

SF Examiner

ACIX AD JUL 7 1974

# Summit gains unappreciated -- Kissinger

## ANALYSIS

By Kingsbury Smith  
European Director  
The Hearst Newspapers

MUNICH — Secretary of State Kissinger is becoming increasingly distressed over what he regards as a tendency in the United States to overlook the forest for the trees in analyzing the outcome of the latest meeting between American and Soviet leaders.

Kissinger feels those who are critical of the results of the dialogue with the Soviets don't really know what they are talking about.

A senior official with Kissinger's party said yesterday, during the flight from Rome to Munich, that he thought an amazing situation was developing in debate over what happened — or did not happen — in the Soviet-American talks.

The conservatives are saying that the outcome of talks means neither side intended to abandon the nuclear arms race. The liberals are saying that failure to achieve a permanent agreement on offensive nuclear weapons, especially MIRV, means that Watergate has ruined American foreign policy.

Actually, Kissinger believes the recent Soviet American summit meeting marked the best intellectual talks held with the Soviet leaders since the first Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) agreement in the summer of 1972.

Kissinger is convinced the Soviets want to maintain the detente with the United States and curb the nuclear arms race. They genuinely accept the proposition that continuation of the arms race could lead to a revival of the Cold War in its most vicious and dangerous form.

However, the problem is that the Soviet leaders still think Russia is strategically inferior to the United States, particularly in the development of the multiple nuclear warheads — the most advanced weapon in the nuclear arsenal.

They want to catch up with the United States, and until they do they do not want to bind themselves to commit-

ments that might make it difficult or impossible.

It is a question — the \$64 one — in Kissinger's mind of determining what constitutes strategic superiority. That necessity applies to the Soviet leaders as well as to the American military establishment and those who contend that Russia is headed for tremendous strategic superiority over the United States.

Kissinger believes there should be a thorough debate in the United States on this issue, especially involving the Pentagon, members of Congress and other interested parties.

Until one analyzes what constitutes strategic superiority, Kissinger feels there is absolutely no basis for judging it. Nobody knows now what constitutes strategic superiority.

The Soviets have more missiles than the United States — about 500 more. The United States has many more nuclear warheads, especially the MIRVs.

Adding up the missiles is a misleading way of determining superiority. Adding up warheads by themselves is also misleading, although perhaps closer to the truth.

Then there is the question of how a nuclear missile would operate under combat conditions.

Neither side has ever exploded a nuclear missile on a launching silo. Nobody has ever fired a missile in a North-South direction. Neither side knows whether the rotation of the earth would throw the missiles 200 or more yards off course so that they could not hit the enemy launching silos with sufficient accuracy to destroy them.

Strategic superiority, Kissinger believes, is a combination of missiles, warheads, accuracy, thrust, and then what a political leader can do with all these things in a crisis.

Kissinger does not have the answer to it. He does not think the Soviets have the answer to it. In fact experience has shown that the Soviet conception of these problems lags a year or two behind the American conception.

(United Press International reported that the official gave it his honest impression that the Russians had their own serious debate over U.S. proposals. They argued bitterly among themselves in front of the Americans during the meetings at Brezhnev's sea-side Yalta villa and during a yacht cruise on the Black Sea, and did not give the impression that they were staging the drama for Nixon's benefit.)

However, after suddenly summoning the Politburo for its approval, Brezhnev did accept another American proposal aimed at breaking the deadlock that had developed on the SALT issue. That was for a resumption of the Soviet-American experts' conference in Geneva to try to define what constitutes strategic superiority and come up with a new approach to the problem of how to control the offensive nuclear weapons in a pact that would last for ten years and thus provide some stability.

That was not an insignificant accomplishment.