U.S. Memo On Angola Released

Washington

Senator John V. Tunney (Dem. Calif.) made public yesterday, a purportedly secret State Department memorandum, which he said may have forced one faction in the Angolan civil war "into closer collaboration with the Soviet Union."

Tunney asked that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger be questioned about the memorandum when he testifies about Angola today before the Senate foreign relations subcommittee on African affairs.

In a letter to Senator Dick Clark (Dem.-Iowa), the subcommittee chairman, Tunney said leaders of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) regarded the memorandum "as an ultimatum that shut the door of accommodation with the United States."

The memorandum, according to Tunney's office, was given to a high MPLA official in Washington last December 11. A copy was obtained by Mark Moran, a Tunney aide, during a fact-finding trip to Angola. Moran returned to Washington Tuesday night.

Moran, in a background report also made public by Tunney, said the memorandum was given to the unnamed MPLA official in the Mayflower Hotel here by T.A. Wilson, board chairman of the Boeing Co. of Seattle.

At the time, the MPLA official had been conferring with Wilson about delivery of two Boeing 737s which the MPLA had purchased but which the State Department had prevented from being delivered.

According to Moran, the memorandum was printed on a sheet of plain paper that bore no official U.S. markings and was headed merely by the word "Memorandum." A copy made public by Tunney said:

"The United States government cannot stand idly by in the face of the Soviet power play in Angola. The United States is unwilling to condone an Angolan regime under Soviet control.

"If the MPLA is willing to work for a political solution and compromise with its nationalist rivals, the United States is willing to back a peaceful settlement.

"The MPLA would do well to heed advice that no government can plan reconstruction in postwar Angola without American and Western help. No government can obtain the technological and financial resources to stimulate economic development without official American consent.

"In fact, the United States would be quite responsive and helpful to a coalition government that was not dependent on the Soviet Union.

"The United States government is prepared to consider further the supply of Boeing aircraft to Angola depending on the course of events in Angola. This message should be given to the Luanda (Angola's capital) authorities. As anyone should be aware, access to sophisticated technology is a privilege. The case of Boeing is just one, but a good, example of the advantages of having access to American technology."

Efforts to reach Wilson were unsuccessful. His Seattle office said the Boeing chairman was en route home by plane from Washington.

U.S. officials acknowledged that a memorandum had been prepared for Wilson's guidance to explain the U.S. position and to explain why the Boeing planes could not be delivered.

U.S. sources identified the MPLA official as Bessa Victor, head of his government's civil aviation. When the State Department learned Victor was in this country to talk to Boeing they recognized he was the first fairly high MPLA contact available to the department since the U.S. consulate in Luanda was closed November 11.

Therefore, the sources said, it was decided this was an opportunity to convey the U.S. position of

Angola directly to the MPLA; and Wilson was picked as the intermediary because U.S. officials did not want to approach Victor themselves. The memorandum given to Wilson was intended to provide him with talking points and not be turned over to Victor. However, Wilson let Victor copy the memo.

Moran said in his report that Wilson had been instructed to say his message "represented not only the view of the Department of State but that of the administration as well."

Moran said the MPLA official promptly delivered the memorandum to his president, Augustino Neto. Moran added:

"He described Neto's reaction as surprise and anger and a very definite feeling that the United States had completely misread the position of his government. I was told the memo was then widely distributed among the MPLA cabinet where the reactions were said to be similar to those of the president."

Tunney, in his letter to Clark, said:

"The memorandum, which constantly came up in (Moran's) discussions with MPLA leaders, was viewed by them as so intractable and bellicose, and so inconsistent with public American claims that the American position on Angola was not based on any opposition to

MPLA itsolf, that it amounted to a virtual ultimatum that slammed the door on furthOr discussions or a possible rapproachment with out country."

Tunney said Moran was told by MPLA leaders that they want closer relations with the United States and will not permit the Soviet Union or Cuba to establish military or naval facilities in Angola.