

# KISSINGER INSISTS STAND ON ANGOLA WILL NOT CHANGE

Says U.S. Will Continue to  
Oppose the Imposition of a  
Soviet-Backed Regime

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NEW TENSION FORESEEN

Secretary Asserts Senate  
Vote Hobbled Attempts to  
Find Diplomatic Solution  
NYTimes

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Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 — Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, warning that Soviet-American tensions might rise, said today that the Ford Administration would continue to oppose—through available military aid and diplomatic means—the imposition of a Soviet-backed regime in Angola by force.

At a news conference, Mr. Kissinger said the Senate vote last week against further secret financing in the Angolan civil war had “severely complicated” the Administration’s efforts

Excerpts from the Kissinger  
news conference, Page 7.

for a diplomatic solution. But he asserted that the Administration would use the \$9 million left for military aid and take other steps to oppose Soviet “expansion,” even at the cost of a setback in Soviet-American relations.

Pledging that no American forces would be introduced into the former Portuguese colony, Mr. Kissinger made a determined effort to rally support for the Administration’s position. He also hardened the Administration’s attitude toward Moscow.

## Warning to Soviet

Referring to Angola, where the Russians have reportedly sent in about \$100 million in equipment and 200 advisers, and encouraged Cuba to send as many as 5,000 soldiers, Mr. Kissinger said:

“Unless the Soviet Union shows restraint in its foreign policy actions, the situation in our relationship is bound to become more tense, and there is no question that the United States will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind.”

Mr. Kissinger clearly wanted to inform both Congress and the Soviet Union of the Ford Administration’s determination to press for a solution acceptable to the United States in Angola.

He said the United States would make “every effort” militarily with the \$9 million still left to it for covert aid to the Angolan factions opposing the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

## More Diplomatic Efforts

Diplomatic efforts would also continue, he said, primarily through the Organization of African Unity, the umbrella group for the continent, which will discuss the Angolan civil war next month. He said that if the situation in Angola had not improved by the time Congress reconvened Jan. 19, “We will go back to the Congress

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and present the situation as it then exists” in an effort to get more funds.

Later in the day, Mr. Kissinger met for 45 minutes with the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, and reportedly reiterated the American concern over Soviet involvement in Angola. Mr. Kissinger has over the last month had several discussions with Mr. Dobrynin about Angola, but so far there has been no agreement on what to do. The Russians have given support to the Popular Movement, which controls the capital, Luanda, and has, together with other Communist and some other third-world countries, extended diplomatic relations to that group, one of three fighting in Angola.

## Link to Arms Talk

Mr. Kissinger, who has devoted much effort to putting relations with Moscow on a more normal basis, was ambiguous about the specific effects Angola might have on over-all Soviet-American relations, but he hinted that even the talks on limiting strategic arms could be affected.

With these talks deadlocked over a few key issues, Mr. Kissinger had planned to fly to Moscow in the second half of January to seek a breakthrough in the negotiations—something sought by both Moscow and Washington. But in answer to questions today, Mr. Kissinger for the first time raised the possibility that, because of Angola, his negotiating mission might be canceled.

“We are talking to the Soviet Union within the context of our over-all relationship, and there is no question that our over-all relationship will suffer if we do not find an adequate solution to the Angolan problem,” he said. “Where it will suffer and in what ways, I am not prepared to say,” he added.

As for the visit, he said, “we will have to look at the situation closer to the time of the trip before we can answer the question whether it is in jeopardy or not.”

Up to now, the talks on strategic-arms limitation, which began in November 1969, have been insulated from other Soviet-American issues. Mr. Kissinger, a leading proponent of an accord to limit offensive missiles and bombers, stressed

that cancellation of his trip to Moscow would be a serious step.

“The question of strategic-arms limitations is a matter that is in our mutual interest and that should not be lightly discarded, he said. “It is not a favor we grant to the Soviet Union. It is an inherent necessity of the present period. Avoiding nuclear war is not a favor we do anybody. Avoiding nuclear war without giving up any interests is the problem that we face now.”

Mr. Kissinger did say, however, that because of Angola the Administration would do nothing to revive efforts in Congress to grant the Soviet Union trade concessions.

Virtually the entire 45-minute news conference was taken up with Angola and problems in maintaining Soviet-American détente.

Mr. Kissinger said—as he had privately told Senators last week in vainly seeking support for \$28 million in additional covert funds for Angola—that the United States did not oppose a Marxist faction’s taking power, but only its being “imposed” by Communist intervention.

## Imposition Called the Issue

“The issue is not whether the country of Angola represents a vital interest to the United States,” he said. “The issue is whether the Soviet Union, backed by a Cuban expeditionary force, can impose on two-thirds of the population its own brand of government.”

If the United States ends its support in Angola, he said, “we are practically inviting outside forces to participate in every situation in which there is a possibility for foreign intervention, and we are, therefore, undermining any hope of political and international order.”

He said the funds sought from Congress were “trivial sums.” By approving tens of millions of dollars, he contended, it did not mean that the country was automatically approving an unlimited involvement. Critics of the Angolan aid raised the precedent of Vietnam, where the American role escalated until billions of dollars and a half million troops were involved.

Mr. Kissinger said the money

for Angola—\$27 million has been spent this year—was arranged clandestinely “because we did not want to have a public confrontation if we could avoid it.”

On détente, Mr. Kissinger said that the main American problem was to “manage” the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower in such a way as to avoid nuclear war “without sacrificing vital interests.”

He said that the refusal of Congress either to approve “moderating” measures such as trade concessions to the Soviet Union, or to go ahead with Angolan military funds, had made it extremely difficult for the Administration to conduct a sophisticated foreign policy.

“I must stress again we are being deprived now of both the incentives for moderation and the capacity to resist, and this must lead to an extremely dangerous situation,” he said.

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