



Associated Press

LISTENING TO PEACE PROPOSALS: Vietnamese civilians in Saigon during President Nguyen Van Thieu's speech

## Private and Public U.S. Statements on Peace Efforts

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26—A series of secret diplomatic efforts to end the war in Vietnam formed the central disclosure made by President Nixon last night and discussed today by Henry A. Kissinger, his adviser on national security. Following is a listing of some of the formerly secret events, with a comparison of the publicly known and privately held activities that surrounded them:

### First Kissinger Trip PRIVATE

President Nixon said that he had sent Mr. Kissinger to Paris on Aug. 4, 1969, to begin a series of secret peace negotiations.

### PUBLIC

Five days before the beginning of the secret discussions, the President declared during a visit to Saigon, "We have gone as far as we can or should go in opening the door to negotiations which will bring peace. It is time for the other side to sit down with us and talk seriously about ways to stop the killing, to put an end to this tragic war which has brought to great destruction to friend and foe alike."

On July 25, 1969, Mr. Nixon outlined to reporters on Guam a Nixon doctrine for Asia, with twin precepts of a United States commitment to honor treaty obligations to allies and a requirement that the allies assume responsibility for their own defense.

Throughout 1969 and 1970, the President voiced skepticism about the Paris peace talks and emphasized, as an alternative, a program of Vietnamization to strengthen South Vietnamese combat forces while withdrawing United States troops.

In April, 1970, Mr. Nixon sent United States troops into Cambodia and, in February, 1971, provided American air support for a South Vietnamese incursion into Laos. Both campaigns were designed, the President said, to weaken the enemy forces and purchase time for the Vietnamization program.

On Oct. 7, the President proposed in a televised address a cease-fire throughout Indochina, exchange of prisoners of war and a broadened peace conference to cover all of Indochina. The offer rejected.

Today, in addition to refusing to give details of his first meeting, Mr. Kissinger declined to discuss the five subsequent meetings during 1969 and 1970, "because they are not relevant to our immediate concern."

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### Seventh Kissinger Trip PRIVATE

The President said last night that Mr. Kissinger conveyed a United States offer "to agree to a deadline for the withdrawal of all American forces in exchange for the release of all prisoners of war and a cease-fire."

According to Mr. Kissinger's amplification today, the May 31 meeting in Paris marked the first time that the United States had indicated a willingness to set a withdrawal date unilaterally, "without an equivalent assurance of withdrawal from the other side." In reply, Mr. Kissinger said, the North Vietnamese insisted that any settlement of the military issue had to be accompanied by agreement on the political future of South Vietnam.

### PUBLIC

At a news conference on April 29, 1971, Mr. Nixon declared that the setting of a date for unilateral United States withdrawals "is not something that is in our interest; it is only in the enemy's interest." If the North



Vietnamese knew when the United States would leave Vietnam, he said, they would have no incentive to negotiate with the United States toward peace.

On June 8, Clark Clifford, who served as Secretary of Defense under President Lyndon B. Johnson, said in a speech that he had reason to believe American prisoners of war would be released in 30 days if the United States agreed to set Dec. 31, 1971, as a deadline for withdrawal from Vietnam.

Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, said the following day that Mr. Clifford's proposal was only "speculation" and added that it "may be an attempt to exploit the prisoners of war for domestic political purpose."

#### **Eighth Kissinger Trip**

Mr. Nixon said that the North Vietnamese rejected the United States withdrawal proposal of May 31 and offered a nine-point plan, Mr. Kissinger said that the Communist plan linked together the military and political issues and that the United States agreed to that as a basis for further secret negotiation.

PUBLIC

On June 22, the Senate adopted an amendment by the majority leader, Mike Mansfield, to the draft extension legislation. The amendment declared that it would be national policy to pull all United States forces out of Vietnam in nine months in exchange for the release of all prisoners. It did not stipulate that the tradeoff must be accompanied by a cease-fire, but called for a companion effort to establish a cease-fire.

Mr. Ziegler said the following day that if the other side at the public peace negotiations "misunderstands this and assumes it to be U.S. policy, this could seriously jeopardize the negotiations in Paris."

On June 28, spurred by an intensive Administration lobbying effort, the House of Representatives declined to instruct its conferees on the draft bill to accept the Mansfield amendment.

On July 1, the Vietcong delegation to the Paris negotiations publicly presented a seven-point plan calling for United States withdrawal, release of the Americans held prisoner and replacement of the Saigon Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu. One week later, United States delegates asked for secret discussion of the plan.

#### **Ninth Kissinger Trip**

PRIVATE

The President and Mr. Kissinger said that this secret session, on July 12, 1971, was devoted to discussing whether to negotiate on the public, seven-point plan or the private, nine-point proposal. The public plan included a truce with American combat forces, the private plan a cease-fire as part of an over-all settlement, Mr. Kissinger said. The two sides agreed, according to the White House, to negotiate on the basis of the secret proposal.

PUBLIC

The White House described the public plan as one with "positive, as well as clearly unacceptable elements," but neither here nor in Paris offered a direct reply. Criticism from antiwar spokesmen grew during the summer as the public plan went unanswered.

On July 13, the White House made known that it would replace the ailing Ambassador to the Paris talks, David K. E. Bruce, with William J. Porter. On July 15, Mr. Nixon announced that he would go to Peking to meet Chinese officials in a search

for world peace. He subsequently warned that it would be risky to expect a Vietnam settlement to emerge from the China meeting, which has been scheduled for Feb. 21 to 28.

#### **10th Kissinger Trip**

PRIVATE

The President disclosed that the United States offered to undertake a "major reconstruction program" throughout Indochina, including North Vietnam. Mr. Kissinger, who made this trip on July 26, 1971, said that one of the nine points of the North Vietnamese plan was a demand for "reparations" from the United States, which the White House could not accept. In a search for an "agreement in principle," the secret talks dealt in June and July with the nine points, Mr. Kissinger said.

PUBLIC

Ambassador Bruce, retiring on July 29, complained that the Communists were demanding "unilateral action from us on troop withdrawals as the price for even beginning discussion on other issues." In a letter to Mr. Nixon, Mr. Bruce said that it was the Communists, "and they alone, who bear the heavy responsibility for the continuation of the war in Indochina."

#### **11th Kissinger Trip**

PRIVATE

Mr. Nixon said that on Aug. 16, 1971, Mr. Kissinger offered "the complete withdrawal of United States and allied forces within nine months after an agreement on an over-all settlement." Mr. Kissinger said that this included the designation of Aug. 1, 1972, as a deadline if the North Vietnamese agreed on an over-all settlement by Nov. 1, 1971. The United States also offered to limit its aid to South Vietnam if North Vietnam would agree to a limitation and to the principle of a neutral South Vietnam if acceptable to "all the other countries of Indochina."

PUBLIC

At a news conference on Aug. 4, Mr. Nixon was asked why he had not responded to the Vietcong proposal made a month earlier in Paris. He said that he was pursuing negotiations in "established channels," as the record would disclose "when it finally comes out." He added that "it would not be useful to negotiate in the newspapers if we want to have those negotiations succeed."

The impression among Senate war critics that the peace talks were being disregarded prompted Senator Mansfield to attempt to revive his proposal for a withdrawal, accompanied by release of prisoners, in nine months. The White House, arguing that such a unilateral declaration would tie the hands of peace negotiators, mounted a successful lobbying campaign to defeat the measure again.

#### **12th Kissinger Trip**

PRIVATE

At another secret session on Sept. 13, 1971, the North Vietnamese rejected the latest United States plan and insisted according to Mr. Nixon, "that we overthrow the South Vietnamese Government." Mr. Kissinger said that the North Vietnamese objected that nine months was too long a period before total American withdrawal, that they were uncertain if individual Americans would remain in South Vietnam and that an expression of United States neutrality "would not overcome the advantage" of the Thieu Government's remaining in power.

Mr. Kissinger said today that the United States had

put in writing in August its willingness to "abide by the outcome of any political process in South Vietnam and that the Communist were not committed to any particular government."

PUBLIC

At a news conference on Sept. 16, Mr. Nixon defended President Thieu's election position as an uncontested candidate for a second term. He said it had taken England 500 years to achieve Parliamentary democracy and a democratic system "didn't spring up full grown in the United States." Mr. Nixon said that "we have to keep in mind our major goal, which is to bring the American involvement to an end in a way that will leave South Vietnam in a position to defend itself from a Communist takeover."

At a public appearance in Portland, Ore., on Sept. 25, the President again asserted his consistent search for a Vietnam solution that would prevent a "Communist takeover" and warned that if there were a Congressional change in American policy forcing him to "move more precipitately, then everything that we have fought for in Vietnam could be lost."

#### **Secret Message to Hanoi**

PRIVATE

On Oct. 11, Mr. Nixon sent to North Vietnam a written, eight-point peace plan—essentially, Mr. Kissinger said, as it was outlined last night—in an attempt to break the deadlock. It reduced the withdrawal period from nine months to six and offered new, internationally monitored Presidential elections in South Vietnam. Despite efforts to arrange another secret negotiating session, the White House said, the North Vietnamese had not replied to the proposal.

PUBLIC

On Nov. 12, after announcing additional troop withdrawals. Mr. Nixon hinted at secret peace talks and said he was determined to secure the release of war prisoners. Mr. Nixon added, however, that he would "not like to leave the impression that we see the possibility of some striking breakthrough in negotiations in the near future."

Last night, in disclosing the secret negotiations in a television and radio address, Mr. Nixon pledged a flexible approach to the issues.

He said that he was making the record public because, "just as secret negotiations can sometimes break a public deadlock, public disclosure may help to break a secret deadlock."

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