

Globe's Account Asserts Johnson Sought Cutback

By United Press International

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BOSTON, June 22—The Boston Globe reported today that the concluding part of the classified Pentagon study on the Vietnam war says that President Lyndon B. Johnson had decided to support South Vietnam but to reduce American troops in a policy that President Nixon later termed Vietnamization.

The decision was made just before Mr. Johnson announced on March 31, 1968, that he would not seek another term, The Globe said.

The Globe added that sections of the study, which The New York Times and The

The New York Times is restrained by Federal court from publishing further articles in its Vietnam series. These dispatches are based on an article in The Boston Globe and were distributed by United Press International and The Associated Press to all their newspaper, radio and television subscribers.

Washington Post temporarily have been restrained by Federal courts from publishing, came to it Monday. It did not mention the source.

The Globe said that the concluding part of the Pentagon study included the following:

¶A recommendation to President Kennedy from Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor that 8,000 United States ground combat troops be sent to South Vietnam under the pretext of flood control. General Taylor said that this might increase world tensions and widen the war. The Globe said that Mr. Kennedy did not approve General Taylor's request for ground combat troops.

¶A request to the Soviet Union in May, 1965, asking it to officially inform Hanoi that

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the United States would temporarily stop bombing North Vietnam, as a peace feeler. The Russians refused to do so, The Globe said, because they felt that China would charge collusion with the United States.

¶A report of a June 2, 1964, meeting in Honolulu, where Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara raised the possibility of using nuclear weapons at some point if Chinese forces entered the ground war.

According to The Globe, the Tet offensive early in 1968 jolted Washington's confidence in an eventual end to the war and "although it had been predicted, took the U. S. command and the U. S. public by surprise and its strength, length and intensity prolonged this shock." At this point, the study said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended refusing requests for additional combat troops because the reserves—needed in case of domestic disorders—were becoming too thin.

The Globe reported that the analyst said in the epilogue: "The possibility of military victory had seemingly become remote and the cost had become too high in political and economic terms. Only then was it realized that a clear-cut military victory was probably not possible or necessary."

General Taylor's cablegram sent in late October, 1961, recommended that the United States "initiate guerrilla action, including United States advisers if necessary" in the Sepone Area of Laos, and send troops to support the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem.

"My view is that we should put in a task force consisting largely of logistical troops for the purpose of participating in flood relief and at the same time of providing a United States military presence," the study reportedly said.

Kennedy Administration Role

BOSTON, June 22 (AP)—The Boston Globe said today that it was making public for the first time "the role of the Kennedy Administration in the escalation of the war."

"As early as May 11, 1961, President Kennedy," the article said, "had approved programs for covert action which had been recommended by a Vietnam task force.

"Among these actions were: "1. Dispatch of agents into North Vietnam.

"2. Aerial resupply of agents in North Vietnam through the use of civilian mercenary air crews.

"3. Infiltration of special South Vietnam forces into Southeast Laos to locate and attack Communist bases and lines of communication.

"4. Formulation of networks of resistance, covert bases and teams for sabotage and light harassment inside North Vietnam.

"5. Conduct of overflights of North Vietnam for the purpose of dropping leaflets.

"These covert actions, which were approved by President Kennedy, were contained, according to the Pentagon study, in a National Security Action Memorandum number 52."

In a cablegram sent from the Philippines in October, 1961, General Taylor, according to The Globe's account, said that his recommendation for 8,000 ground troops in Vietnam "without delay offers definitely more advantage than it creates risks and difficulties."

Problems Are Outlined

The Globe account said that the following risks and difficulties were outlined by Taylor:

"1. The strategic reserve of United States forces is presently so weak that we can ill afford any detachment of

forces to a peripheral area of the Communist bloc where they will be pinned down for an uncertain duration.

"2. Although United States prestige is already engaged in SVN (South Vietnam) it will become more so by sending of troops.

"3. If the first contingent is not enough to accomplish the necessary results, it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce. If the ultimate result is the closing of the frontiers and the cleanup of the insurgents within SVN, there is no limit to our possible commitment unless we attack the source in Hanoi."

"4. The introduction of United States forces may increase tensions and risk escalation into a major war in Asia."

"On the other side of the argument," Taylor said, "there can be no action so convincing of United States seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring to the people and the Government of SVN and to our friends and allies in SEA (Southeast Asia) as the introduction of United States forces into SVN."

The Globe said that "President Kennedy stepped up covert actions against North Vietnam and increased the number of advisers to 16,000 men before he was assassinated in November, 1963, but he never committed the United States ground unit as Taylor had suggested."

A Private Decision

The Globe also said that the Pentagon study showed that when "President Johnson announced publicly that he would not run for re-election in March, 1968, he was also deciding privately that a policy of Vietnamization was the best one for the nation to follow in the war."

"The President's speech was also a denial of Gen. William C. Westmoreland's request for an additional 206,000 troops," The Globe said.

The Globe said that the two months between the Tet offensive and Mr. Johnson's speech early in 1968 "are described in the Pentagon study as a time of conflicting counsel coming to the White House and revolving around a request from General William Westmoreland, then U.S. commander in Saigon, for 206,000 additional troops over the 525,000 ceiling that had previously been put on American forces there."

The Globe added: "The fireworks of the Tet offensive had, it is clear from the Pentagon studies, shaken Washington's confidence in the eventual outcome of the war and kicked off what the writers describe as a 'reassessment from A to Z.'"