

Kissinger Parley Excerpts

Following are excerpts from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's news conference in Washington yesterday, as recorded by The New York Times through the facilities of ABC News:

The basic problem in our relation with the Soviet Union is the emergence of the Soviet Union into true superpower status. That fact has become evident only in the 1970's. As late as the Cuban missile crisis, the disparity in strategic power between the United States and the Soviet Union was overwhelming in our favor.

In the 70's and 80's the Soviet Union will have achieved and is on the road to achieving effective strategic equality, which means that whoever may be ahead in the damage they can inflict on the other, the damage to the other in a general nuclear war will be of a catastrophic nature.

This being the case, in the past the emergence of a country into superpower status, such, for example, as Imperial Germany vis-à-vis Great Britain, has generally led to war.

Under the conditions of the nuclear age it must not lead to war. That is a fact of the period that any administration and any opponent of the administration would have to face if they had to assume responsibility—how to manage the emergence of Soviet power without sacrificing vital interests is the pre-eminent problem of our period.

That part of the Soviet-American relationship cannot be abolished. That is inherent in the relationship.

Move for Moderation

The second problem we have is whether we can accelerate the process of moderating this potential conflict by conscious acts of policy. This has been called détente. In this respect, it requires conscious restraint by both sides. If one side doesn't practice restraint then the situation becomes inherently tense.

We do not confuse the relaxation of tension with permitting the Soviet Union to expand its sphere by military means and that is the issue, for example, in Angola. The danger to détente that we face now is that our domestic disputes

are depriving us of both the ability to provide incentives for moderation such as in the restrictions on the trade act, as well as of the ability to resist military moves by the Soviet Union as in Angola.

If the Soviet Union continues action such as Angola we will without any question resist. Failure to resist can only lead other countries to conclude that their situation is becoming precarious, because in Angola we are not talking about American participation, we are talking about giving military and financial assistance to people who are doing the fighting—to local people who are doing the fighting.

Unless the Soviet Union shows restraint in its foreign-policy actions, the situation in our relationship is bound to become more tense, and there is no question that the United States will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind.

We warned and warned [Congress] about the implications of the amendments with respect to Soviet trade. The end result was that the trade act could not be implemented or the trade agreement would not be implemented and the people who were supposed to be helped were hurt in the sense that Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union fell from 38,000 to 10,000.

Warning to Congress

We warned and warned about the implications of the Turkish aid cutoff and it is now perfectly evident that our relations with Turkey have been damaged beyond any immediate hope of recovery, though we have made some progress and we are warning now that what is happening in Angola has nothing to do with the local situation in Angola.

We were prepared to accept any outcome in Angola before massive arms shipments by the Soviet Union and the introduction of Cuban forces.

We are not opposed to the M.P.L.A. [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] as such. We make a distinction between the factions in Angola and the outside intervention. We can live with any of the factions in Angola and we would never have given assistance to any of the other factions if other

great powers had stayed out of this.

The issue is not whether a pro-Soviet faction is becoming dominant in Angola. The United States policy until well into the summer was to stay out of Angola, to let the various factions work out their own arrangements between themselves. We accepted in Mozambique without any difficulty a pro-Marxist faction that came to power by indigenous means, or perhaps with some minimum outside support in the Frelimo [Front for the Liberation of Mozambique].

Start of Soviet Aid

What happened between March and the middle of the summer was a massive introduction of Soviet military equipment which was then followed by Soviet advisers and large numbers of Cuban troops — large, at least, in relation to what it takes in Angola to affect the situation.

Therefore, the issue is not whether the country of Angola represents a vital interest to the United States; the issue is whether the Soviet Union, backed by a Cuban expeditionary force, can impose on two-thirds of the population its own brand of government. And the issue is not whether the United States should resist it with its own military forces.

Nobody ever suggested the introduction of American military forces. The President has made it clear that under no circumstances will we introduce American military forces.

The issue is whether the United States will disqualify from giving a minimal amount of economic and military assistance to the two-thirds of the population that is resisting an expeditionary force from outside the hemisphere and a massive introduction of Soviet military equipment.

If the United States adopts as a national policy that we cannot give even military and economic assistance to people who are trying to defend themselves without American military forces, then we are practically inviting outside forces to participate in every situation in which there is a possibility for foreign intervention and we are therefore undermining any hope of political and international order.