ixon's Challend

Washington Post Service By Murrey Marder

ous use of military force East-West tension. decade of work to reduce the Soviet Union after a that risked a clash with namese war by an audaci-Washington that he could end the Viet oled massively last night President Nixon gam-

late President Kennedy in ne 1962 Cu-No president except the

clear age. erisis has wagered ngher stakes ban missile the Analysis Zews

dangled over the 1962 crisis. of imminent nuclear war ences, in these two Sovietbut also profound differ-American crises. The threat There are direct parallels

actions as a direct challenge den of his remarks, were dito its vital interests. gambling that the Soviet ast night, Mr. Nixon is however, and the main bur-Union will not construe his The President's actions, In the crisis that emerged

with the weapons of offensupplying North Vietnam dress, he held the Kremlin sentence of his grim adprimarily responsible for Union. From the opening

rected squarely at the Soviet

shipping before the mines harbors of North Vietnam Soviet Union with a supreme with just "three daylight periods" allowed to remove all are activated, confronts the

Kennedy did in 1962, differs around Cuba, as President Vietnam and imposing a quarantine line of warships mining the harbors of North The distinction between

North Vietnamese ports to order last night was to close ons, while President Nixon's er specified offensive weapsage of Soviet vessels carry. in 1962 barred only the pascause the blockade of Cuba other sense it is greater, belimited challenge, but in aning nuclear missiles and oth-In one sense it is a more

start May 22. viet Union, negotiations," his military orders was the prospect of fulfilling the negotiations," which were intended to be climaxed by viet Union to comply with President held out to the So-Mr. Nixon's talks in the 'significant progress in our scheduled

major interests at stake in them, including above all mit talks, touched on the pressly mentioning the sum-Mr. Nixon, without ex-


national choice. His orders to mine the

only in degree.

all shipping.

The prime inducement the

the first stage of the strate-



> U.S. destroyer and patrol plane intercepted a Soviet freighter during the 1962 Cuban crisis

that is now in sight. gic nuclear arms agreement

agreement to freeze for the States and the Soviet Union negotiations, the United have within their grasp an After years of intensive ments "on trade" and "on a high hopes of new agree-President noted, there are destructive nuclear missiles. first time their mutually Along with this accord, the spiraling stocks of mutually

> ally, China. any direct reference to the President's remarks was North Vietnam's other main host of other issues." Noticeably absent from

China was included only in however, to sever "rail and

erences to weapons supplied other Communist nations." "by the Soviet Union and by the President, in his refthe most oblique references The President's orders,

Kremlin

all other communications...to the maximum extent possible," do involve China indirectly because the rail and other ground supply lines carrying weapons and other equipment into North Vietnam are routes from China.

Nevertheless, by omitting any direct reference to China, the President is presumably trying to maintain the rapprochaent between the U.S. and China that he achieved and confirmed with his visit there in February.

Since the North Vietnamese offensive was launched in South Vietnam March 30, China has been markedly moderate and restrained in its support for Hanoi's cause and in its verbal attacks on the U.S. The Chinese have avoided personal condemnation of President Nixon.

China's bitter ideological rivalry with the Soviet Union may cause it to stand back and try to reap whatever gain it can from the challenge raised to the Soviet Union from President Nixon's actions.

If China takes such a position, that could make the Russian decision more tortuous because there is underlying Kremlin suspicion about Sino-American "collusion" against Soviet interests.

In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the backdown that the late Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev was forced to make under U.S. pressure, and the great split between Moscow and Peking that occurred during his time in office, both helped to bring about Khrushchev's overthrow on 1964.

The positive prospect that President Nixon has held out to the world, an end to the Indochina war, may or may not be in the interest of the Soviet Union. U.S. strategists have debated through the years whether it is in the interest of the Kremlin to see the war end, or to see it continue, draining off U.S. resources which otherwise might be pitted against the Soviet Union globally.

President Nixon's proposal for ending the war with an internationally supervised, Indochin a-wide cease-fire, a release of American prisoners and a withdrawal of all American forces from vietnam, has previously been offered in several forms.

This combination of proposals has never before appeared publicly with a time limit as short as "within four months." But in the present case, this time limit is coupled to a continuing, novel, military threat.