

Haldeman: 'Good' on Memo

Meant They Were Doing It Clearly

Following are excerpts of testimony before the Senate Watergate committee yesterday by former White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman.

Haldeman was questioned throughout yesterday morning about memos and previous testimony by other witnesses concerning alleged White House investigations of various U.S. citizens and allegations by White House officials that the Democrats directed violent demonstrations against the Nixon campaign during the 1972 election.

Sen. Herman Talmadge (D-Ga.) first questioned Haldeman about White House interest in tax investigations of various citizens.

Talmadge: Mr. Haldeman, we have had evidence here before the Committee from witnesses . . . concerning White House requests for audits into individual's tax returns. Will you comment on that?

Haldeman: I can only comment to the extent, Senator, that there have been over the time that I was in the White House a number of inquiries made or pieces of information brought to the attention of various people within the White House from time to time that there were potential questions that should be investigated regarding business or financial activities of individuals, and there was a concern or a feeling that the IRS had been during the time of our administration being out of office and subsequently even during the time that this administration came into office, there had been considerably more zeal shown by the IRS in looking into potential questions of those who were supporters of this administration than zeal shown in looking into inquiries that were directed or raised regarding those who were known and vocal opponents of the administration, and these factors would be brought to the attention of various people at the White House from time to time with a query as to why there wasn't some kind of investigation into the dealings of some particular person with regard to

some matter and those would be referred to the IRS. That would be the context in which I recall the question being raised.

Talmadge: Here, I believe, is a "talking paper" prepared for you to use with (IRS director Johnnie) Walters . . . and here is paragraph (c) "H. R. Haldeman" or "H.R.H." I assume that means you, "should tell the Secretary Walters must be more responsive in two key areas, personnel and political actions. First, Walters should make personnel changes to make IRS responsive to the President. Walters should work with Fred Malek immediately to accomplish this goal (Note: there will be an opening for General Counsel IRS in the near future. This should be the first test of Walters cooperation.)"

Did you use this talking paper?

Haldeman. . . . This doesn't indicate to whom, by whom it was prepared or to whom, it was directed. I agree with you it does refer to "H.R.H. should tell the Secretary". I don't recall seeing it . . .

Talmadge. . . . Did you ever have any conversations at any time with the Secretary of the Treasury or anyone else about making the Internal Revenue Service more politically responsive?

Haldeman: Only in this—I don't recall any specific conversations with the Secretary of the Treasury. If I had any or I was a participant in any such conversations they would have been in the context that I referred to earlier, Senator, which was the question of—well, as (White House counsel John W.) Dean indicated that the IRS bureaucracy at

the lower levels was very strongly staffed with people . . . whose positions were due to previous administrations and whose interests were in the policies and philosophy of previous administrations, and that the diligence with which they pursued cases that had been referred to

them relating to potential misdoings by opponents of this administration were not pursued with the diligence that they were pursuing matters relating to supporters of this administration.

This had been the case when we were out of office for several years, and there was discussion of that question, and that, in that context, I may have had—I know I have been in discussions where that kind of feeling was under—was a topic under discussion. . .

Talmadge: Did you or anyone, to your knowledge, within the White House ever request the White House to make a political, an audit of any taxpayer?

Haldeman: In the sense of referring information that had come to our attention or information that appeared to indicate a reason for an audit it is quite possible that that was done. I recall no specific such request.

Talmadge: Now would they be foes of the administration or friends of the administration?

Haldeman: These would be inquiries or information that would come in from friends of the administration regarding foes of the administration. . .

Talmadge: Do you remember a particular effort to "get," so-called "get" Clark Clifford?

Haldeman: No, I don't. . . I

know that there was considerable—now wait a minute, Clark Clifford.

Talmadge: He is a prominent Washington attorney, as you know.

Haldeman: I am sorry, I was thinking of a different person. . . .

Talmadge: Let me say this, Mr. Haldeman. I am the second ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee and our jurisdiction is the Internal Revenue Service among others, as you know. And we have tried our dead level best to keep that totally nonpolitical and nonpartisan, totally objective, without favor, without fear to any taxpayer in the United States and I certainly hope we can continue to keep it that way.

Haldeman: I am sure, sir, that you have attempted to do so and I hope that you have been successful.

Sen. Lowell P. Weicker (R-Conn.) later questioned Haldeman about allegations he made in his opening statement to the Senate committee Monday that various acts of violence were directed by the Democrats against the Nixon campaign during the 1972 elections.

Weicker: Mr. Haldeman, last night I took your opening statement after the hearings were over and I read it and I re-read it and there was something about it that bothered me and I think I finally put my finger on what it was. . . .

Weicker: And what bothered me was the fact that. . . you listed various and sundry acts, violent in nature, illegal acts, and then left the intimation that these acts belonged to Sen. McGovern, the Democratic Party, etc.

Now, I know that is not exactly the way it reads if you read it very carefully but that is the impression that is given, and this is what bothered me, was the impression that even now in your statement you are trying to give the same image to the opposite candidate and the opposite party, that it is my contention and which I intend to prove here this morning that you tried to give during the course of the campaign, specifically—specifically that the opposition party and the opposi-

tion candidate are soft on communism and soft on law and order.

You say in your opening statement, and let me read it.

“Moreover, the pranksterism that was envisioned would have specifically excluded such acts as the following: violent demonstrations and disruption, heckling or shouting down speakers, burning or bombing campaign headquarters, physical damage or trashing of headquarters

and other buildings, harassment of candidates’ wives and families by obscenities, disruption of the National Convention by splattering dinner guests with eggs and tomatoes, indecent exposure, rock throwing, assaults on delegates, slashing bus tires, smashing windows, setting trash fires under the gas tank of a bus, knocking policemen from their motorcycles.”

“I know that this committee and most Americans would agree that such activities cannot be tolerated in a political campaign.”

Mr. Haldeman, I would first of all point out it is not a question as to whether these activities could be tolerated. These activities which you listed are clearly illegal and they are not a question of whether we agree on it or not. In most cases there are specific laws that are meant to be enforced against such activities, which enforcement, of course, is in the hands of various judicial local states and federal officials.

“But unfortunately the activities I have described are all activities which took place in 1972 against the campaign of the President of the United States by his opponents.”

Now, do you mean by that word “opponents” in your statement at that point of your statement the Democratic Party or Sen. McGovern?

Haldeman. . . I immediately went on to say, and I quote from the next following sentence in my statement: “Some of them took place with the clear knowledge and consent of agents of the opposing candidates in the last election.

“Others were acts of people who were clearly unsympathetic to the President but may not have had direct order from the opposing camp.”

In the following paragraph when I referred to the fact that there had been no investigation and little publicizing I again characterized the two different possibilities by saying:

“Either those which were directly attributable to our opponent or those which certainly served our opponent’s interest but did not have his sanction,” clearly recognizing, Senator, the precise point that you are making here, and I do recognize it.

Weicker: The precise point that I am making is I want you to clearly tell me exactly which of these acts, rather than comingling the two, and giving an impression, I want you to tell me which of these illegal acts you ascribe to Sen. McGovern and/or the Democratic Party.

Haldeman: I am not able to do that at this time, Senator. I have indicated to the committee yesterday that the documentation on these is available, it was my understanding that the committee had it. I find apparently it does not and I will make sure it gets it and that that verification can be made item by item and I would expatiate that this is a, such a list. . . .

Weicker: Well, now, isn’t it actually true, isn’t it actually true, Mr. Haldeman—let’s cite here the next paragraph, “So far there has been no investigation of these activities and very little publicizing of them either those which were directly attributable to our opponents or those which certainly served our opponents’ interests but did not have his sanction.”

Now, isn’t it true that the acts which you list there didn’t serve your opponents’ interests, that they did on occasion serve your candidate’s interests?

Haldeman: If they did, I can’t conceive of how they did, sir.

Weicker: All right, I want to submit to you a document on, White House stationery, memorandum for Mr. H. R. Haldeman from Ronald H. Walker. . . .

“The White House, Washington, Oct. 14, 1971, 5:00 p.m.

"Memorandum for: Mr. H. R. Haldeman.

"From: Ronald H. Walker.

"1. The most recent intelligence that has been received from the advance man, Bill Henkel, and the USSS (United States Secret Service) is that we will have demonstrators in Charlotte tomorrow. The number is running between 100 and 200; the advance man's gut reaction is between 150 and 200. They will be violent," with a pencilled underlining of "violent," "they will have extremely obscene signs," underlining "obscene" and next to the word "obscene" pencilled in writing which to me, and you will have to confirm this, seems to be the same as the writing below your initialling appears to be yours, if not, I want you to say so, saying "good".

Is that your writing there where it says "good"?

Mr. Haldeman. I believe it is, yes, sir.

Weicker. "As has been indicated by their handbills. It will not only be directed toward the President, but also toward Billy Graham" . . . where you pencilled in "great."

Weicker (following laughter in the hearing room): I would also request along with the chairman the fact that order is kept in this room. This is an extremely serious matter, a document which is now being presented and the one to follow I think probably get to the very heart of this entire investigation.

(Chairman Sam J.) Ervin: And Senator, I might state I can testify about that because I went down to Charlotte on that occasion with the President and I saw my constituent, Billy Graham, and I can testify there were about a handful of students or young people rather with some placards there that really didn't interfere with anybody.

Weicker (quoting the memo again): "According to Henkel and the USSS, and it is also indicated on the handbills being distributed by the demonstrators, the Charlotte police department is extremely tough and will probably use force to prevent any possible disruption of the motorcade or the

President's movements."

And again the penciling "good" next to that.

Then No. 3, I had better, best read the whole exhibit:

"My instructions to Henkel are to control the demonstrators outside the Coliseum as much as he can with the help of the USSS and the police department, from the city of Charlotte. He is to set up as fine a screening system as possible. There are 8,000 seats in the Coliseum and we have printed up 25,000 tickets. It is a known fact that there are demonstrators who have tickets. Therefore it will be necessary for us to set up a screening system to eliminate anyone that has a false or fake ticket.

"We will set up our normal checkpoints, using 25 Veterans of Foreign Wars and between 50 and 60 ushers that are being provided by the local Republican Party. There will also be a volunteer lawyer corps to handle any legal questions that might arise, as far as us denying entrance on the grounds of a phony ticket.

"The thing that bothers me is that we are for the most part paralleling the system that we had designed for the Wright-Patterson Air Force Museum dedication in Dayton, Ohio. Realizing the attention that was drawn to the techniques used there, and the concern that has since been expressed by Ziegler, Warren, and most vehemently by Pat Buchanan, the feeling is that that the press corps especially the liberals are very much aware of how the demonstrators are being handled, and although the White House has not been identified with these processes, we are very much suspect. Buchanan maintains that they will be the lookout for demonstrators and how they are being handled, and it is his feeling that his could be extremely damaging to the President's posture, even if

the White House is only indirectly involved. The Billy Graham people have been of great help but they've got their own problems with citizens' organizations sponsoring the Billy Graham Day, and have pretty well backed off from any of the arrangements with the exception of crowd building.

"Therefore, we have got very little support in handling demonstrations in the hall.

"Question: Should we continue with our plan to prevent demonstrators from entering the Coliseum?"

Under "Yes" the initial "H," and the pencil notation, "As long as it is local police and local volunteers doing it, not our people."

My question specifically relates to what mentality it is in the White House that goes ahead and indicates "good" when the word "violence" is mentioned, when "obscene" is mentioned, at which violence and which obscenity is to be directed against the President of the United States. How in any way can that be good?

Haldeman: Senator, I can explain that, I think, very easily.

The problem that we had during the campaign of violence, of demonstrations of obscene signs, of efforts to heckle and shout down the President when he was delivering a speech were very great. They were not recognized as being very great and there was an attempt made in the coverage of many of these events to present this as a totally off-the-cuff reaction of certain people in the audience who were just there and disagreed with what the President said and were expressing their disagreement in a proper exercise of their right to do so as contrasted to planned organizations that were put together for the purpose of creating violence and creating these things in the way that the intelligence indicated this one was going to be handled.

The reason for reacting to the indication that they would be violent, obscene and directed toward Billy Graham as good was that if, in fact, they were going to

do this in this way it would be seen that they were doing so clearly. Sometimes they weren't that ineffective. They did a better job of disguising their true intents and their true method of operation, and the reaction of "good" to those indications was very much in that sense.

Let me point out that the whole point of the memo very strongly confirms my feeling that this sort of activity was not to our benefit in showing the extremes that, steps that were planned, in order to try to avoid these people having the opportunity to carry out their violence and their obscenity and directing it toward the President and Billy Graham, at least in the hall. We had no real practical means of doing much outside the hall and, in fact, as I recall that meeting there were some demonstrations outside but there was reasonably good control and the Charlotte police force, I think, was extremely tough, and I think they did do a good job, including, as I recall, at that occasion some local police forces did you have to use force in order to restrain the activities that were attempted. That happened in this case. But as you can see here there were strong efforts made by our advance men to try to avoid incidents and this kind of problem.

We had the intelligence that there were going to be this group there, that they would be violent and have obscene signs. That at least would show up with the public there and the press there and in a place like North Carolina where the people are wise enough not to feel that that is a very good thing to do, that it would put this in its true perspective.

Sen. Joseph Montoya (D-N.M.) then questioned Haldeman about the so-called "ene-

mies list" kept by the Nixon White House:

Montoya: Are you acquainted with the project which was launched in the White House to develop an "enemies" list?

Haldeman: I am aware of the existence of enemy lists or opponents lists, yes, sir.

Montoya: What do you know about it?

Haldeman: I know that from time to time we received from within the White House and from outside the White House, from supporters of the administration, both in the Congress and from the general public, complaints that people in and out of government were being treated by the White House in ways that people that were opposed to administration policies, and specifically who were vocally expressing public opposition to administration policies, and this would most frequently relate to the position on the war in Vietnam because that was the policy most thoroughly under discussion.

People who were expressing vocal opposition were at the same time being extended extraordinary courtesies by the White House in the form of invitations to social events and other functions at the White House, appointments to honorary boards and commissions, inclusion on delegations to events, and that sort of thing?

Montoya: I am talking about enemies, not friends.

Haldeman: No, sir, that is what I am talking about, people, I am talking about complaints by friends that people who were opponents and were vocally expressing their opposition were being, in the view of our friends, treated like friends in the sense of receiving these special courtesies from the White House.

Montoya: And you were compiling a list of these people?

Haldeman: And as a result of the concern by our friends that we were in their view unwisely extending these courtesies to the people who were opposing administration policies, and on some occasions people who, after receiving an invitation to the White House and being at the White

House used that as a platform for getting extraordinary publicity for their expression of opposition, that as a result of these complaints there was a program of drawing up a list of those who in prominent public positions were believed to be expressing opposition to administration policies, and who, therefore, should not be receiving these courtesies. This was in the same context as a list of those who were supporting such policies and who should be extended such courtesies and who many times were not.

Montoya: Have you seen Exhibit 50, which has been introduced by Mr. Dean in evidence here?

Haldeman: I am not sure that I have. I would like to see it.

Montoya: Or Exhibit 10, and I will read you some names. What did these people have to do with the Vietnam War?

Haldeman: Excuse me, sir, but could I have copies of those?

Montoya: Yes, sir, let me just read them and then you can comment on them. Mr. Eugene Carson Blake, Mr. Leonard Bernstein, Arthur Fisher, Ed Guttman, Maxwell Cain, Charles Dison, Howard Stein, Al Lowenstein, Morton Halperin, Leonard Woodstock, Dan Schorr, Mary McGrory, Lloyd Cutler, Thomas Watson, Tom Weicker, Clark Clifford. That is the list? Do you want to see—

Haldeman: No, sir, I do not need to see it. I would think that the public record of the time would indicate that a number of those people were, in fact, quite vocally and publicly opposing administration positions on the war.

Montoya: Why did you label them as enemies, then? Do they not have a right to comment on the war?

Haldeman: Why, certainly, they did, but they did not have a right to be extended the courtesy of the President's hospitality in order to express their opposition.

Montoya: Well, are you in effect telling me that this enemies list was compiled so that it would serve as an exclusion list for the White House?

Haldeman: In effect, yes.

Montoya: Why was so much time wasted in the White House with memos and communications between staff members in trying to compile this list, then?

Haldeman: First of all, I don't believe a great deal of time was wasted in doing so. The time that was expended in doing it was for the purpose that I have indicated and was a part of carrying out the effort of the White House to extend our policies to carryout the policies of the administration—rather than to provide a forum for the expression of opposition.

Montoya: Well, if your objective was, as you have stated it, why was it an effort to involve IRS in auditing some of these people and why were there orders from the White House to the FBI to check on some of these people?

Haldeman: I would like to know what those orders were and perhaps I can respond to them.

Montoya: All right. Mr. Higby, who was your administrative assistant, has given information to this committee that while he was in the Grand Tetons with the President and you, he was asked by you to call Mr. Hoover and get a complete background on Daniel Schorr, and Mr. Higby did this, and he has submitted testimony to this committee in secret to that effect.

Now, would you deny that?

Haldeman: No, sir.

Montoya: Did you do that?

Haldeman: I requested a background report on Mr. Schorr, or asked Mr. Higby to request one, not in connection with the enemies list and I am not sure in what connection it was, but I am sure there was something that arose at the time that this request was made and I don't know in what context, but there had been,

as has been indicated here in earlier testimony, concern from time to time about statements that were made and the reasons for them in terms of national security questions and I don't know that this was in such a context because I simply don't recall what the reason was for it.

Montoya: Why would you order a check in that context? Was Mr. Schorr being considered for an appointment?

Haldeman: No, sir he was not.

Montoya: Why would you check on him, then?

Haldeman: The check was made—I don't know why but the check was made.

Montoya: You ordered it?

Haldeman: The request for the check was in connection with something apparently—I assume that arose at that time—that generated a request for the background report on Mr. Schorr. The request I would like to emphasize, Senator, was not a request for an investigation of Mr. Schorr and at the time that the request was made it was for the background file which the FBI has on individuals, that is, a summary report on their activities and background.

Montoya: Wouldn't you call that "investigate" when the FBI goes out to try to get the background on an individual?

Haldeman: When they go out to do it I would but the request was not that they go out to do it. The request was for the file, what happened.

Montoya: What file? Do you have a file in the White House on Mr. Schorr?

Haldeman: No, sir. The FBI did, or may have.

Montoya: How did you know they have?

Haldeman: They have a file on most people who are known publicly and the request was for whatever file they have.

Montoya: You mean the FBI has a file on every American that is known publicly?

Haldeman: I think they probably do. I have not been through their files so I can't verify that.

Montoya: Well, you just stated that—

Haldeman: I said I think they did.

Montoya: Now, assuming that Mr. Schorr is one case, now I will give you an instance where you ordered FBI checks on eight other individuals. Did you do that?

Haldeman: I don't know. I would like to hear what they are.

Montoya: Well, Mr. Butterfield has so testified that you did.

Haldeman: Could I hear them, please?

Montoya: Yes. The testimony of (Haldeman aide Alexander) Butterfield is as follows. It is on page 10 of his interview before the Committee, and this is his testimony. Haldeman and occasionally Ehrlichman had requested an FBI check on non-appointees. To Butterfield's recollection—this is a memorandum of his testimony—to Butterfield's recollection there may have been eight such requests. Among them were Frank Sinatra, Daniel Schorr, Helen Hayes. Now, what do you have to say to that?

Haldeman: In the case—

Montoya: Was Helen Hayes being considered for an appointment?

(Laughter)

Haldeman: Quite possibly so. Helen Hayes had helped presidential appointments and commissions at a number of times and that is quite possible.

Montoya: Was Frank Sinatra being considered for an appointment?

Haldeman: No, sir. Frank Sinatra was being considered as an entertainer at the White House and was an entertainer at the White House.

Montoya: And was Daniel Schorr being considered for entertainments at the White House?

(Laughter)

Haldeman: No, sir. I have already covered the Daniel Schorr appointment.

Later, Sen. Weicker again questioned Haldeman on Haldeman's linking of the Democrats to anti-Nixon demonstrations and violence in the 1972 campaign.

Weicker: Let me read (another memo) dated Feb. 10, 1973. Memorandum for John Dean from H. R. Haldeman.

"We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communist

money that was used in support of demonstrations against the President in 1972. We should tie all 1972 demonstrations to McGovern and thus to the Democrats as part of the peace movement.

"The investigation should be brought to include the leads directly to McGovern and Teddy Kennedy. This is a good counteroffensive to be developed. In this connection we need to itemize all the disruptions such as the Century Plaza, San Francisco, Statue of Liberty, and so on.

"You should definitely order Gray to go ahead on the FBI investigation against those who tapped Nixon and Agnew in 1968.

"We need to develop the plan on to what extent the Democrats were responsible for the demonstrations that led to violence or disruption.

"There's also the question of where we should let out the Fort Wayne story now — that we ran a clean campaign compared to theirs, libel and slander such as against Rebozo, et cetera.

And lastly—I beg pardon, reading directly — "We could let Evans and Novak put it out and then be asked about it to make the point that we knew and the President said it was not to be used under any circumstances.

"In any event, we have to play a very hard game on this whole thing and get our

See TEXT, A21, Col. 1

Text, From A20

investigations going as a countermove."

Is that what the document states?

Haldeman: That is what this document states.

Weicker: And this document states it is a memorandum from you to John Dean. Is that a memorandum that you prepared?

Haldeman: I will accept responsibility for the memorandum, although because of some bad English and other problems in it, I would point out that it is not initialed by me, which it would have been had I written the memorandum and sent it. I believe that this was a memorandum prepared from notes or from telephonic instructions to a

staff member who then wrote it up and sent it out over my name. Having said that, I am disclaiming responsibility for the English and typos, and accepting overall responsibility for the memorandum.

Weicker: In other words, accepting responsibility for the thrust of the memorandum, if not the actual words used?

Haldeman: Yes sir.

Weicker: Well, I guess the first thing to ask here is I would like to get your version as to what this first paragraph means, "We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or communist money that was used in support of demonstrations against the President in '72. We should tie all 1972 demonstrations to McGovern and thus to the Democrats as part of the peace movement."

Haldeman: I think there was, or I know that there was, some information, I don't know how good it was that there was foreign money used to support the financing of demonstrations. The point here was to develop the story that that had been the case, develop the facts on it.

Skipping down to the fourth paragraph it does say, "We need to develop the plan on to what extent" this is the bad English again "but" to what extent the Democrats were responsible for the demonstrations that lead to violence or disruption."

In other words, this was to determine the facts and get out the story with like objective to tying, where the facts did so, tying those demonstrations to those who were responsible for them. . .

I am asking to develop a plan on to what extent the Democrats were responsible for demonstrations that led to violence or disruption. . .

Weicker: You say "We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communist money that was used in support of demonstrations against the President in '72. We should tie all 1972 demonstrations to McGovern and thus to the Democrats as part of the peace movement." This is one paragraph here, the head of this memorandum.

Haldeman: That is right, I am reading. . .

Weicker: Are you trying to tie the Democratic Party to Communist money or foreign money?

Haldeman: I am trying to tie the demonstration that is were instigated by McGovern or McGovern campaign people to those people. I am trying to get out the story of what the facts were in regard to the instigation of and financing of demonstrations.

Weicker: Well, now, this is dated Feb. 10, 1973. And interestingly enough I have made my own notes and I go back to your opening statement before this Committee and I expressed myself as to imagine that you were trying to portray here being rather clever with words, as to these matters being linked to the Democratic candidate, to the Democratic Party.

And I didn't receive or I didn't get this particular memorandum until after I had made my own impression as to what thought you were trying to convey in your opening statement, so, in other words, I had my impression of your opening statement in trying to tie the Democratic Party and George McGovern to the image of being soft on communism and being soft on law and order and all of a sudden this memorandum appears and here you are suggesting as a counteroffensive that these entities, this individual, and this party be tied in with foreign and Communist money and that it be tied into the demonstrations. Is this what you — let me ask you, is this what you — believed during the course of the campaign of 1972? Was this to be the thrust of the attack?

Haldeman: Let me — I don't understand your references to soft on communism and soft on law and order.

Is there something that I have said that leads to that?

Weicker: Well, I think that you're definitely trying to make a link-up here. I just have your own memorandum before me on that point.

Haldeman: My own memorandum makes no reference to McGovern being soft on communism.

Weicker: No, it just tries to go ahead to link Mr. McGovern to demonstrations

and to communism, is that right?

Haldeman: Tries to link Mr. McGovern or the McGovern campaign to —

Weicker: And the Democrats.

Haldeman: And the Democrats and the peace movement to the demonstrations and to the point that I understood there was backing on or information on that there was foreign or communist money used in support of demonstrations. If, in fact, those were facts it was my feeling that they should be known.

Weicker: No, you say, you don't want to develop the fact, "We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communist money that was used" in the last election.

Haldeman: He says that was the case.

Weicker: Do you mean to tell me that as a man closest to the President of the United States, you issued a directive linking the Democratic Party, and the Democratic candidate to communist money, to demonstrations because you thought that was the case, that you are willing to go ahead and do that as the man closest to the President of the United States, you were willing to throw that party and that name around in that fashion?

Haldeman: Only if it is the case, Senator, and only—

Weicker: Isn't it your job before you issue a memorandum to make sure that it either is or is not the case?

Haldeman: Isn't that—

Weicker: Isn't that what this country is about

Haldeman: That is why the memorandum was directed to the counsel to the President who had the facts, as I understood it, on this case.

Weicker: "We need to get our people to put out the

story," this is not a request for an investigation. If it were a request for an investigation wouldn't this be the type of thing which certainly we should put into the hands of our law enforcement branches here in the United States, either the FBI, CIA, the National Security group or any valid law enforcement branch. This isn't a request for an investigation of these facts. This is to put out the story.

Haldeman: It was my understanding that there were facts that led to these points.

Weicker: What are the facts?

Haldeman: I don't know. I have stated what my understanding was. Mr. Dean was the one I understood had the facts.

Weicker: I think I have come close to my time now, Mr. Chairman. I am going to be candid with you, and I am going to be candid with you, and I am going to continue on this subject every 10 minutes until we go and get this right out on the table. But I want you to know this, that if I am emotionally wrought up at this point in time it is because these things have been imputed or an attempt has been made, and I think we have stopped here, to impute these matters and other matters here to your party and to your candidate.

I am going to tell you, my job is to go ahead and beat Democrats and I have done a pretty good job, quite frankly . . .

But this type of business here when it emanates from the highest councils in the land, I think is a disgrace, and I think, quite frankly, the tactics, this is Feb. 10, 1973, I don't think there has been any change in tactics from the election campaign of '72 as to when you sit before this committee right now, Mr. Haldeman.



By Bob Burchette—The Washington Post.

ed a wide-angle lens to get this panoramic view of the Watergate hearings in the caucus room of the old Senate office building. Witness H. R. Haldeman, back to camera, listens to question from Chairman Sam Ervin.