

Excerpts From Testimony of Strachan

WASHINGTON, July 23— Following are excerpts from the transcript of testimony by Gordon C. Strachan today on the 26th day of hearings on the Watergate case before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.

MORNING SESSION

MR. DASH: Mr. Strachan, in your statement [last Friday] you indicated that you were staff assistant to Mr. Haldeman. Will you please tell us prior to that position what position you held?

MR. STRACHAN: Yes, I did. From Aug. 3, 1970 until December, 1970, I was also staff assistant under Mr. Klein. I technically reported to Mr. Magruder.

Q. What were your duties at that time? A. Well, I was originally recruited to be what was called a project manager. Particular issues would be assigned to one junior staff man and one senior staff man. For example, in the 1970 election the economy issue was assigned to Mr. Safire as the senior man, and I was the junior staff assistant on that project.

Q. Prior to your position at the White House, this last position that you stated, where were you employed? A. I practiced law in New York for two years with the law firm Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander.

Q. Is that the same law firm with which Mr. Mitchell was associated as a partner? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And it is also the same law firm with which President Nixon was associated one time as a partner? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could you then again give us your duties as staff assistant to Mr. Haldeman?

A. Well, the duties changed slightly over the course of the two years I worked for Mr. Haldeman. When I first began work I was assigned an office on the third floor of the Executive Office Building, and my responsi-

bilities for the first couple of months were to get all the polling files of the office, which were extensive, in order.

Personal Staff Assistant

Eventually I became for a certain amount of time the personal staff assistant, that is, I would prepare all the papers that would be going to Mr. Haldeman, put them in the correct folders, be the action, F.Y.I., personal, as well as the material that was going to the President that Mr. Haldeman would want to review. I prepared those in folders and took those in to Mr. Haldeman twice, usually at noon and then at the end of the day at six.

Q. What were your duties really during the period from January, 1972, to June 17, 1973, and thereafter? A. Well, we shifted Mr. Haldeman's office, shifted location, and moved into the staff secretary complex offices and from Jan. 1 through the election my primary duties were in the area of polling and in the area of political data bank.

Q. And, of course, during that time, I think you have stated that you served as the liaison between the White House and I take it specifically Mr. Haldeman and the Committee to Re-elect the President. A. It is correct to say I served as the liaison between Mr. Haldeman and the committee.

Q. And information that you received from the committee, and I take, was that primarily from Mr. Magruder?

Haldeman's Activities

A. Well, I received information from Mr. Magruder, and also from many of the other people on the staff. Mr. Haldeman's particular interests were advertising and polling and I dealt directly with those senior people in those two areas. I also dealt with the people in the political area in order to acquire as much information as I could. Mr. Haldeman had a well-deserved reputation as a very, very tough staff man, and there were constant

pressures to perform well, and I worked very hard.

Q. Could you tell us something about Mr. Haldeman's activities and how he administered the office, how he ran his, how he performed his role?

Q. Well, Mr. Haldeman is a very organized individual. He had a system, for example, on this telephone where lights would indicate whether he was in his office, not to be disturbed or in the President's office or if he would push a green light which would light up one of his personal aide's phones, then that would be your opportunity to take a matter in to him if you thought it was important enough to bother him.

I would spend as little time as possible in there, not to waste his time. I don't know what else you want.

Q. Aside from your own statement that he had passion for the facts, that he was a well-organized person what was his relationship with other staff members, as staff director, for instance what was his relationship with Mr. Ehrlichman?

A. Well, he had known Mr. Ehrlichman for a long time. They, I presume were close friends. They played tennis together, they had direct phone lines to each other. They would walk in and out of each other offices, I would characterize it as a very close relationship.

Q. And, to your knowledge, would it be fair to say that they communicated frequently with each other and that if Mr. Haldeman had important information he would be keeping Mr. Ehrlichman informed? A. I don't know that is a matter of fact but I would surely assume that.

Higby and Haldeman

Q. What was Mr. Higby's relationship with Mr. Haldeman?

A. Well, Mr. Higby had worked for Mr. Haldeman for, I believe, four or five years before I joined the White House staff. His title, as dis-

tinguished from mine as staff assistant was administrative assistant. He was the senior personal aide to Mr. Haldeman. I think they had a very close personal relationship and personal friendship, spent a lot of social time together.

Q. What was Mr. Haldeman's role with regard to the campaign itself?

A. Well, Mr. Haldeman was obviously quite interested in the campaign. He would express his views as to the way certain things would be done. In particular, he insisted upon clearing, that is personally approving by initial every piece of advertising, be it radio, TV, bumper strip, whatever that went out from the committee.

Q. And would it be fair to say that on many important issues of the committee that these issues would be communicated to Mr. Haldeman for his approval, actions of the committee?

A. No, not all matters would be communicated for action. He had very little interest, for example, in what the field organization would be doing. I would advise him on an FYI basis of who had been selected to head the campaigns in the various states but he showed very little interest in that.

Q. When you made your reports to Mr. Haldeman, especially those reports that came from the committee, could you briefly tell us but in some detail what kind of reports did you make, how did you report to Mr. Haldeman?

Political Memos

A. Well, usually once a week or once every two weeks, memoranda entitled, "Political Matters Memos." These memoranda would summarize the information that I had accumulated from the politically active people on the White House staff, Mr. Colson, Mr. Dent, information I had accumulated from 1701 [Pennsylvania Avenue, CREP headquarters]

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from the various state organizations, he had quite an interest.

He had quite an interest in California so I would talk with the California people, and then I would write a memorandum usually quite long, eight, nine, 10 pages, with several attachments as back-up. The main purpose of attaching the tabs would be that I would refer in the paragraphs to information that I thought he should read in the original form, and would attach it as a tab.

Q. Were some of your communications in an oral form rather than in a memorandum form?

A. He prefers to communicate in writing. Of course, I would have oral communications with him but the great bulk of information that he received from me regarding the campaign would be in writing.

Q. All right, now, when he received from you a political matter memorandum with the various items indicated, and the tabs, how would he respond to you concerning those items that were brought to his attention by you?

A. Well, he would always read with a pen and he would write his comments beside them or check the item as he read each particular paragraph.

Q. In instances, I take it, you would be given or at least indications from him as to what he wanted to do to follow up on various matters?

Cryptic Comments

A. Well, usually, his comments on the side would be cryptic and humorous. If he had a disagreement as to the way things were being done at the committee, he would send a memorandum to John Mitchell or on occasion to Jeb Magruder, or make a note to me that I should contact a particular individual about something.

Q. Now, when he wanted to have a meeting with somebody, would you pre-

pare any particular paper with regard to that meeting? A. Yes. I would prepare what would be characterized as a talking paper.

Q. Now, do you recall whether Mr. Magruder gave you any information concerning an intelligence plan prior to March 30, 1972? A. No, he did not.

Q. Mr. Magruder did testify that certainly after the Feb. 4, 1972, meeting, he communicated to you about the meeting, about the contents of the meeting, and in fact, sent you copies of the notes or memoranda of the so-called Liddy plan that had been presented to Mr. Mitchell in Mr. Mitchell's office where Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Liddy met with Mr. Mitchell. Did Mr. Magruder do that?

A. No, he did not. Mr. Magruder relies on the fact that, automatically, materials would have come over to me. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has established that that is not true. Materials do not automatically come over to me. Q. How did the Federal Bureau of Investigation establish that that is not true?

Some Data Withheld

A. They interviewed several of his secretaries and people in his office and they indicated that matters were not always sent to Mr. Strachan or to the White House, that they would be held back at the express direction of Mr. Magruder.

Q. Would it be true that important matters, matters of significance, would be sent over to you, and would you not agree that a plan such as the so-called Liddy plan to engage in electronic surveillance for political intelligence was a significant matter?

A. Obviously, that is a significant matter, but I think Mr. Magruder probably relied upon the fact that John Dean was present at the meeting to report to the appropriate people at the White House.

Q. Could you tell us at this point about that separate relationship? What was Mr.

Dean's relationship with Mr. Haldeman as apart from your relationship?

A. Well, Mr. Dean had line responsibility as distinguished from mine of staff responsibility. He would have a certain amount of independent authority and would function on projects of his own and report to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman on matters on which he needed guidance.

Q. All right, now. If Mr. Dean attended an important meeting as the one we have already had ample testimony about, the Feb. 4 meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, the Jan. 27 meeting in the first instance and the Feb. 4 meeting, 1972, in the second instance, would it be likely or actually, would you expect that Mr. Dean would, in fact, report that meeting to Mr. Haldeman?

A. Yes, I would think so, because Mr. Dean was aware of the interest over the six months previous, interest in political intelligence, and Mr. Dean has testified he reported to Mr. Haldeman about that meeting.

Political Intelligence

Q. Well, what was Mr. Haldeman's interest in political intelligence in the past? A. Well, it was a subject that I was expected to raise in talking papers and to periodically follow up with John Dean to see that certain individual projects were on track.

Q. Were you aware of a particular interest Mr. Haldeman had in political matters, intelligence matters? A. Well, he was particularly interested in the area of political intelligence and information about Senator Kennedy.

Q. Now, you say that Mr. Dean would, to your expectation, report this meeting—in fact, did report this meeting. Could you give us a little more description, to your knowledge, of Mr. Dean's relationship to you and to other members of the staff? How did he carry out his responsibilities in making re-

ports and giving factual information to various members of the White House?

A. Well, as I say, he had line responsibility, a certain number of staff people under him. He handled conflict of interest matters, would usually have an opinion as to what stand the President should take on legislation, and so forth. My role on Mr. Haldeman's personal staff was to follow up with John Dean on certain matters that he was working with for him. The best example is when John Dean was working on the President's estate plan. He would prepare memoranda addressed to Mr. Haldeman and to Mr. Ehrlichman, and I would have a chance to look over those memoranda, but they would go in their original state.

Dean's Memory Cited

Q. But would Mr. Dean share generally with you the information that he would give to other members of the White House staff, Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman or others?

A. No, not necessarily. Mr. Dean had a remarkable facility, almost that of a litigator, to remember facts and to keep track of which facts which staff members knew or should be informed about. Q. Would you say that, over what period of time that you experienced this remarkable quality of Mr. Dean to recollect and also to separate out who was to receive what facts?

A. Well, I observed that the whole time I was on the White House staff. Whatever the particular subject would be on the President's estate plan, he could keep track of who was handling which tax returns, which people should have access to which parts of which tax returns, very tough questions of fact and internal politics. But, most particularly, during the summer of 1972, for example, when he interviewed me regarding Segretti, he had in-

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interviewed both me and Chapin, both of us knew something about the subject, yet John Dean was able to keep which of us knew what perfectly straight.

Q. Well, you also said that you believe he probably told Mr. Haldeman (about the Jan. 27 and Feb. 4 meetings) because he has testified that he told Mr. Haldeman. Is that based on your opinion or knowledge of Mr. Dean when he makes a statement, whether that is a true statement? A. Well, I have confidence in John Dean's ability to state the facts as he recalls them.

Q. And your knowledge of John Dean's relationship with Mr. Haldeman, would lead you to what conclusion concerning his giving Mr. Haldeman all the facts that he had at any one time that he felt Mr. Haldeman ought to have?

A. My opinion would be that John Dean would disclose the facts to Mr. Haldeman.

Gemstone Material

Q. Now, you are also familiar with Mr. Magruder's testimony that after the Feb. 4 meeting and when there was an installation of wire-tap equipment in the Water-gate or Democratic National Committee headquarters, that he showed you at a particular time the so-called Gemstone material. Did he in fact show you such Gemstone material? A. No, he did not.

Q. Now, did you ever hear, prior to June 17, the term, the code term "Gemstone?" A. No, I did not.

Q. Why would Mr. Magruder keep from you this very sensitive material? I think his testimony here was that he thought it was so sensitive that he did not, as he would usually, send you the materials, he asked you to come over to the office to see them. Would it not be natural that Mr. Magruder would ask you to come see these materials?

A. Well, his testimony that it was too sensitive to send over is inconsistent with his testimony that he sent automatically the budgets [for intelligence activities] over to me. If the budgets contain bugging and wiretapping, that would strike me as far more sensitive a matter to send through normal messenger channels than some file which other witnesses have indicated was not patently illegal on its face.

Q. In other words, what you are saying is that you never did see the Gemstone file, Mr. Magruder never invited you over to see it, and that prior to March 30, you had no knowledge of any so-called Liddy intelligence plan? A. That is correct.

Q. Now, did that change, at least after March 30?

A. Yes, I was aware that Mr. Magruder would be going down to Key Biscayne to review several campaign decisions that had accumulated during John Mitchell's working on the I.T.T. problem. He called me up in an apparently fairly brief telephone conversation and reviewed the 30 or so pending campaign decisions. I took notes on that telephone conversation and prepared shortly thereafter a political matters memorandum for Mr. Haldeman, summarizing that telephone conversation as well as other information.

Haldeman Notified

Q. And what did that include? I mean did it include a Liddy intelligence plan? A. Yes, Mr. Magruder told that a sophisticated political intelligence gathering system had been approved and I reported that to Mr. Haldeman.

Q. Were you aware that that was one of these items for decision that went down to Key Biscayne with Mr. Magruder? A. No, I was not.

Q. So that it was after he came back that he reported that to you? A. That is correct.

Q. Can you recall approximately when he made that report to you? A. Well, it was shortly thereafter, I would guess either Friday, March 31, maybe Saturday. My secretary recalls having typed the memorandum on Friday.

Q. And it is clear in your mind that Mr. Magruder reported that Mr. Mitchell had in fact approved a sophisticated intelligence plan? A. Well, I concluded that Mr. Mitchell had approved it. I believe that when Mr. Magruder was going through the decisions and the way I would usually report it to Mr. Haldeman would be that Mr. Magruder reports that Mr. Mitchell has approved the following matters, and I would put a colon, and then I would list the items.

Q. But did you do it with regard to this plan? A. Yes, that was one of the 30 items that was listed.

Q. I think in your statement you referred to a sophisticated intelligence system with a budget of 300—300 what? A. Well, it is \$300,000 on almost all of the memoranda that I wrote to Mr. Haldeman, I would leave off the last three zeroes, because usually the figures that we were dealing with were very, very large.

Q. Now, you say that you then prepared a political action memorandum—a Political Matters Memorandum for Mr. Haldeman, and you included this approved sophisticated intelligence plan,

that \$300,000 budget, in that Political Matters Memorandum. Do you recall the number of that memorandum? A. Yes, it was Political Matters Memorandum No. 8.

Wrote 28 Reports

Q. And how many Political Matters Memoranda did you write after that, can you recall approximately? A. Well, through the campaign and towards the end of the campaign, they got a little further apart, but I wrote 28.

Q. Did you receive any information or indication that Mr. Haldeman, in fact, read the Political Matters Memorandum No. 18 with specific reference to the sophisticated intelligence plan with a budget of \$300,000?

A. Yes, it was Mr. Haldeman's practice when he would read such a memorandum to make notes and check off those paragraphs which he had indicated and then he would write it up in the upper right hand corner, "to Strachan," in this case indicating the memorandum should be returned directly to me, and I would go through his memoranda after he had read them, and this particular one I re-read, and noted his checking off of all the paragraphs that I had prepared for him.

Q. Was there any other comment besides that particular one? A. Besides the paragraph that you are concerned about there was simply a blank check.

Q. Now, did there come a time shortly afterwards when you were asked to do anything about that particular matter? Did that just stay in your file or did Mr. Haldeman take any further action on it, to your knowledge?

A. Well, after the memorandum came back out Mr. Haldeman was going to meet with Mr. Mitchell on April 4.

Q. How did you learn about that? A. Mr. Haldeman had a system on his telephones where he could push a button and have one of his personal aides monitor the telephone conversation.

Q. Would this be similar to an extension phone where somebody would be asked to get on an extension phone and just listen in?

A. Well, it would be different from an extension phone because you could not detect the fact that it was picked up, and there was no way that the person listening on the phone could make any noise either by talking or by a secretary typing to indicate that there was someone else on the phone.

Button on the Phone

Q. How were you notified or how was it indicated to you that you were to pick up the line?

A. Well, there was a button on the call director phone that I had which would buzz when I was to pick that line up, and I pushed down the button and began listening to the conversation usually at that time which was already in progress.

Q. All right. In this particular case now with a call, I take it, to Mr. Mitchell, could you tell us, having picked up the line, what did you hear?

A. Well, Mr. Mitchell indicated that he was either going to return or had returned from Florida, and Mr. Haldeman jokingly said, "Well, that is clearly a mistake. You ought to stay down there and vacation some more," and Mr. Mitchell indicated that, "Well, we had better get together and talk about some matters." Haldeman asked him if 3:00 o'clock that day would be convenient.

Q. And that day was when? A. April 4, [1972].

Q. And was there, in fact, a meeting on April 4, 1972 between Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell?

A. Well, I did not attend the meeting so I could not testify that there was in fact but I prepared a talking paper for the meeting and we would prepare a folder which would include the talking paper, and the talking paper went into his office and came back out afterwards.

Q. Now, in this talking paper, did you include the item of the sophisticated intelligence plan with a budget of \$300,000? A. Yes. In most talking papers I would frequently pose the question, is the intelligence system adequate? Is the proposal on track, just to get the conversation going on the subject, and in this particular one I did include that paragraph.

Higby told me yes, in fact Magruder had talked with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman was handling the entire matter.

Q. At that point having learned that Mr. Haldeman now had spoken to Mr. Magruder and was informed did a concern come into your mind?

A. Yes, I expected over the entire weekend Mr. Haldeman to call me and ask me that I knew, if I knew anything why I had not reported to him, the usual very tough questions he would ask.

Q. Did you begin at that time to suspect any problem that Mr. Haldeman may have with regard to this? A. Well, you have to draw one of three conclusions: Either he knew about it ahead of time; either he didn't expect me to report to him, or he had received a report and had calmed down.

Q. Did you arrive at any one conclusion? A. It was either one of the latter two, either he knew or he didn't expect me to report to him.

Q. What did you do after you now learned that he had heard about it, what did you do yourself? A. I didn't do anything. The White House logs indicate that I was in the White House for a minute Sunday, I don't know what that was for. The next day, Monday—

Q. Monday was June 19, 1972? A. I began going through my files, Mr. Haldeman's files, to see if there were any indications of any information that would be in any way related to this act.

Q. Well, did you come to any conclusion as to whether there was anything in the files that would be in any way related? Yes, I pulled out several documents, most particularly Political Matters Memorandum No. 18.

Intelligence Plan Reference

Q. And that was the one that referred to the sophisticated intelligence plan? A. That is correct.

Q. Did you also pull out that memorandum or these little notes that you had taken concerning the communication that you had from Mr. Haldeman to contact Mr. Liddy about his capabilities being switched from Muskie to McGovern? A. Well, I pulled that document out but I did not take that up to Mr. Haldeman.

Q. Now, what did you believe at that time when you took the document out? Did you believe that a break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters was in fact related to this plan? A. I didn't know for sure but I had pretty strong suspicions.

Q. Did you meet with Mr. Haldeman shortly after you did that, after you pulled that file out? A. Yes, I did.

Q. Could you tell us when?

A. I believe it was the morning of June 20. He had returned from Florida, I had given a note to Mr. Higby that I thought I should see Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Haldeman summoned me to his office, and I walked in with the Political Matters Memorandum.

Q. I think you had indicated that you were somewhat concerned about Mr. Haldeman's reaction to you about not being informed. Were you still concerned when you met with Mr. Haldeman on June

20? A. Yes, I was scared to death. I thought I would be fired at that point for not having figured that out.

Q. Were you fired or did he berate you?

A. No, he did not berate me. He said almost jokingly, well, what do we know about the events over the weekend? And I was quite nervous and retreated to sort of legal protective terms and I said, well, sir, this is what can be imputed to you through me, your agent, and opened the political matters memorandum to the paragraph on intelligence, showed it to him. He acknowledged his check and that he had read that, and said that he had not read the tab, which had been attached, turned, began reading it, said, maybe I should have been reading these, these are quite interesting, and read the tab.

Sedan Tab II Mentioned

Q. What tab was that? A. That was Sedan Chair II.

Q. Then what, if anything, did you tell him or did he tell you after he had gone through this memorandum again? A. He told me, well, make sure our files are clean.

Q. What did that mean to you? A. Well, I went down and shredded that document and others related.

Q. Now, did you do that on your own initiative as such, or did you feel that you were making sure that you were following Mr. Haldeman's instruction that you should make sure the files are clean? A. No, I believed I was following his orders.

Q. And you shredded all of that, all of No. 18, the Political Matters Memorandum No. 18? A. That is correct.

Q. What about the memorandum that you had made on the communication with regard to Mr. Liddy? A. Yes, I shredded that also.

Q. Were there any other documents that you shredded? A. Yes, I did go through and make sure our files were clean. I shredded the talking paper between Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell on April 4, I shredded a deference to Mr. Segretti, I shredded Mr. Segretti's telephone number.

Q. What reference was that to Mr. Segretti?

A. Well, that had been a dispute between whether or note Mr. Segretti should continue out in the field functioning somewhat independent. Mr. Magruder wrote a memorandum to Mr. Mitchell entitled, "Matter of Potential Embarrassment," in which he described this individual in the field and how that individual should be under the direction of Mr. Liddy. Mr. Mitchell had a copy of that and Mr. Haldeman had a copy of that. And Mr. Haldeman had told me to call up Mr. Segretti and to tell him to expect a call and his directions from Mr. Liddy. I shredded that memorandum also.

Q. Were there any other documents that you shredded? A. Well, we gave the committee list.

Q. You may have stated, but did that include the talking paper that you had prepared for Mr. Haldeman for his meeting with Mr. Mitchell on April 4th? A. Yes, I think I said that this was one of the items.

Q. Now, after you shred-

ded these papers on the 20th of June, 1972, did you inform anybody that you had done this?

A. Yes, I went over to John Dean's office and gave him a list orally of the documents that I had shredded and told him that those had been Mr. Haldeman's instructions.

Q. Why did you inform John Dean? A. Well, John Dean was, as you know, the counsel to the President and the man who would presumably be handling this problem.

Q. Did you inform anybody else? A. No.

Q. Now, have you since had an opportunity to go through the White House records to look at the various memoranda that you have prepared in the past? A. Yes, I have gone back into an Executive Office Building office, Room 522, to go through the files.

Q. And did these files still have the political matters memorandum that you had prepared for Mr. Haldeman? A. Well, they contained all Political Matters Memoranda except No. 18.

Q. Eighteen was missing? A. That is right.

Q. So you reaffirmed the fact that you had destroyed 18? A. Well, I did not forget that.

Q. No. It had not been replaced, anyway? A. No.

Q. Now, later, did you ever inform Mr. Haldeman that you had, you wanted to make sure that the files were clean or that you had destroyed, in fact, the particular files that you were worried about? A. Yes. On July 1, I was invited to go out with the PVresidential party on Air Force 1. At that time I reviewed both the most recent Political Matters Memorandum and the fact that I had in fact made sure the files were clean.

Q. What was Mr. Haldeman's reaction, if anything, when you told him that you had destroyed No. 18? A. I do not think he said anything. I just reported it as a matter of fact and we went on to something else.

Q. And to your recollection, he accepted that as a matter of fact? A. Well, I would remember if he had told me that was a very stupid thing to do.

Q. Now, after this event, and after, of course, the break-in at Watergate, what was your relationship with the Committee to Re-elect the President? Did it continue, and did you continue as liaison? A. Yes, it did.

Q. Did you have any responsibilities to report to Mr. Haldeman concerning the Watergate affair? A. None.

Q. I take it that after the break-in, the so-called Watergate affair became an important matter of concern in the campaign. A. Well, everybody follows it rather closely.

Q. And I take it various meetings were held, through the latter part of June, July and August. Were you aware of those meetings?

A. No, not really. I certainly never attended any. I don't think I was specifically aware that they were having all these meetings on what had been turned out to be the Watergate matter.

Q. Were you aware of an

interchange of information, let me say between Mr. Dean and Mr. Magruder, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Mardian, Mr. LaRue, and then on the other side, Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, involving these meetings?

A. No, I don't think so and that sort of goes to the point of how Dean could keep all facts and people sort of in order. I don't think he ever told me that he was having all these meetings.

Q. So as you testified earlier with regard to the meeting back on Feb. 4 and also Jan. 27, when Mr. Dean was present, Mr. Haldeman would rely on Mr. Dean's report when Mr. Dean attended all these meetings over at the committee, he would be the one that would communicate this information to Mr. Haldeman if anybody did?

Would Report Directly

A. That is correct, and I would guess that he would report directly rather than through me or one of his aides. But I didn't know that for a fact.

Q. Now, did there come a time when you became aware of a transfer of \$350,000 from the Committee to Re-elect the President to Mr. Haldeman or the White House under Mr. Haldeman's control?

A. Yes. The subject had been discussed for a couple of months before that. This would be from December, 1971, through April, '72. Mr. Haldeman, his office conducted extensive polling, and he told me at one point, when I was having discussions with Mr. Kalmbach, to make sure that we have an ample supply of cash to pay for these polls.

I talked with John Dean about it, tried to arrange for John Dean a method for holding the money. He eventually told me that he could not do it.

On April 6th, I prepared a memorandum for Mr. Haldeman saying that we are going to get money from the committee before the new finance law and we have to get it very soon; John Dean can't make arrangements. You have four other alternatives. He checked the one indicating that I should go and pick up the money. I went over to 1701, to the committee to re-elect the President, either Mr. Kalmbach's office or to Mr. Sloan's office.

Q. And you took this money — was this in cash? A. Yes, it was.

Q. And you returned it back now to the White House? A. That is correct.

Q. Actually, what was that money for? Was that for the command or the disbursement of Mr. Haldeman? A. Definitely.

Q. Now, did you become aware of the fact that any money was in fact spent from that \$350,000?

A. Yes. Somewhere around the time of the Hanoi-Hai-phong bombing, Mr. Howard came to me and indicated that Mr. Colson had an approved advertisement, indicating public support for the bombing and mining decision. Mr. Howard said that Mr. Colson needed \$22,000 and I asked Mr. Haldeman if we should authorize that expenditure. He said yes, and the money was delivered.