

Excerpts From Analysis of Nixon-Dean

6/21/73

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WASHINGTON, June 20—Following are excerpts from a White House analysis of conversations between President Nixon and John W. Dean d, former White House counsel, which was sent to the Senate Watergate committee tsi week and was made available to The New York Times by a person with access to it:

Sept. 15, 1972—Dean reported Watergate indictments.

Feb. 27, 1973—Dean suggested White House aides submit answers to interrogatories.

Feb. 28—President inquired of Watergate. Dean said no White House involvement.

March 1—Was decided the question would come up as to why Dean was sitting in on F.B.I. interviews and that the reason was he was conducting an investigation for the president. President asked Dean to write a report. Dean was also critical of Gray.

March 6—[The meeting did not concern Watergate.]

March 7—Dean again told the President the White House was clear.

March 8—The President inquired as to whether Chapin had helped Segretti. Dean said no.

March 10 — [The analysis has only a question mark, apparently indicating that the substance of this meeting could not be determined].

Question by Nixon

March 13 — President inquired as to Ken Rietz. Dean said no illegality involved. President asked if Colson or Haldeman knew Segretti. President asked if Mitchell and Colson knew of Watergate. Dean said there was nothing specific on Colson; that he didn't know about Mitchell but that Strachan could be involved. President states again that Dean should compile a written report about the matter. Dean said Sirica was a hanging judge, the President said he liked hanging judges. They discussed fund-raising before before April 7. Dean said that everything had been done was legal.

March 14—The President suggested Dean should possibly appear before the press and discussed whether Chapin should make a statement about Segretti. The Gray hearings and the use of F.B.I. files were also discussed.

March 15—Decided on use

of "separation of powers" instead of executive privilege terminology.

March 16—The President reiterated his position on use of raw F.B.I. files. Suggested Dean's written report be accompanied by affidavits. Dean suggested untimely release of written report might prejudice rights of innocent people. Discussed possibility of getting Dash to interview Haldeman and Ehrlichman. The President suggested Dean should possibly go to Camp David to write his report.

Noted Press Survey

March 17—President had made a note on a press survey containing an article alleging White House involvement for follow-up. (Dean possibly has copy of this.) Dean again suggested they bring out 1968 bugging, and President said Kleindienst had advised against it. Several names were mentioned as possibly subject to attack. Colson, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Dean himself. The President asked Dean point-blank if he knew about the planned break-in in advance. Dean said no, there was no actual White House involvement regardless of appearances except possibly Strachan. Dean told President Magruder pushed Liddy hard but that Haldeman was not involved. The President wanted Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean to talk to the committee, and Dean resisted. Dean told the President of the Ellsberg break-in but that it had nothing to do with Watergate.

March 19—It was decided Dean would send a letter of sworn statement to the Judiciary Committee answering certain questions.

March 20—Dean discussed Mitchell's problems with the grand jury, Vesco and the Gurney press conference. The President and Moore agreed that the whole investigation should be made public and that a statement should be released immediately after the sentencing of the defendants. Dean suggested that each member of the Ervin committee be challenged to invite an F.B.I. investigation of his own Senate campaign. The President called Dean that night and Dean said there was "not a scintilla of evidence" to indicate White House involvement and Dean suggested he give the President a more in-depth briefing on what had transpired.

March 21—Dean gave the President his theory of what had happened. He still said no prior June 17 White House knowledge, that Magruder probably knew, that Mitchell possibly knew, that Strachan probably knew, that Haldeman had possibly seen the fruits of the wiretaps through Strachan, that Ehrlichman was vulnerable because of his approval of Kalmbach's fund-raising efforts. Colson had made the call to Magruder. He stated Hunt was trying to blackmail Ehrlichman about Hunt's prior plumber activities unless he was paid what ultimately might amount to \$1-million. The President said how could it possibly be paid. "What makes you think he would be satisfied with that?" Stated it was blackmail, that it was wrong, that it would not work, that the truth would come out anyway. Dean had said that a Cuban group could possibly be used to transfer the payments. Dean said Colson had talked to Hunt about executive clemency. He spoke of Haldeman's return of the \$350,000. He said that Haldeman and Ehrlichman possibly had no legal guilt with regard to the money matters. Dean said nothing of his role with the cover-up money. He said nothing about his discussions with Magruder helping him prepare for the grand jury. He said nothing of his in-

structions to Caulfield to offer executive clemency.

This information was gone over twice, the last time in Haldeman's presence. [This sentence was underlined in the White House analysis.]

Later that afternoon it was tentatively decided that everyone would go to the grand jury, however, Dean asked for immunity. Haldeman suggested they write the whole thing out and release it from the White House. Ehrlichman said there should be no executive privilege claim and that no one should ask for immunity. The President told them to discuss these matters with Mitchell.

March 22 — Mitchell suggests they go before the Ervin committee, that they not use executive privilege but that first it should all be put down on paper.

March 23 — The President called Dean and told him to go to Camp David. Later that afternoon he called Dean at Camp David to check on his progress.

(March 30—After it became obvious Dean would write no report, the President directed Ehrlichman to investigate. On April 14, Ehrlichman reported possible Mitchell, Magruder and Dean involvement. The President called Kleindienst, who followed up. Up until now the President had assumed Dean was get-

Talks

ting much of his information from the Justice Department. Kleindienst and Petersen focused in on possible involvement of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Strachan. On April 15 Petersen submitted a memo on Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Strachan. They also found out about Gray's destruction of the documents.)

Told to Drop Immunity

April 15—Dean along with almost everyone else was called in that day. The President told Dean he must go before the grand jury without immunity.

April 16—The President asks Dean to resign. Had two drafts prepared for Dean's signature. Dean demanded Haldeman and Ehrlichman resign also.

(Petersen asked the President to hold off on firing Dean until they could get him before the grand jury.)

On April 17 the President released his statement saying that no White House staffers would receive immunity.

On April 19 Dean said he would not be a scapegoat.

On April 27 Petersen told the President there is no use trying to get Dean to go before the grand jury, that he was demanding immunity.

On April 30 the President made his speech concerning Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's resignations and Dean's firing.