

Excerpts From Hunt's Testimony on

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, May 7—
Following are excerpts from
a transcript of additional
grand jury testimony by
E. Howard Hunt Jr. and from
an affidavit by Egil Krogh Jr.
as released at the Pentagon
papers trial here today:

Hunt Testimony

Q. All right. Now, did you
ever engage in any other
clandestine operations? A.
Not of that type, no sir.

Q. What type did you en-
gage in? A. The only other
one that comes to mind has
to do with the widely publi-
cized fraudulent Vietnamese
cable.

Q. Tell us about that. A.
Which to my knowledge is
not an illegal activity.

Q. What did you do?

A. During the course of
the researches, which are
performed with the help of
the Department of State, go-
ing over many hundreds of
cables, comparing them with
what actually appeared in
the Ellsberg so-called Penta-
gon papers it became clear
to me, from the State Depart-
ment files, that a number of
cables were missing. And
that is to say that the chron-
ological files did not contain
cables in chronological se-
quence. Some of these micro-
file—well, there weren't no
micro-file, but they were
greatly reduced in size ap-
proximately 3 by 4 inches
from an 8—about half-size
reduced.

Chronology Found Lacking

But these small versions
had been extracted so that
there was not a complete
chronology of the period of
the Vietnam war immedi-
ately prior to and subsequent
to the assassination of then
Premier Diem.

Inquiries at Pentagon

This encouraged me to
have inquiries made at the
Central Intelligence Agency
as to whether or not their
chronological files for 1963
were still intact. I wanted to
obtain legal access to their
files to see whether or not
any of these chinks in the
assassination story could be
filled in through reference to
C.I.A. traffic.

I was told that the com-
munications office of the
Central Intelligence Agency
did not maintain their chron-
ological files for that period
of time. I think that more
than five years had elapsed
and they had been destroyed
not stored at the Department
of State.

I also had occasion to in-
quire—or I had inquiries
made—of the Pentagon as to
whether the so-called back
channel had been utilized for
any of its missing traffic and
was told that no copies had
been kept at the Pentagon of
this type of traffic that
might have taken place be-
tween, let's say, the com-
manding general in Saigon
and the chief of staff in
Washington.

I also, with some difficulty,
managed to obtain the State
Department's file. It was a
State Department back chan-
nel. It was Secretary of State
to the Ambassador, back and
forth, and I went through
that, satisfied myself that
there was nothing of sub-
stance in there but, at the
same time, I had concluded
that a lot of significant traf-
fic was missing.

And there came a time
when I mentioned this to Mr.
Colson, who I had been di-
recting my research into the
—at the particular period—
the Vietnamese war, and told
him that, in my opinion, a lot
of stuff that should have
been there had been ex-
tracted.

He said, "How do you ac-
count for that?" And I said,
"Well, some of the cables
that they still have on hand
at the Department of State
have been sent, with date
stamps, saying photographed
or duplicated for the John F.
Kennedy Memorial Library."

Removal Termed Possible

So I said, "Well, obviously,
anybody who had been given
access to the Department of
State files for the purposes
of incorporating them into
material held by the J.F.K.
Library would also have had
opportunity to remove any
cables that could have been
embarrassing to the Kennedy
legatees."

And he said, "Well, what
kind of material have you
dug up on the files that
would indicate Kennedy com-
plicity?"

And I showed him three or
four cables that indicated
that they had pretty close
to pull the trigger against
Premier Diem's head, but it
didn't say so in so many
words. Inferentially, one could
say that it was a high degree
of Administration complicity
in the actual assassination of
Diem and his brother.

And he said, "Well, this
isn't good enough. Do you
think you could improve on
them?"

I said, "Yes, I probably
could but not without tech-
nical assistance." After all, I

had been given some training
in my past C.I.A. career to
do just this sort of thing and
had done it successfully on
numerous occasions, floating
forged newspaper accounts,
telegrams, that sort of thing.

So he said, "Well, we won't
be able to give you any tech-
nical help. This is too hot.
See what you can do on your
own."

So, with the very meager
means at my disposal, which
were literally a Xerox ma-
chine in the White House,
a razor blade and a type-
writer—which was not the
same one as had been used
on the original cables—I set
about creating two cables
which bore on that particular
period.

The process was relatively
simple. I first of all prepared
a cable text. In other words,
from many of these cables I
could pretty well adjust the
text to the type of language
that would be used by the
man who was the ostensible
originator, and altered these,
from time to time, until I
was satisfied that I had two
credible cables.

Signature Problem

Then the problem came of
getting the bottom line, which
had the signatures of the
reviewing officers and the
originating and the heading,
which had also the time date
stamp on it, which was a
crucial thing.

And simply by Xeroxing
and re-Xeroxing, I substituted
a text for what previously
had been a legitimate cable
and could use those.

I was not satisfied with the
result. I showed them to Col-
son. He seemed to like them
and I said, "These will never
stand any kind of scrutiny."
I said, "Let's be very sure
about that."

And I asked the F.B.I. to
tell me what kind of type
face has been used on the
original State Department
cables and actually a White
House cable, because one of
them was ostensibly a White
House cable, and I found out
that it would be impossible
for me to get access to a
similar type page.

So I knew this was a tech-
nical problem that could not
be overcome. So if anybody
was going to see these
cables, they'd simply have to
see them. They could never be
published.

So there would just have
to be a fast brush show on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
which I began to believe was
the purpose Mr. Colson had
in mind.

*4. That on or about July 15,

1971, affiant was given oral
instructions by Mr. John D.
Ehrlichman, assistant to the
President of the United States
for domestic affairs, to begin
a special National Security
project to coordinate a Gov-
ernment effort to determine
the causes, sources, and ram-
fications of the unauthorized
disclosure of classified docu-
ments known as the Pentagon
papers.

5. That Mr. David Young
of the National Security
Council staff was assigned to
this special project with him;

6. That to his information
and belief one reason
for undertaking an independ-
ent investigation centralized
among White House staff
was that a close personal re-
lationship existed between
the then director of the
Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, J. Edgar Hoover, and
Mr. Louis Marx, father-in-law
of Daniel Ellsberg, admitted
public source of the Pentagon
papers.

7. That on affiant's infor-
mation and belief the estab-
lishment of an independent
investigatory unit reporting
to the White House staff was
expressly agreed to by Direc-
tor Hoover and this agree-
ment manifested in a memo-
randum from Director Hoover;

8. That to his information
and belief Central Intelligence
Agency investigative support
was unobtainable for this
special National Security
project and to the lack of
C.I.A. jurisdiction within the
Territorial United States;

9. That in July, 1971, the
affiant recommended to Mr.
John D. Ehrlichman that Mr.
G. Gordon Liddy be em-
ployed by the special unit as
an investigator and staff as-

* This is from Krogh's
affidavit. See
Washington Post
8 May 73.

Vietnam Cable and From Krogh's Affidavit

sistant, and Mr. Ehrlichman subsequently authorized the employment of Mr. Liddy;

Hunt Remembered

10. That Mr. E. Howard Hunt was recommended to affiant for assistance on the Pentagon papers investigation, such recommendation was made to affiant over the telephone by Mr. Charles C. Colson, Special Counsel to the President;

11. That Mr. Colson's recommendation of Mr. Hunt was based on Mr. Hunt's investigative experience as an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency;

12. That Mr. Hunt was at that time employed as a part-time White House consultant by Mr. Colson on matters no known to me;

13. That information obtained by the special unit made it imperative to ascertain whether the unauthorized disclosure of the Pentagon papers was (a) an individual act, (b) the act of a small group, or (c) the result of a wider conspiracy to engage in espionage;

14. That during the early stages of the investigation, affiant received information suggesting that Dr. Ellsberg did not act alone;

15. That the affiant was informed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the so-called Pentagon papers were in the possession of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., prior to their publication by The New York Times newspaper suggesting an effort to aid and abet an enemy of the United States through the ally;

16. That shortly thereafter additional public disclosure

of classified information related to national security took place, to wit:

A. Publication of a news story on the Strategic Arms Limitation talks with the Soviet Union, and

B. Publication of a news story on Aug. 12, 1971, regarding a Soviet move to avert a war by entering into a pact with India;

17. That following the publication of the above mentioned SALT story, the affiant was personally instructed by President Nixon, in the presence of John D. Ehrlichman, that the continuing "leaks" of vital information were compromising the national security of the United States, and the President instructed the affiant to move ahead with the greatest urgency to determine the source of "leaks;"

18. That the affiant was informed by the C.I.A. that a news story had put in jeopardy the life of an intelligence agent, thus emphasizing the need for increased investigative effort on the part of the affiant's special unit;

19. That in addition the affiant was informed repeatedly during the months of July and August of 1971 of the extreme threat perceived to be developing by high Government officials, because of the possibility of further unauthorized disclosure as to the capacity of the United States Government to conduct its foreign affairs and protect its national security;

20. That efforts to discover the sources had not succeeded;

21. That affiant's special

unit received information from an interview conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with one Dr. Fielding, former psychiatrist to Daniel Ellsberg, which yielded no information;

22. That additionally a psychological profile of Dr. Ellsberg, prepared by the C.I.A. provided no useful information to the affiant's special unit;

26. That general authorization to engage in covert activity to obtain a psychological history or ascertain associates of Dr. Fielding was thereafter given to the special unit by John D. Ehrlichman;

27. That plans for acquiring the information from the office of Dr. Fielding were developed by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy;

28. That to affiant's information and belief a first trip to California was undertaken by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy to determine means for acquiring the information.

29. That films of the premises of Dr. Fielding's office were brought back by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy following the first trip.

30. That the affiant's understanding and belief certain of these films were left in a camera belonging to the Central Intelligence Agency and transmitted to the Department of Justice by the Central Intelligence Agency.

31. That a second trip was undertaken to acquire the information in early September 1971.

32. That in affiant's supervisory capacity, affiant agreed to the mission with the understanding that Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy would

obtain the service of certain mission.

34. That recent newspaper reports suggesting that an individual had accepted responsibility for the entry into two offices on the premises where Dr. Fielding has his office was a completely unknown incident to affiant;

Funds for Undertaking

35. That to affiant's understanding and belief the funds for implementing the effort to acquire the information were provided to affiant through an unknown intermediary after a request by affiant to Mr. Charles Colson for the funds;

36. That to affiant's knowledge affiant did not inform Mr. Colson as to the reason for the request for funds;

37. That to affiant's understanding and belief the funds totaled \$2,000.00 which were to be used for expenses;

40. That to affiant's understanding and belief no information of any kind was transmitted to any Government agency for use in the prosecution of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg derived from either trip to California as none was obtained.

41. That upon return from the second trip to California, failure of the objective to acquire information was reported by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy to affiant and photos of destructive activity within an office were displayed to explain the events which had reportedly transpired.

42. That photographs of Dr. Fielding's apartment were presented by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy with a recommendation that another attempt be made to acquire the desired information.