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## 4


game, and then look those over to pick the most desirable . . .
"In general terms, we decided that 35 groups and individuals were responsible for most political change in Latin American nations . . . In a specific situation the number may be larger or smaller, but for the creation or the original model, 35 was right. They were: the Government, the military, the rich, three political parties, and workers in four different regions - the Capital City, Provincial City, Agricultural Region, and Industrial Region. Additional players were the middle class, landowners in the Capital, students in the two cities, the Embassy of the foreign capitalists, and foreign managers in the Industrial Region. Enough players were included so that Pulitica could vecume a very realistic copy of the real situation of any particular nation. Politica could be made more 'real' as a planning simulation by having the same number of players as actually existed in any particular nation, say Chile.
"'The players in a specific playing of Politica would be given a description of the individual or group they were to represent, so they could do things in a realistic way. To quote the game-plan for Politica, 'any of the above player categories may be duplicated, expanded or eliminated to suit the aim of any particular simulation.' All players could vote for any person, vote for any political party, enter into coalitions with any other groups, attempt to communicate with other players in their region or in any other region, engage in business transactions, attempt to revolt (in coalitions), go on strike, engage in terrorism, lie, bribe,
deceive. The Government could in addition tax, open or close the University, order the military into action, negotiate with any other player, or 'govern' - that is, force other players to act or to refrain from acting in a particular manner.
"Finally, the Military could revolt against the government on its own initiative, enter into coalitions with other groups to pressure the government, refuse to obey the government's orders, and act on its own initiative to suppress strikes or terrorist activity."

Del Solar continues with a brief history of Politica from the point of its creation in 1965 by Abt and its subsequent sale to the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency which started preparing it for play on vig computers and made it classified. "By mid-1966," he writes, "definite plans existed to have the Politica model played by a computer . . . In order that the computer could play realistic versions of Politica, I created a preliminary list of 'social variables and personality characteristics.' The list included such traits as cohesiveness, economic group interest patterns, politicaleconomic goals, social weaknesses, perception of need for standing alone or in coalition, group style or ways of doing things in regard to violence/persuasion, honor/opportunism, unity/individualism, and so forth. The list included more than forty different characteristics.
'The aim of Politica was to provide training to military men in how political change occurs, or could be made to occur, in specific Latin American nations. Politica was used, perhaps in a more sophisticated ver-
sion, to determine whether the situation in Chile would be 'stable' after a military takeover if Allende were still alive," which del Solar says he knows through friends in the field. "It was determined by analysis based on Politica that Allende should not be allowed to live. This game plan was carried out by Politica planners and their counterparts in the Chilean army. Allende died. .
"Who directly ordered the killing of Allende? I did not, but I made an intellectual tool that was part of it. ITT's Harold Geneen began offering the CIA one million dollars to remove Allende in 1969. ARPA paid for the 'pure' research that led to the creation of Politica . . .
"Why was Allende killed at this time? One clue is to be found in the fact that US copper users have become desperate for copper, and our strategic stockpile, with which the world price of copper has been held down (by dumping our reserves), has been committed as well as depleted ... Individuals who know more about US military planning should make their information known. Politica suggests that foreign policy is being made at the Pentagon and at the Citadel (the armed forces advanced training school) with little or no reference to Congress or to any other public body."

Anyone now for Politica-USA?

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3. The recent development in the Detroit Weatherman trial raises this question another way.

Recall that 15 Weatherpeople were under federal indictment on bomb conspiracy charges (Phoenix, Aug. 21). They came to trial last summer
in the court of US District Judge Damon Keith, a black liberal, who astonished the world by ordering the prosecution to make available to the defense the totality of data collected over the past ten years on SDS and the Weathermen by illegal espionage means, whether by the FBI, the CIA, the Plumbers, the IRS, the Treasury, or any other state police agency.

Simply, this meant that the pretrial evidentiary hearing originally set for mid-September could easily turn into a Watergate Left with the Weatherpeople and their lawyers sitting in the place of Ervin \& Co., but examining the same witnesses: Mitchell, Colson, Segretti, Sullivan, Mardian, McCord, Hunt, Chapin and the rest. Since the intuition is strong these days that the government has much more domestic espionage to hide than Watergate, the question was put: Could the government hand the Left such an opportunity to probe the operations of the FBI's infamous Division V?
The answer came October 15 when the prosecution returned from the postponement it had won in September to say that even though there was no such illegal surveillance as the defense had charged, still it could not produce the stipulated records without compromising "national security," and so would not, and so could not present its case, and so was dropping charges.
We rejoice for the Weatherpeople already liberated by this turn, including especially the fugitives Jaffe, Fliegelman, and Wilkerson, who are now free and clear. We rejoice as well in this new hope for Weatherpeople still underground. Some are wanted on a separate Chicago indictment for
the 1969 "Days of Rage" fiasco. Others are wanted on Tucson and Cleveland indictments for possessing destructive weapons. But these are the kind of charges that the government has never made stick in the past conspiracy cases, and now with the Keith ruling of June '72 and the late dropping of charges (with prejudice), maybe there is a chance the core Weatherpeople, chastened by their incredible experience, can begin to think of coming back to life in the open.

Yet this escape is perplexingly legalistic. The political question of this trial, which is social and historical and cannot be dropped, is in suspense. What is the White House trying to hide?
4. Two current articles offer deceptive but enlightening tours, quite guided, of the suburbs of this vast question: What is Nixon hiding?

One author, writing in the $9 / 14$ and 10/26 National Review, is Miles. Copeland. The other is Andrew St. George, writing in the November Harper's. Both are old-hand type insiders of the Atlantic intelligence community. Copeland is on St. George's right and St. George is on Copeland's Ieft, like the two magazines, but on the fundamental question of what Watergate is about, they are saying much the same thing, namely, that since the advent of Nixon if not Johnson, the structures of a national police-state organization have been forming within the leadership of the presidential bureaucracy. Copeland sees this as happening because it is good and
$\ldots$ Please turn to page 241

## Oglesby

