

# Excerpts From Secretary of State Kissinger's News Conference Here

Following are excerpts from Secretary of State Kissinger's news conference in New York yesterday, as recorded by The New York Times:

## OPENING STATEMENT


There has been a great deal of speculation tied to a possible trip of the President to Europe. We still, of course, plan this trip. And its exact date will have to be determined by the pace of our preparations.

Much of the speculation has been in terms of an adversary relationship between us and the Europeans, and great difficulty in coming to an agreement. I would like to correct this impression.

What we are confronting in the dialogue with the Europeans is the merging of several processes. There is the process of European integration. There is the process of the debate on security within NATO. And there is the redefinition of the Atlantic relationship covering all these areas.

When on behalf of the President I proposed a new Atlantic declaration of principles, there was some uncertainty in Europe on how and in what forum to respond. And several months were spent in internal discussions within Europe whether the proper forum would be NATO, a series of bilateral negotiations with the Europeans or a series of talks between the United States and the Common Market.

The result has been that after some months of going



The New York Times/Neal Beenzli  
Secretary of State Kissinger leaving the United Nations General Assembly with his son, David, yesterday.

all these routes, the European opinion crystallized: that the economic and those political considerations relevant to economic matters and those political considerations relevant to Europe as an entity should be discussed by the nine as a unit with the United States; that security issues and those political issues relevant to security matters should be discussed in the NATO council; and that, of course, the bilateral channels would remain open throughout this process.

With respect to the declaration that the Europeans—that the nine—have developed, the United States recognizes that this first at-

tempt by Europe to speak with one voice on a political matter—on trans-Atlantic relationships—is an event of the greatest significance.

The United States in the postwar period has constantly supported the emergence of a European identity, and we therefore welcome the fact that Europe has now organized itself well enough so that it can speak to us with one voice. And it may be that in historical retrospect this meeting of the European mind will be seen as one of the decisive events of the postwar period.

Secondly, as you know, there are discussions taking place right now in NATO dealing with the definition of future allied relationships concerning security and the political aspects of security.

There is general agreement that these discussions will be energetically pursued within the context of the NATO council. We expect to make a significant contribution to this. And so will other countries.

What I want to underline here is that we are not engaged in an adversary process in which a traditional friendship is attempted to be given new vitality. The trip of the President is not an end in itself. The trip of the President will certainly take place in the near future. And our concern is to produce documents that will have some historic significance.

In the conversations with Japan, it was of course inevitable that the relationship of Japan to these various efforts be a subject of conversation.

Since the Japanese Foreign Minister and Prime Minister are going to be visiting Europe in the next few weeks, it would not be appropriate for me to comment on this except to say that in my speech of April 23 we outlined the American point of view, which is that at some stage of the process, in some manner, it is important for Japan to participate. The manner and the kind of declaration remains to be discussed and I think will continue to be discussed between the Japanese and our-

selves, and between the Japanese and the Europeans on the trip of the Japanese senior officials through Europe.

## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. This is not meant for your talks with Andrei Gromyko, but I'd like to ask a question about his public speech in the Assembly in which he demanded that Western nations stop meddling in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. I think in connection, principally, with the emigration policies of the Soviet Union. The manner in which he spoke left us uncertain as to whether this really meant any lessening of the spirit of détente or whether it was simply a public gesture in a private game. Could you?

A. The United States, of course, has its own views, deeply held, about the human values at stake, both in emigration policies and in internal policies. The foreign policy question we face is, first, the degree to which our foreign policy can directly affect these by overt acts. And secondly, the alternatives we in fact confront in our direction actions are ineffective.

There is a great tendency to assume that everything that has been achieved is now automatically permanent and can be drawn upon as if its capital were inexhaustible.

We are taking the position that we would not, as a government, take a formal public position. But we have

also taken the position that insofar as we have influence in other ways, we could use it to the limit of our capabilities.

Q. You say that there is a point beyond which the détente should not be infringed. I wonder if you could outline what you think might happen if the Congress revokes or blocks the most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union in the new trade bills.

A. I don't want to speculate about Soviet actions. I have stated previously that the most-favored-nations clause was part of a general arrangement with the Soviet Union in negotiations extending over a period of many years. If now the most-favored-nations clause is blocked, then the most serious questions have to be raised about the degree to which other countries—and in this case, the Soviet Union—can rely on a complex negotiation and about the performance of the United States over a period of time of its commitments.

There was no reason to suppose at the time that this most-favored-nations issue was discussed with the Soviet Union that the type of problem that is now blocking it could be the subject of conditions in Congress, because it had never been so used in any previous case where most-favored-nations status was requested for a Communist country.

And therefore, it would certainly be a significant setback in the policy that we are pursuing.

Q. There's been some talk about the convocation of a special conference on the Middle East. I was wondering whether the United States favors such a conference in the near future.

A. The United States position on the Middle East has been that we should avoid at this time any very dramatic moves until we have had an opportunity to discuss with the parties what the possibilities are and how far they are prepared to go in moving toward a just peace in the Middle East. And I think the calling of a conference before one has determined the framework, and has some understanding as to objectives, would be putting the cart before the horse.

Q. The Senate voted today to reduce U.S. forces abroad 40 per cent in the next two years. Is that a good idea, and how will it affect the U.S. position and negotiating capability in the talks on the mutual and balanced force reduction and the limiting of strategic weapons?

A. As you know, the Administration strongly opposes this type of resolution. It will be impossible to negotiate an agreement for the reduction of forces when the United States unilaterally accomplishes what the negotiations are supposed to bring about. It will be very difficult if not impossible to convince our allies of the steadiness of American policy when the United States again unilaterally, before our discussions have well advanced, reduces its forces in Europe.