

West Europe Urged Not to

Nixon Wants Berlin Pact Before a Security Parley

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WASHINGTON, Feb. 25—The Western commitment to seek a relaxation of tensions between the East and the West in Europe was renewed by President Nixon today with a caution to Western nations against accomplishing this at the expense of allied solidarity.

In his message to Congress on foreign affairs, the President said the United States and its European allies would press in the coming year for mutual reduction of military forces in Eastern and Western Europe. But he emphasized that the European security conference proposed by the Soviet Union should be put off until the Berlin negotiations had been successfully concluded.

Despite explicitly approving of the new "independence and vitality" of West European diplomacy, his comments about a relaxation of tensions showed a wariness over Soviet tactics. He seemed to indicate a nervousness about the possibility that Western powers might be drawn inadvertently into arrangements with Moscow at the expense of their allies.

Although Mr. Nixon did not name any foreign leader disapprovingly, private comments of Administration officials indicated that Mr. Nixon's primary concern was over the Eastern policy of the West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, and possibly over the French dialogue with Moscow.

Stress on 'Solidarity'

Mr. Nixon's comments about Europe were replete with references to the importance of Western "solidarity" and "cohesion" and the need to "harmonize" Western diplomatic approaches to the Soviet Union and other Communist powers.

"We and our allies seek a European détente," he said, "But we know that we cannot achieve it if we let slip away the close friendships in the West and the basic conditions

of stability which have set the stage for it."

The objective of the Soviet Union, he said, was to achieve Western acceptance of postwar boundaries and not Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe. Tactically, he cautioned, the Soviet Union has offered "a relaxation of tension selectively to some allies but not to others, and only on limited issues of primary interest to the U.S.S.R."

Concern Over Germany

The White House is known to be concerned that Chancellor Brandt may, in time, find himself under strong domestic pressure to make concessions to Moscow on such a vital issue as Berlin to prove the success of his diplomacy and to ratify the treaties he has already signed with the Soviet Union and Poland accepting the postwar borders of Poland.

Evidently reflecting this concern, Mr. Nixon stated:

"The West cannot afford to allow the momentum of individual approaches to the East to put allies inadvertently in the painful position of having to choose between their national concerns and their European responsibilities."

Notably, Mr. Nixon endorsed Mr. Brandt's "objective of normalizing relations with its Eastern neighbors" and spoke sympathetically of the problems of divided Germany without explicitly endorsing Bonn's diplomatic tactics.

The President described the problem of working out equitable reductions of the forces of the Warsaw Pact the Communist military group, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as "more complex" than Soviet-American strategic arms negotiations, especially because the Soviet Union, after any agreement, would be able to reinforce Eastern European forces much more quickly than the United States could reinforce West European forces.

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Let Efforts for Accord

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Unity

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