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the cost to the country of such things as befell him and his colleagues. That was merely the best-advertised. There were many earlier ones of one of which I have first-hand knowledge.

Glad to get the simple explanation of the Chou distance keeping. Makes perfect sense.

We diverge on your worry about the turning of history that can follow this. I agree completely on the racist interpretation of the dropping of the atom bombs and am certain every land of oigmented people feels this way. I've heard blacks say it often. But I do not share your worry that our military will get to or need to use tactical nukes in SVN, for domestic reasons. At least not unless things awful thing lingers long, for I don't think the Dirty Trickies will dare try that on the electorate while they expect to return to the electroate. My greater concern for the immediate future is with internal repression. It is the ultimate non-answer of the man who has no answers.

I think you undertate in pointing out that the Chinese have said they would not be the first to use nukes, although you are correct. Did not the USSR also either say that or ask a joint declaration on it?...And I'm inclined to think that even the bombast and recriminations will now recede. There is and will always be the strong disagreement between the systems and their representatives. But I think we have moved farthur forward than perhaps any but the direct participants might. The one danger is the horrible mistake to whoch you refer, and I wonder if that might not involve us and the Chinese as much as them and the getting-more-paranoid USSR. What remains, of course, is the danger from the lone nut, the Khrushchev figure of speech. I suppose that can always happen, a la Strangelove.

You are right on your comment on the Cold War, but here I am more optimistic than you. I think we have now advanced to the point where everyone realizes that thekind of opposition we have mounted to liberation struggles can't succeed, that there really is no answer to guerrilla warfare when it is waged by a majority of the local people, and that there will have to be a gradual end to this kind of foolishness. What the left seems not to have apprehended is the end of the usefulness of the traditional imperialism and now the end of the first form of its military variant. The race has gone faster than even the runners have realized. Dxamine, for example, some of the lingering Chinese slogans and ask yourself if they are not really a bit outdated. This does not mean they are outdated in terms of internal usefulness or as a means of making what it is desired be underttood comprehensible. But strictly speaking, I think they have not kept pace and I predict, with the always-present danger of predictions, that in time their formulations will change. Not the basic thing they say, but how they say it.

One of the deterrents, in my opinion, is the a validity in your mized metaphor of the throwing of fat back from the wild blue yonder. The most populous nation is the one best able to survive such a tragedy, and the one least able to is the one most "advanced", that is, requiring all sorts of modern devises and machines. We are the fat that would be thrown back into the fire with such wild-blue-yongering, and I think the realization has reached all but the insane.

My knowledge of thecompetetive histories of the peoples of the USSR and China is inadequate, although it does include that to wich you refer and some of the more recent. However, what you say can be said almost without exception about all peoples~~xxx~~ who have been neighbors and doesn't explain the present situation. I can't really believe the Chinese look longingly at Sibera because it given them room. I can believe they hold parts are their land taken by force. However, I also seem to remember that in every other case where there was a border dispute except with India the Chinese settled each case on generous terms more than satisfactory to that beighbor. Of course, it can be argued that in that stage of their development the minor territorial concessions represented no real cost and hardly anything like their enormous return in immediate political and public relations, satibility, ending disputes, etc. My feeoing is that their offer to India was more than fair. So, this leaves the major problem and the only recent clash that with the USSR, and I can't think of any reason to exist aside from political. Assuming it is not a fake, those parts of Khrushchev Remembers what relate to this might interest you. I think perhaps the initial trouble comes from excessive holiness by the Only True Be;ievers. The USSR had made a literal interpretation of Marx that it had found valid from its experience, in a land that could be considered the kind of which Marx theorized. China is no such land. Mao's interpretation of Marx was the equivalent of Lenin's for Russia, for there was no European-like proletariat in China. This part of society there was rhe peasant. I think it began here and got worse when events proved Mao right. Were I Mao I'd also feel the way you say he does about the USSR's continued recognition of Chiang for so long, especially during the

beginning of the Cold War. But taking all the legitimate and existing tensions you point out, the relations between these two giants can't be explained to my satisfaction in reasonable terms consistent with their doctrines and theories. I think they find a kind of inappropriate parallel in history, in the religious wars of the past. If I think you are absolute correct in describing "Sino-Soviet friendship" as "a difficult, fragile thing", I also believe it need not be and it is very much against the genuine and the selfish interests of both parties for it to be. It is irrational, especially in the world of today. My own feeling, and it is only a feeling, for my knowledge is deficient, is that if both are in part to blame, most of it is that of the USSR and the strangest part of all, given Chinese current approval of Stalin, is that it is largely his heritage. Not the right way to put it. Part of his legacy, he laid the foundation for it, made it first possible, then inevitable.... I'd like to think it possible that Mao could not recall the inevitability of all the many flowers blooming and attempt to germinate a few of those so long dormant in the colder climes. I think he should NOW take the initiative, and I think ~~it would~~ it would increase his enormously greater stature were he to try. At the same time, I think the most obvious grim interpretation of Nixon's move would impel the USSR along the same line. I think they should be looking forward to increased domestic dissatisfaction and stronger internal demands. Discontent, really.

I think Mao was wrong on Tito, that Tito was correct for Tito, for his country, and for international communism. Stalin's or the USSR's dictating of internal policies and approaches within each land and for each people was wrong. Moreover, he visualized a new imperialism, not a confraternity of the friendly, of political brothers. He visualized all the contiguous lands as suppliers of the USSR of what the USSR said it wanted from each. The inevitable consequence was a lower standard of living and life for those people. Tito was only the first. It has become the reality. Why should the Romanians, for example, accept the role of food supplier for the Moscow table, and live the life of international peasant? I think we have not yet realized the probable extent of Stalin's mental illness.

Whether or not Kh. Remembers is authentic, one of the things that makes it seem to be is the enormous support for what it says in Stalin's known record. I have noted a few of the indications that it is not authentic, and largely they do relate to the East. If it is an oversimplification, there are things the Russians are going to have to learn of politics that they have learned in other areas. Examples are their developing of seeds best suited for special areas, like what that does well in the bitter cold. It is like me trying to plant an orange tree and expect it to survive our local winters. It is irrational. But we can grow apples and all sorts of other things. I'd have loved to have brought a Bird of Paradise plant back from California to see if Lil, with her green hands (not just a thumb) could find a way of keeping it alive inside. But I know damned well that it can't make it outside here. There are such simple realities that major powers of more advanced political understanding and thinking can't excuse avoiding, and the disputes

between these two can't be justified or explained by history. They have both emerged from their histories, are both different lands, with people even different, if basically true to their pasts. But no point in worrying this further. To me, at least, it is as minimal as it is obvious. I can't find explanation that satisfied.

Is not the Mao "lean to one side" speech to which you refer a kind of Titoism? And is there not explanation of the lower Chinese opposition to us than to the Russians really because there had been fewer frictions, less exploitation from us than from all the other Gignosed White Barbarians? Did not more Chinese learn English because there was more immediate use for it, before the Russian revolution? You develop a reasonable thesis, but I think it begins to break down at the point where we were succoring Chiang as he collapsed. I have a fairly good recall of that period. We were training his men and equipping them on Taiwan, and as soon as they hit the front, the desertions were total and complete, entire divisions, from generals down, and with full equipment. So, we then used our navy, initially to move troops on the mainland, then to Taiwan, and then to enforce protection of Taiwan. These things of the closer present, ordinarily, should have been heavier in the Chinese scales. If I were to guess at a reason it hasn't been that way it is because of what is probably not paranoid, the Chinese view of the recent past that they are between several more powerful enemies, and here your references to history can be an important factor, because despite the past, the USSR did then begin to help China, in meaningful ways. The

contrast was so great it should have had a greater impact. Except for the religious-like disagreements, I think it would have been. (Aside, in the atime when such things should be diminishing, they are increasing, I think much of this has been inflamed and inflated in the near east to make that an immediately incoluble issue, but I think it would not have been a legitimate issue and was made into one for other reasons having, really, nothing to do with Jews ligin on what Arabs regarded as Arab lands. I think I have addressed this before, but if I haven't, and it interests, I will. I think the basic issue there is the lack of vaibility of the government of any of the neighboring states without this issue.)

Cannot the traditional suspicion of the Russian, greater than that of Americans, be attributed to closer proximity and longer-existing exploitation and the liking for Americans, at least comparatively, be attributed to some factors you do not mention, for example, the comparative success of Sino-Americans, who write home and after the initial coolie days had it comparatively well, to the hope of having a hchance of getting benefit from us when history indicated that not likely from the Russians, and from the goodness of a number of you, reporters and some of the military, ranging from Carlson to Stilwell?

Do suggest you underestimate the impact of the Korean adventure on Mao and the Chinese. All you say is true, but they got an added and important lesson, that American political control does not include the military. This had to worry them. More recent history has to have made this belief an article of faith in Chinese ruling circles.

Agreed on your guilt-complex opinion of the Russians. I can't understand how except in terms of Stalin's illness, this could have come to pass. He should have had no problem with Mao's extension of Marxist thinking to include the peasantry as the agricultural proletariat or some such formulation and evolution. I know they took first Chiank and then his son under their wing. But after Shanghai, how could they continue. Too many locomotives were fueled with Marxist brothers.

There is a kind of contradiction in successive paragraphs, each accurate, that I can't reconcile. Tzme, Kh. withdrew in 1960, but is it really because he had been outwitted and out-maneuvered? What about? I know little about that affair, but I'd lean more to the belief that the basic conflict was doctrinal. And how explain the bitterness and totality of the Russian withdrawal from the land of bothers, taking even their plans with them? I think, ultimately, it made China, but I just can't see the USSR conduct here, especially not when they should have understood so clearly how adversity was their best ally. I watched the Khrushchev visit here with fascination and agree completely with your local reporter's evaluation. It was everywhere that way. It was also an eyeopener for many Americans. Whoda think of a bloody, dictatorial tyrant walking waround on enemy turf without battalions of of guards and wearing \$10 watches? That, too, was a watershed, and it had to have been followed by the U-2 affair to slow down what has ensued.

The works you cite are unknown to me, but the indictments of the 50s I do, if dimly, recall. But I think that ear is aneding, and there will be a "rehabilitation" of the victims, could be of their work of the past, and think there will be of their work of the future, of which I hope on retirement you become part. It is inevitable that there will come a melding of honest writing and national need, even in Nixonian terms, on this subject. It will not be as is my specialty, that of pariahs.

Thanks much for taking the time. Thinking of these things is good for me as is your knowledge, which covers what mine does not. By the way, after the notes I made on Lamia In continued in it and I think the Asian parts will, in the end, interest you. They begin about page 85-88, somewhere in there, perhaps a bit earlier. I am finding it fascinating confirmation of my spot analysis based on inadequate raw material.

Best,

carbon more legible.