

Excerpts From Hunt's Testimony on

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, May 7—Following are excerpts from a transcript of additional grand jury testimony by E. Howard Hunt Jr. and from an affidavit by Egil Krogh Jr. as released at the Pentagon papers trial here today.

Hunt Testimony

Q. All right. Now, did you ever engage in any other clandestine operations? A. Not of that type, no sir.

Q. What type did you engage in? A. The only other one that comes to mind has to do with the widely publicized fraudulent Vietnamese cable.

Q. Tell us about that. A. Which to my knowledge is not an illegal activity.

Q. What did you do?

A. During the course of the researches, which are performed with the help of the Department of State, going over many hundreds of cables, comparing them with what actually appeared in the Ellsberg so-called Pentagon papers it became clear to me, from the State Department files, that a number of cables were missing. And that is to say that the chronological files did not contain cables in chronological sequence. Some of these micro-file—well, there weren't no micro-file, but they were greatly reduced in size approximately 3 by 4 inches from an 8—about half-size reduced.

Chronology Found Lacking

But these small versions had been extracted so that there was not a complete chronology of the period of the Vietnam war immediately prior to and subsequent to the assassination of then Premier Diem.

Inquiries at Pentagon

This encouraged me to have inquiries made at the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether or not their chronological files for 1963 were still intact. I wanted to obtain legal access to their files to see whether or not any of these chinks in the assassination story could be filled in through reference to C.I.A. traffic.

I was told that the communications office of the Central Intelligence Agency did not maintain their chronological files for that period of time. I think that more than five years had elapsed and they had been destroyed not stored at the Department of State.

I also had occasion to inquire—or I had inquiries made—of the Pentagon as to whether the so-called back channel had been utilized for any of its missing traffic and was told that no copies had been kept at the Pentagon of this type of traffic that might have taken place between, let's say, the commanding general in Saigon and the chief of staff in Washington.

I also, with some difficulty, managed to obtain the State Department's file. It was a State Department back channel. It was Secretary of State to the Ambassador, back and forth, and I went through that, satisfied myself that there was nothing of substance in there but, at the same time, I had concluded that a lot of significant traffic was missing.

And there came a time when I mentioned this to Mr. Colson, who I had been directing my research into the—at the particular period—the Vietnamese war, and told him that, in my opinion, a lot of stuff that should have been there had been extracted.

He said, "How do you account for that?" And I said, "Well, some of the cables that they still have on hand at the Department of State have been sent, with date stamps, saying photographed or duplicated for the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library."

Removal Termed Possible

So I said, "Well, obviously, anybody who had been given access to the Department of State files for the purposes of incorporating them into material held by the J.F.K. Library would also have had opportunity to remove any cables that could have been embarrassing to the Kennedy legates."

And he said, "Well, what kind of material have you dug up on the files that would indicate Kennedy complicity?"

And I showed him three or four cables that indicated that they had pretty close to pull the trigger against Premier Diem's head, but it didn't say so in so many words. Inferentially, one could say that it was a high degree of Administration complicity in the actual assassination of Diem and his brother.

And he said, "Well, this isn't good enough. Do you think you could improve on them?"

I said, "Yes, I probably could but not without technical assistance." After all, I

had been given some training in my past C.I.A. career to do just this sort of thing and had done it successfully on numerous occasions, floating forged newspaper accounts, telegrams, that sort of thing.

So he said, "Well, we won't be able to give you any technical help. This is too hot. See what you can do on your own."

So, with the very meager means at my disposal, which were literally a Xerox machine in the White House, a razor blade and a typewriter—which was not the same one as had been used on the original cables—I set about creating two cables which bore on that particular period.

The process was relatively simple. I first of all prepared a cable text. In other words, from many of these cables I could pretty well adjust the text to the type of language that would be used by the man who was the ostensible originator, and altered these, from time to time, until I was satisfied that I had two creditable cables.

Signature Problem

Then the problem came of getting the bottom line, which had the signatures of the reviewing officers and the originating and the heading, which had also the time date stamp on it, which was a crucial thing.

And simply by Xeroxing and re-Xeroxing, I substituted a text for what previously had been a legitimate cable and could use those.

I was not satisfied with the result. I showed them to Colson. He seemed to like them and I said, "These will never stand any kind of scrutiny." I said, "Let's be very sure about that."

And I asked the F.B.I. to tell me what kind of type face has been used on the original State Department cables and actually a White House cable, because one of them was ostensibly a White House cable, and I found out that it would be impossible for me to get access to a similar type face.

So I knew this was a technical problem that could not be overcome. So if anybody was going to see these cables, they'd simply have to see them. They could never be published.

So there would just have to be a fast brush show on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, which I began to believe was the purpose Mr. Colson had in mind.

4. That on or about July 15,

1971, affiant was given oral instructions by Mr. John D. Ehrlichman, assistant to the President of the United States for domestic affairs, to begin a special National Security project to coordinate a Government effort to determine the causes, sources, and ramifications of the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents known as the Pentagon papers.

5. That Mr. David Young of the National Security Council staff was assigned to this special project with him;

6. that to his information and belief one reason for undertaking an independent investigation centralized among White House staff was that a close personal relationship existed between the then director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, and Mr. Louis Marx, father-in-law of Daniel Ellsberg, admitted public source of the Pentagon papers.

7. That on affiant's information and belief the establishment of an independent investigatory unit reporting to the White House staff was expressly agreed to by Director Hoover and this agreement manifested in a memorandum from Director Hoover;

8. That to his information and belief Central Intelligence Agency investigative support was unobtainable for this special National Security project and to the lack of C.I.A. jurisdiction within the Territorial United States;

9. That in July, 1971, the affiant recommended to Mr. John D. Ehrlichman that Mr. G. Gordon Liddy be employed by the special unit as an investigator and staff as

Vietnam Cable and From Krogh's Affidavit

sistant, and Mr. Ehrlichman subsequently authorized the employment of Mr. Liddy;

Hunt Remembered

10. That Mr. E. Howard Hunt was recommended to affiant for assistance on the Pentagon papers investigation, such recommendation was made to affiant over the telephone by Mr. Charles C. Colson, Special Counsel to the President;

11. That Mr. Colson's recommendation of Mr. Hunt was based on Mr. Hunt's investigative experience as an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency;

12. That Mr. Hunt was at that time employed as a part-time White House consultant by Mr. Colson on matters no known to me;

13. That information obtained by the special unit made it imperative to ascertain whether the unauthorized disclosure of the Pentagon papers was (a) an individual act, (b) the act of a small group, or (c) the result of a wider conspiracy to engage in espionage;

14. That during the early stages of the investigation, affiant received information suggesting that Dr. Ellsberg did not act alone;

15. That the affiant was informed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the so-called Pentagon papers were in the possession of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., prior to their publication by The New York Times newspaper suggesting an effort to aid and abet an enemy of the United States through the ally;

16. That shortly thereafter additional public disclosure

of classified information related to national security took place, to wit:

A. Publication of a news story on the Strategic Arms Limitation talks with the Soviet Union, and

B. Publication of a news story on Aug. 12, 1971, regarding a Soviet move to avert a war by entering into a pact with India;

17. That following the publication of the above mentioned SALT story, the affiant was personally instructed by President Nixon, in the presence of John D. Ehrlichman, that the continuing "leaks" of vital information were compromising the national security of the United States, and the President instructed the affiant to move ahead with the greatest urgency to determine the source of "leaks;"

18. That the affiant was informed by the C.I.A. that a news story had put in jeopardy the life of an intelligence agent, thus emphasizing the need for increased investigative effort on the part of the affiant's special unit;

19. That in addition the affiant was informed repeatedly during the months of July and August of 1971 of the extreme threat perceived to be developing by high Government officials, because of the possibility of further unauthorized disclosure as to the capacity of the United States Government to conduct its foreign affairs and protect its national security;

20. That efforts to discover the sources had not succeeded;

21. That affiant's special

unit received information from an interview conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with one Dr. Fielding, former psychiatrist to Daniel Ellsberg, which yielded no information;

22. That additionally a psychological profile of Dr. Ellsberg, prepared by the C.I.A. provided no useful information to the affiant's special unit;

26. That general authorization to engage in covert activity to obtain a psychological history or ascertain associates of Dr. Fielding was thereafter given to the special unit by John D. Ehrlichman;

27. That plans for acquiring the information from the office of Dr. Fielding were developed by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy;

28. That to affiant's information and belief a first trip to California was undertaken by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy to determine means for acquiring the information.

29. That films of the premises of Dr. Fielding's office were brought back by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy following the first trip.

30. That the affiant's understanding and belief certain of these films were left in a camera belonging to the Central Intelligence Agency and transmitted to the Department of Justice by the Central Intelligence Agency.

31. That a second trip was undertaken to acquire the information in early September 1971.

32. That in affiant's supervisory capacity, affiant agreed to the mission with the understanding that Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy would

obtain the service of certain mission.

34. That recent newspaper reports suggesting that an individual had accepted responsibility for the entry into two offices on the premises where Dr. Fielding has his office was a completely unknown incident to affiant;

Funds for Undertaking

35. That to affiant's understanding and belief the funds for implementing the effort to acquire the information were provided to affiant through an unknown intermediary after a request by affiant to Mr. Charles Colson for the funds;

36. That to affiant's knowledge affiant did not inform Mr. Colson as to the reason for the request for funds;

37. That to affiant's understanding and belief the funds totaled \$2,000.00 which were to be used for expenses;

40. That to affiant's understanding and belief no information of any kind was transmitted to any Government agency for use in the prosecution of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg derived from either trip to California as none was obtained.

41. That upon return from the second trip to California, failure of the objective to acquire information was reported by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy to affiant and photos of destructive activity within an office were displayed to explain the events which had reportedly transpired.

42. That photographs of Dr. Fielding's apartment were presented by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy with a recommendation that another attempt be made to acquire the desired information.