Central Intelligence, and other agency officials continued to aid anti-Allende military factions even after it became clear that no military coup would be possible without the removal of Gen. Rene Schneider, the army's commander in chief, who was an Allende supporter.

The C.I.A. encouraged two unsuccessful kidnapping attempts in mid-October on the general, supplying at least \$70,000 to two Chilean officers and three machine guns and other weapons, the testimony showed. On the third attempt, General Schneider was assassinated after he allegedly opened fire on his abductors.

The slaying took place on Oct. 22, 1970, two days before Mr. Allende's victory in the Sept. 4 election was to be ratified by the Congress. Mr. Allende, a Marxist who was founder of the Socialist Party in Chile, defeated less leftist candidates who had been covertly aided by the C.I.A.

Nixon Summoned Helms

On the previous Sept. 15, the Senate report said, President Nixon had summoned Mr. Helms to a White House meeting with Mr. Kissinger and John N. Mitchell, then the Attorney General, and ordered the C.I.A. to spend \$10 million, and "more if necessary," to provoke a military coup in an effort to "save Chile."

Details of Mr. Nixon's role in the plotting were initially described last July by The New York Times, but the Senate assassinati report included the first direct testimony on the operation as well as the first account of the dispute between Mr. Kissinger and the C.I.A. over who authorized what.

During his Senate testimony, Mr. Kissinger acknowledged that he was aware that the primary thrust of the White House meeting "was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent Allende from being seated." Mr. Kissinger further testified, "It is clear that President Nixon wanted him [Helms] to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or to take the initiative in preventing Allende from taking office."

The Senate report describes how the C.I.A. was authorized to report on its efforts to President Nixon through Mr. Kissinger, bypassing the Ambassador in Chile, the Department of State, the Pentagon and the 40 Committee. At the time, the 40 Committee which oversees clandestine intelligence efforts, was considered one of the most secret units in the Government.

This led to what the Senate report called a two-track approach, with the 40 Committee authorizing funds for anti-Allende propaganda activity and the White House seeking contacts with Chilean military men who would lead a coup.

By the end of September, the Senate report concluded, both tracks had the same goal: the overthrow of the Allende Government.

The Senate report notes that the White House insisted that economic pressure also be brought against the Allende Government. The report includes the following warning that Ambassador Edward M. Korry, sent to a Chilean political moderate in an effort to encourage him to become involved in the anti-Allende planning:

Not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost

deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile."

Thomas Karamessines, then the C.I.A. deputy director in charge of covert operations, was placed in direct charge of a special Chilean task force. He told the Senate committee of having been under pressure from Mr. Kissinger to accomplish an overthrow. Mr. Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind," Mr. Karamessines testified, "that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished."

Mr. Kissinger, in his testimony, said he knew of no specific plan that involved the abduction of General Schneider.

He testified that on Oct. 15, 1970, he met in the White House with Mr. Karamessines to discuss a coup attempt to be led by a retired Chilean general, Roberto Viaux Marambio. His chances were not rated very high and it was decided at the meeting to forestall any further action by Mr. Viaux.

The basic dispute cited by the Senate emerged from that meeting. Mr. Kissinger, whose testimony was supported by General Haig, said that he had turned "off the coup plans." Mr. Karamessines told the Senate Committee that he had left the meeting after Mr. Kissinger said that "the agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight."

Mr. Karamessines further testified that there never was a White House order ending the anti-Allende effort.

"I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973," he told the committee, alluding to the coup that ousted Mr. Allende in September 1973 and led to his death.

The Senate report noted that it had been unable to question former President Nixon in this point and had been unable to gain access to the daily calendars of Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Nixon to confirm that some of the subsequent meetings on a military solution in Chile alleged to have taken place by C.I.A. officials had actually been held.