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NYTimes Excerpts From Kissinger's News

Following are excerpts from Henry A. Kissinger's broadcast news conference from San Clemente, Calif., yesterday, as recorded by The New York Times through the facilities of A.B.C. News:

Opening Statement

First, I wanted to say that the President has done me a great honor to nominate me for a position that was held by such great Americans as Secretary Stimson, George Marshall, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles—all of whom were united in one basic approach: that the foreign policy of the United States is not a partisan matter. It concerns the whole nation. That the future of our country transcends any particular administration. That is the spirit in which, if the Senate confirms me, I will attempt to conduct the office of Secretary of State.

I would also like to say a few words about the outgoing Secretary of State, William Rogers.

Many of you for four and a half years have commented about the difficult relationship between the White House staff and the Secretary of State.

And it is, of course, true. You wouldn't believe me if I said anything else, that there is an institutional problem when there is a strong White House operation and a strong Secretary of State, which is one reason why we have combined these positions now.

Minimum of Difficulties

I would like to say, on this occasion, that these difficulties, which are inherent in the arrangement, were at an absolute minimum. The Secretary of State has conducted his affairs with enormous dignity, grace, wisdom and, above all, humanity.

I had a long talk with him on the telephone yesterday and I look forward to his continued advice and participation in the policies in which he played such a large role, in which he was perhaps more instrumental in shaping than he often received credit.

Now, let me say a few things about what is ahead.

Any administration wants to leave the world better than it found it, and the most important challenge before our country in the field of foreign policy is to bring about a stable peace.

'Revolutionary Changes'

In the first term of the President, many important and some revolutionary changes were made. These required to a considerable extent secret diplomacy, and they were conducted on a rather restricted basis.

But now we are in a different phase. The foundations that have been laid must now lead to the building of a more permanent structure. What has been started is still very tender. If you think back, it is only three years that we had simultaneous crises in the Caribbean, in the Middle East and on Berlin.

It's only two years that we first opened relations with the People's Republic of China. And in the same period relations with our traditional friends have undergone enormous transformation.

So what we are going to try to do is to solidify what has been started, to put more emphasis on our relationship with Europe and with Japan, and to conclude during the term of the President the building of a structure that we can pass on to succeeding administrations so that the world will be a safer place when they take over.

Now this requires that there be a greater institutionalization of foreign policy than has been the case up to now.

Plans More Interchange

The role of the National Security Council staff will continue to be interdepartmental, there will be a greater exchange between the State Department and the National Security Council staff and personnel than has been possible up to now, but the details of this I would like to defer until after the confirmation.

Another important aspect in the institutionalization of foreign policy will be to bring the Congress into a close partnership in the development, planning and execution of our foreign policy.

Yesterday I called every member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and key members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and I told them all what I am saying to you ladies and gentlemen today.

The foreign policy of this Administration is designed not on a partisan basis but on a national basis. And it is essential that the Congress fully understand what we are attempting to do. Even in my present position as assistant to the President, I met regularly with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at first in Chairman Fulbright's house, and later in a committee room in the Senate, at first on a very informal basis but later with very full notes being taken by the committee staff.

Conference

Plans to Testify Often

I therefore welcome the opportunity of being able to testify regularly and as frequently as the chairman and

the members of the committee consider desirable about the purposes and policies of the President and the Administration.

There has been some question about whether dual positions of assistant to the President and Secretary of State may cause me to invoke executive privilege. Let me answer this now.

The purpose of combining the two positions is, as the President pointed out yesterday, an attempt to move policy-making from the White House into the department and therefore to make it more accessible to Congressional and public scrutiny.

I would therefore expect to testify about all matters that secretaries of state have traditionally testified. In addition, I would feel it appropriate to testify about those interdepartmental matters with respect to which I spoke informally previously to the Senate Foreign Relation Committee.

I would not be able to testify about personal conversations between the President and myself, or about direct advice I gave to the President. But I could not testify with respect to this in any event, and no Cabinet member is ever asked to testify with respect to conversations he has with the President.

To Increase Information

So I know the President's intention in combining these two positions is to increase the information available to the Congress. And the President, whom I have seen only a few minutes ago, has asked me to say that executive privilege will not be invoked except with respect to the range of issues that I have mentioned, the practical consequence of which will be that more information will be available to the Congressional committees than before.

Now a word about the relationship of the department and of our foreign policy to the public. If we are going to achieve the lasting peace which we seek and if we are going to leave behind a foreign policy tradition that will be carried on on a nonpartisan basis in succeeding administrations, we have an obligation to explain our philosophies, purposes and policies to the public.

After my confirmation I intend to invite leaders of various opinion-forming elements in this country to the State Department to advise us on how they can most effectively discharge this responsibility.

We will do our best to conduct foreign policy in as open a manner as is consistent

with the goals which we all share, which is to bring about a lasting peace.

Replies to Questions Cambodian Bombing

The question is whether there were fighter-bomber raids closer to Phnom Penh than 10 to 15 miles. I'll take this question but I'm sure that the Senate will also want to ask about it, and therefore I don't want to go into all the details. And also I haven't consulted all the records, but the B-52 operations were confined to an area within 10 miles.

Occasionally—but I think very rarely—there were some tactical air operations when there were military activities there were military activities on one side of the border that continued in which the sequence of military operations continued across the border, and in the pursuit of them occasionally—but very rarely—some tactical air operations took place.

They could have been deeper than 10 miles, but I doubt if they were very much deeper.

Impact of Watergate

Now your other question on the impact of Watergate on foreign policy. The foreign countries have to assess what sort of a country they're dealing with, how steady it can be in the carrying out of its commitments and the degree of authority possessed by its leaders. To the extent that these are affected, there is a long-term effect on foreign policy.

Our intention will be, as I stated prior to this appointment, to emphasize both aspects of foreign policy on which most Americans agree—to carry out a foreign policy that has the widest possible support on a bipartisan basis. And since I'm confident that that can be achieved, I believe that the effect of Watergate on the conduct of foreign policy can be minimized.

I was asked very early in the Watergate affair, at the end of April, whether it might have an effect on foreign policy.

At the time, one's knowledge of it was confined essentially to the break-in of Democratic campaign headquarters. At that time I said that if an orgy of recrimination set in, it might have an effect on foreign policy.

There is no question that if the divisions in a country grow too deep, then the conduct of foreign policy will be affected. And then, people have to decide whether it is—whether the issues, on

which they are being divided are worth it.

On this I'm not now taking a position. I'm just stating the facts analytically.

Consensus Eroding

Now it is true that the consensus on which foreign policy was conducted in the late nineteen-forties and through the fifties and sixties is eroding in part because the conditions in the world have changed so enormously.

In the late nineteen forties and in the nineteen fifties, foreign policy was essentially designed to prevent what was munism from entirely overrunning the world. Today, we are getting a foreign policy in which at one and the same time we are engaged in—with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and on the other hand, we are trying to strengthen the traditional friendship with Europe and Japan.

On the one hand, we are quite defense budgets, and on the other we are conducting negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms. This requires a complexity of thought and a sophistication on the part of the American public that was not called for in the forties and fifties.

We've had the legacy of a war that bitterly divided Americans. And that has to be healed. And therefore one of the prime objectives of the be to create a consensus in which the American people and the American Congress can understand and will support the necessity of carrying on adequate defense programs and disarmament negotiations.

The Middle East

The President has repeatedly stated that the Middle East is an important area, and perhaps the most dangerous area, and I will pursue, under the President's direction, those policies which are considered necessary, and in the past that has sometimes meant a less than restrained profile.

I'm asked to conduct the foreign policy of the United States and I will conduct the foreign policy of the United States, regardless of religious and national heritage. There is no other country in the world in which a man of my background could be even considered for an office such as the one to which I have been nominated, and that imposes on me a very grave responsibility which I will pursue in the national interest.

Grain Sales

With respect to the grain sales, I think it is important

to understand that there are major areas of American foreign policy, or let me rather put it, of the American position in the world in which our approach and realities are fundamentally changing.

For example, for the entire postwar period and the entire first term of this Administration, it was considered axiomatic that the United States could never sell too much grain. The entire farm policy and the entire foreign policy as it was expressed—as it related to agricultural policy proceeded from the assumption that with our huge surpluses and our huge productivity we could stand for free markets. For our almost entire postwar history we have considered ourselves more or less self-sufficient in raw materials.

Now we find a greater dependence on foreign sources for energy. We find that for the first time because of a combination of factors there is a shortage of American food for export, and this has profound consequences for the conduct of our foreign policy when free access to foreign markets had been one of the cardinal tenets of our policy previously.

So what we have to change first is our traditional approach, and we have started prior to this appointment already a study on an interdepartmental basis in this Government to examine how over the next five to 10 years world needs and American productivity could be brought into some relationship.

Department Operation

I plan to maintain an office in the White House and to spend some of my time in the White House on interdepartmental matters and on being available to the President.

I would expect that some of my associates would join me in the State Department to ease the cultural shock, and I also would expect that some of the head people in the State Department would move to the White House in order to see the interdepartmental operations from a White House perspective.

But we would keep the energy structure in place for interdepartmental business and for the Presidential business.

We would hope to give even more vitality to the operation of the State Department. And I can only reiterate that if what has been done can be built on, and if it is to last, it must engage the commitment of the professionals who will have to carry on over a period of time. And this will be one of my principal purposes at the State Department.