

Excerpts From Moorer Letter on Military Snooping and Kissinger Statement

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WASHINGTON, Feb. 5—Following are excerpts from a letter sent Jan. 30 by Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Senator John C. Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, dealing with the allegations of military snooping inside the White House, and excerpts from a statement made Jan. 29 by Secretary of State Kissinger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session:

Moorer Letter

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I am pleased to respond to your request that I set out my knowledge of the matter. I would emphasize, however, that I have never been provided or seen any investigative report pertaining to these matters, although apparently, simultaneous investigations were conducted in the Pentagon and the White House. I would, therefore, note that the following is reconstructed from memory and informal discussions with others associated with the case which arose over two years ago.

The level of interface between the N.S.C. and the J.C.S. runs from clerk-to-clerk to personal contact between the special assistant to the President for national security affairs [Henry A. Kissinger] and the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. As early as 25 January 1969, Kissinger announced his procedures for support and cooperation which established two essential ingredients; first, that the chairman, J.C.S. would be routinely furnished copies of all National Security Council documents; and, second, that there would be direct access between the President (and the N.S.C.) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The personal relationship between Dr. Kissinger and C.J.C.S. [Admiral Moorer] is of great importance in this context. Our relationship was—and is—excellent. As a matter of fact, aside from the continuous flow of staff papers and information, we frequently had—and continue to have—expanded personal discussions by telephone, or in his office, on key matters. I never had the feeling of isolation from information.

With regard to information pertaining to matters under discussion within the N.S.C. system, in reality, my problem—if I had one—was sifting, synthesizing, and analyzing the flow of information, data, and opinion avail-

able. In the event I felt the need for any information—specific or general—I simply called Dr. Kissinger, who was immediately forthcoming. This remains the case today.

On occasion, Yeoman Radford accompanied staff personnel on various trips. For example (General Haig) requested that Yeoman Radford be assigned to assist Dr. Kissinger on his July, 1971, trip to Asia. Admiral Welander resisted due to his newness in the job and Yeoman Radford's pending leave request. General Haig insisted and Yeoman Radford was so assigned. Upon his return, Yeoman Radford provided to Admiral Welander a collection of miscellaneous staff papers, roughs and questionnaires. After screening these papers, Admiral Welander hand-delivered some of the, working papers to my office, noting that Yeoman Radford had retained them incident to his clerical duties on the trip. To the best of my memory, based upon a very brief exposure, these papers dealt primarily with the military and political situation and discussions taking place during the trip—matters with which I was already familiar. These papers did not stimulate close attention by me because they contained no new information. I had already received several messages from the various embassies involved, as well as reports from the military authorities in the field, on the progress of the trip. In addition, on 16 July, five days before the receipt of the Radford papers, I spent the entire day in San Clemente with the President and Dr. Kissinger discussing the details of the trip. I did not scrutinize the papers as to their precise contents or origin but handed them back to Admiral Welander.

Subsequently, in September 1971, at General Haig's request, Yeoman Radford was again assigned to accompany General Haig to Southeast Asia. I had received reports pertaining to this trip from Admiral McCain and General Abrams. I had been informed by General Haig not only about the trip, but also in detail on other matters. Subsequently, Admiral Welander provided me with some miscellaneous papers Yeoman Radford had prepared during the trip. These papers had been overtaken by events, and again, I did not scrutinize them as to their content or precise origin. I want to stress that these papers were provided me by a staff officer in a routine manner. They were treated by me in

and Kissinger Statement

the same manner that I would treat any other staff officer's report upon which I was already fully informed. Such papers are only momentarily scanned for subject matter—not precise origin or method of transmission.

These are the only instances, to the best of my knowledge and belief, where information acquired in a manner which, in retrospect, might be labeled "unauthorized," was brought to my at-



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Adm. Thomas H. Moorer at a Congressional hearing yesterday in Washington.

tention.

When I was advised of these matters, I consulted with the Chief of Naval Operations concerning my desire to institute proceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Conduct. I was, however, advised that no disciplinary proceedings were to be conducted and that it had been decided by the civilian leadership that Yeoman Radford was to be immediately transferred.

When I was advised by Mr. Buzhardt, the general counsel, that Yeoman Radford testified during the defense investigative service inquiry that he had not only been retaining papers in the course of his clerical duties but,

also, had been actively collecting them in a clearly unauthorized manner, I directed that any such papers which might be in the liaison office files be returned to the N.S.C. staff. Acting on those instructions, all such papers were then returned.

In retrospect, one could

argue that, perhaps, I should have been more alert in following up on the manner in which the information provided by Admiral Welander was acquired. However, since the same information was freely flowing from many sources, I simply did not give any thought to scrutinizing the precise origin of the material at that time. In this connection, I gave no orders, no instruction, and no encouragement, either direct or implied, to Yeoman Radford—or to anyone else—to collect or retain any information or papers from the N.S.C. in an irregular manner. As a matter of collateral fact, I have never, to my knowledge and belief, talked to Yeoman Radford.

There have been allegations to the effect that I opposed several aspects of national policy. These allegations, made in the press media, are not only untrue but their lack of validity is easily demonstrated without exception by simple reference to the public record and members of the National Security Council. I have repeatedly explained and firmly supported our national policy.

It is not appropriate for me to discuss, in detail, my relationship with the President. However, I would simply note that my reappointment as Chairman, J.C.S., occurred several months after

these matters had been known and thoroughly investigated.

T. H. MOORER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Kissinger Statement

I stand by every word I have said before the committee. I did not know about the "plumbers." I did not know that David Young's assignments included investigation of internal security matters. It was my belief that David Young was assigned to John Ehrlichman's staff to work on declassification and whatever other assignments John Ehrlichman might give him, but I did not know what these other assignments were.

I stated before the committee, and I repeat again, that based on my recollection and on my logs, which is the only evidence I now have, I never saw David Young after he left my staff. I never telephoned David Young after he left my staff, and I never communicated by any other means with

David Young after he left my staff.

I received from David Young three memoranda after he left my staff. They are dated May 11, 1972; June 15, 1972, and Aug. 11, 1972. Each of them dealt with declassification. I had no other communication with David Young.

It is, of course, not precluded—because my logs would not show it—that I ran into him in the halls of the White House on some occasion, or at a cocktail party. I have no such recollection, but I do want to leave some margin, since something of that sort could

have occurred. But I have no recollection of any meetings with David Young until he had resigned in March of 1973 and asked me whether I could help him find another job.

He came to me because, as I have told this committee, I had brought him to Washington to work for me originally.

The only other memorandum in my files dealing with David Young is a note to me from General Haig on Dec. 13, 1971, which put through a routine promotion for Young. I wrote on that note, "Why are we carrying him when he is working for Ehrlichman?" These are all the records that I have on David Young.

Leak of War Papers

You gentlemen are all familiar with the Anderson stories on the India-Pakistan war, stories in which there were very substantial leaks of National Security Council documents in early December, 1971.

The first knowledge I had of any substance in connection with this investigation was when I was away and General Haig called me and told me that Admiral Welander, who was in charge of the J.C.S. liaison office on my staff, had reported to General Haig that, on the basis of internal evidence, one of the documents that had been leaked to Anderson had to have come from Admiral Welander's office. General Haig asked me what he should do with that information. I told him to send Admiral Welander to John Ehrlichman because John Ehrlichman was in charge of the investigation. I heard no more for about a week. Then

on Dec. 24th John Ehrlichman asked me to come to his office where he played a portion of the tape in which Admiral Welander was interviewed by David Young about his knowledge of the allegedly stolen material. The part of the tape I heard was the new information that was developed as a result of this interview, according to which someone on the staff of the J.C.S. liaison office was reportedly stealing documents from me and transmitting them in an unauthorized way to the office of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I listened to about 15 minutes of that tape.

I frankly attached no importance whatever to the fact that David Young was conducting the interview. I did not construe from that that David Young was conducting an investigation; the "plumbers" were beyond my imagination, and I was much more interested in the substance obtained from that interview that I was in who was conducting the interview of a man whom, I repeat, I had sent there, and whom I would have had interviewed by one of my staff members if I had not previously been told that Ehrlichman was in charge of the investigation, and that I was to stay out of it.

Except for that interview, I was given no other information about the investigation. I did not know that David Young had written a report until I read it in Seymour Hersh's article about two weeks ago. I have never seen the report. I have never had it described to me, nor have I seen the report that was made of this matter to Secretary Laird.