

By William Greider

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THE EPIC DETECTIVE story that began a year ago this morning with a third-rate burglary still holds the nation's government in its suspense, an obsession undiminished by the absolute overload of startling clues.

Very well, Watergate is an important obsession. Let the various processes of inquiry, the prosecutors and the senators and the gumshoe reporters, work their way toward solving the finite legal questions. Who done it? Who goes to jail? Was it the butler? Or the master of the mansion? Given the partisan political implications, those questions carry enormous promise of dread-or-satisfaction if they are ever clearly answered.

Yet, in broader terms, what we already know about the Watergate affair is as dreadful as anything we might still discover. Thanks mainly to the parade of witnesses called before the Senate investigating committee, we can now grasp the texture of the crime, if not all of its tangled particulars. What confronts us is the utter normality of the participants. They were not criminals "at heart," Gov. Reagan of California re-

cently insisted, and he is right. They saw themselves, with evident sincerity, as loyal members of the Organization. They were guided by a code of conduct which seemed perfectly reasonable to them at the time. Only when examined with hindsight does it seem to them ugly and bizarre.

Watergate was crime-by-the-group. The complicity was so fragmented and compartmentalized, the loyal silence so general, it is difficult to delineate where responsibility begins and ignorance leaves off. Those old-fashioned questions of individual guilt seem strained against the opaque sense of personal ethics which dominated President Nixon's campaign committee and, for that matter, his White House staff. In terms of human behavior, however, the group-think which led to group-crime is not as aberrational as we would like to think.

Americans don't like to contemplate this quality in their national character. Yet here it is, emerging full blossom at the pinnacle of power. Trim and intelligent young men blur together in our memories, a look-alike, talk-alike group which conformed so smoothly to organized crime. Certainly, the peculiar organizational values which these men espoused—the excessive money, the preoccupation with spying—were abnormal. Yet their individual behavior within the Organization was not.

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CAUSE

THE YEAR OF WATERGATE

Following is a chronology of the Watergate affair, beginning in 1970 and including the many threads of government crime and deception.

1970

July 23—President Nixon approves an "intelligence plan" for expanded domestic surveillance, including electronic surveillance, "surreptitious entry" (breaking and entering), opening mail and other aspects that he had been warned were "clearly illegal."

July 28—The intelligence plan is rescinded after strong opposition from FBI director J. Edgar Hoover.

1971

June 13—The "Pentagon Papers," an official and highly classified government analysis of American involvement in Vietnam, are published in The New York Times.

June 13-20—The President approves the creation of a "special investigations unit" in the White House which comes to be known as "The Plumbers." He appoints John Ehrlichman, his chief assistant for domestic affairs, for overall supervision, with Egil Krogh, an Ehrlichman deputy, in direct charge. Others working for "The Plumbers" are David Young, E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy. The President also orders "as a matter of first priority, the unit should find out all it could about Mr. (Daniel) Ellsberg's [who was responsible for making available the Pentagon Papers to The Times] associates and his motives." Among the select few at the White House who are aware of "The Plumbers" group are H. R. Haldeman and John Dean, the President's top adviser and his counsel, respectively.

Sept. 3—Hunt, Liddy, Bernard Barker, Eu-

genio Martinez and Felipe DeDiego burglarize the Los Angeles office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The CIA gives Hunt a special camera, a wig and a "speech altering device" for his mission. Ehrlichman later tells the FBI that he knew Hunt and Liddy had gone to California, but not that they had broken into the psychiatrist's office. When he learned about the burglary, he instructed them "not to do this again."

Sept. through Dec.—"The Plumbers" are assigned by the President to "a number of other investigatory matters." He says their work "tapered off around the end of 1971," and that the nature of the work "was such that it involved matters that, from a national security standpoint, were highly sensitive then and remain so today."

1972

Jan. 27—Attorney General John Mitchell, White House counsel John Dean, and Nixon aide Jeb Stuart Magruder meet in Mitchell's office to hear G. Gordon Liddy discuss a proposed \$1 million espionage and sabotage plan. Magruder says they discuss

plans, mounted on large charts in Mitchell's office, to abduct radical leaders and take them to Mexico until the Republican convention period is over, to hire prostitutes, place them on a yacht equipped with secret cameras and eavesdropping equipment in Miami Beach where the Democrats will convene, to enter the Democratic Committee's national headquarters in Washington and place electronic listening devices there, and to do the same at the headquarters of the Democratic presidential nominee. The plan, Magruder says, is rejected as too large, and Liddy is told to scale it down.

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EFFECT

CAUSE

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What we glimpse in the panorama of Watergate players is an outline of the group ethic which might be closer to reality than the old American creed of rugged individualism. While we still espouse the old ethic, practical experience suggests that in the post-industrial age the one who stands up alone, who sticks his head up, gets it lopped off. He becomes an institutional pariah, an eccentric whom nobody trusts or likes.

These men understood that. The ethical climate inside CREEP, as Sen. Robert Dole used to call the Committee for the Re-election of the President, was best described by Bart Porter, one of the bright young men who got caught in the web.

"I did not do it for money," Porter said earnestly. "I did not take a bribe. I did not do it for power. I did not do it for position. I did not do it to hide anything I had done—because I did not think I had done anything.

"And yet, on the other hand, there were three or four factors that probably weighed, and I cannot put any percentage on them of which weighed more and which toppled me over onto the other side. My vanity was appealed to when I was told my name had come up in high counsels, and I was an honest man and I made a good appearance and that sort of thing.

"My loyalty was appealed to—to the President. It was the heat of the campaign—a campaign, as I am sure every one of you senators know, was an abnormal situation—you react, you act and react, you spend most of your time reacting.

"And it was, I think, all of those things coupled with what I have found out to be a weakness in my character, quite frankly, to succumb to that pressure, all added up to my tipping over to that side."

A New Faith

PORTER OR CAULFIELD or Sloan or Magruder — the casual explanations are fresh echoes of the ethic described nearly a generation ago in "The Organization Man," by William H. Whyte Jr.:

"When a young man says that to make a

living these days, you must do what somebody else wants you to do, he states it not only as a fact of life that must be accepted, but as an inherently good proposition." The pressures of the group, becoming more and more a practical reality for Americans, are transformed from a hindrance in the old myth to a virtue in the new one.

A new faith, Whyte argued, sustains people who must work in large and complex organizations, where individual responsibility is limited, where decisions are molded by large groups or remote authorities: "... a belief in the group as the source of creativity, a belief in 'belongingness' as the ultimate need of the individual . . ."

Those approximate values guided the behavior inside President Nixon's Organization, if one believes the testimony recorded so far. The "team player" ethic was a common expression. The players, particularly the smaller ones, relied heavily on others, the group, for their self-esteem and ultimately their personal values.

"It was a great honor for me," John J. Caulfield explained, "to serve as a member of the presidential staff. I had come from a rather humble background, a police officer. I did receive this great opportunity to serve on the President's staff. I felt very strongly about the President, extremely strongly about the President. I was very loyal to his

people that I worked for. I place a high value upon loyalty."

Bart Porter, when asked why he didn't protest the suggestion of perjury, invoked his own sense of loyalty to the team: "In all honesty, probably because of the fear of group pressure that would ensue, of not being a team player."

"The Team Left Me"

EVEN HUGH SLOAN, the young campaign treasurer who resigned when he realized dirty things were happening with all that loose cash he distributed, had pangs of conscience not about the crimes, but about his organizational loyalty. Sloan returned to the White House after the election, to explain himself to the President's chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman.

"I also want you to know," Sloan told him, "that I still feel total loyalty to the President of the United States. I have worked for him over this period of time and my wife has for a long period of time, because we believe in what he is doing and I want you to know that I feel I did not leave the team. As far as I am concerned, the team left me."

Probably the most extreme expression of the "team" mentality came from Bernard Barker, the Cuban-American who drew his notions from his days of underground work for the CIA. Barker was not a member of the Organization; he was recruited to do the dirty work. Yet his words reflect the spirit of adventurous togetherness:

"If you are caught by the enemy, every effort will be made to retrieve you, all expenses will be taken care of and your family will be provided for," Barker said proudly. He conceded that he was never able to reconcile the contradiction which confronted him when the "team" that hired him became the "enemy" that arrested him.

Fragmented Parts

THE OTHER important element is that the Nixon Organization, except perhaps at the upper reaches, did function in highly fragmented parts. With each member doing his work with limited knowledge of the grand scheme, he is insulated from a sense of responsibility for the consequences.

Robert Reisner, a bland young man who worked as administrative assistant to Jeb Magruder, the deputy campaign director, was presumably close to the important decisions, at least physically. Yet he seems to have known so little of what was really happening, a claim which is generally accepted

as accurate.

"Call Liddy and tell him it's approved," Magruder told him. Reiser dutifully delivered the message, unaware that he was relaying approval for the burglary budget.

Again, Barker's CIA operational style fits the blind coming-and-going, the stunted sense of responsibility which seemed to prevail at Nixon headquarters: "As a matter of discipline, of compartmentalization and of habit, we do not discuss these operations with anyone or even amongst each other."

Sloan, the treasurer, handed out envelopes stuffed with \$100 bills to a long list of people. By his own account, he had only the sketchiest notion of where the money was going. Usually, he didn't ask. Once, when he did raise a question, his boss, former Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans, had to check himself. Stans returned with this answer: "I do not know and you don't want to know." That satisfied Sloan. The cryptic answer became meaningful to him only after the Watergate burglars were arrested.

"I Drifted Along"

THAT IS ANOTHER quality of the Organization—trust. Because a man has great loyalty, because his own view of the Organization's purposes is limited, because he relies on the esteem of his colleagues, his reflex is to trust the organization and accept its mysteries.

Jack Caulfield said he never bothered to inquire whether the President himself wanted him to urge James McCord to plead guilty and remain silent. "If I were given an assignment," he said, "I would go ahead and do it."

Hugh Sloan explained how he could disperse something like \$1 million in cash without knowing what the money would buy: "These were funds authorized by higher authority, men who I worked with for periods of five or six years. They are men I have great trust in. I had no reason to be suspicious at that time of the motivations of any of these individuals."

Jeb Magruder knew all about the cover-up, even helped plan it. Yet he did not pause to consider that strategy might ultimately damage the President more than the truth. "I assumed that the higher authorities in the campaign and at the White House would handle it in a way which they thought was best for the President and I accepted that position," he said.

Bart Porter privately wondered if the "dirty tricks" business would contribute anything of value to the reelection of the President, but he kept the doubts to himself. "In all fairness," he said, "I was not the one to stand up in a meeting and say this should be stopped . . . I kind of drifted along."

The organization man whom William H. Whyte described was caught in the same bind:

"Every decision he faces on the problem of the individual versus authority is something of a dilemma," Whyte wrote. "It is not a case of whether he should fight against black tyranny or blaze a new trail against patent stupidity. That would be easy—intellectually, at least. The real issue is far more subtle. For it is not the evils of organization life that puzzle him, but its very beneficence. He is imprisoned in brotherhood. Because his area of maneuver seems so small and because the trapping so mundane, his fight lacks the heroic cast . . ."

Given what they perceived as limited personal choices, they do not feel personal guilt for remaining silent or taking part. It was "sanctioned" by the Organization, as McCord put it.

Porter even managed to confuse loyalty with innocence: "I have been guilty of a deep sense of loyalty to the President of the United States." And Barker said his wiretap-

ping forays were not to be taken personally by their targets. Nothing personal.

"If this hurt Mr. McGovern, it would be the nature of the evidence, not I," said Barker. "Mr. McGovern, to me, is as impersonal in that aspect as it would be when I was a bombardier in the Second World War in Germany and bombed a town."

Nothing Abnormal

BUT THAT IS precisely the point of ethical conflict. Presumably, the legal process will be able to determine individual guilt at the top—who ordered the wiretapping, who covered it up. Yet there will still be all those people whose silent or active complicity down below made it all possible. The Watergate plot depended on their acquiescence. Or on their small gestures of cooperation—like perjury or shredding documents or on absence of curiosity. Probably most of them won't go to jail. In a cruel sense, that seems reasonable. The least an individual might expect, when he trades in his self-will, is that the Organization will protect him. If people function by group-think, then surely only the group is to blame for what they think.

Why should this shock anyone in 1973? Instead of dismissing the Watergate behavior as a freakish aberration, perhaps the point is to examine the normality of it, the practical logic of how these people reacted, utterly routine in their complicity, no more consciously malevolent than a Monday-morning staff conference.

The "team" ethic, after all, is enshrined in recent history. Dean Rusk, when he was Secretary of State and the Vietnam war was going badly, upbraided a group of reporters for their negative reporting. "There gets to be a point," Rusk said, "where the question is: 'Whose side are you on?' Now I'm Secretary of State of the United States and I'm on our side." And, indeed, no high official of the team spoke out against U.S. involvement, though many revealed their private doubts long after they left office.

Lt. William L. Calley, charged and tried for combat murder in Vietnam, expressed bewilderment and then a sense of betrayal, a sentiment widely shared by the public. The Army was his organization and, he reasoned, it had no cause to prosecute him. After all, he was still loyal to it.

Those Who Try

REINFORCING THIS don't-buck-the-group mentality is the abundant evidence of what befalls those who have the gall to try. In virtually every case, the lonely figure who rebelled was labeled a kook or worse, an absolute liability to his organization, even if his protest proved correct, even if the public interest was clearly served by his actions.

Jacqueline Verrett, a biochemist at the Food and Drug Administration, determined from her research with 13,000 eggs that cyclamates were linked to embryo deformities, a good reason to ban the use of cyclamates. She appeared in a television interview and discussed her findings. For going out of channels, she was twice censured by HEW Secretary Robert H. Finch, who consulted with the soft-drink companies first. For a time, she was prohibited from granting interviews or even answering her office telephone. Eventually, however, FDA banned cyclamates.

"I'm still kind of a leper around here, if you want to know the truth," she told *The Washington Monthly*. "I'm called to some meetings if it's absolutely essential, but that's about it."

On Capitol Hill, where institutional loyalty is also strong, James Boyd assembled the documentary evidence which revealed the abuses of his boss, the late Sen. Thomas Dodd. Even as the Senate reluctantly censured Dodd for pocketing campaign money, its members denounced Boyd as a turncoat, with vague charges of sexual misconduct. The idea of a Senate aide speaking against his former boss was abhorrent to the institution.

"It was the greatest liberating experience of life," Boyd wrote afterward. "It cut away all sorts of restrictions and taboos that kept

me from saying what I think honestly. What a Senate aide does is to promote the image of a politician, selling out little by little in rational, absolutely essential steps. I did not realize what 12 years like that can do to you . . ."

Charles Pettis was an engineer with Brown & Root, overseeing construction of a foreign-aid highway through the mountains of Peru. When he complained about design factors that would increase the chance of landslides in unstable cliff cuts, Pettis was first cajoled by his organization, then fired. "Every firm in the business considers me a rat," he acknowledged afterwards.

A. Ernest Fitzgerald, the Pentagon cost-accountant who revealed that the Air Force was paying \$2 billion more than it ought to for some airplanes, had his job eliminated. For economy reasons, the Air Force said.

Henry Durham, a production-control engineer at Lockheed's aircraft plant in Marietta, Ga., documented inefficiency on the same planes. The local newspaper christened him "Public Enemy Number Two." Number one was Sen. William Proxmire.

Two celebrated figures who were embraced as minor heroes for following their consciences and breaking the rules were Daniel Ellsberg and Otto Otepka, who acted for vastly different political reasons. They were cheered by those whose political purposes were compatible, but the rest of us, left or right, condemned the disobedience.

A Steep Price

TAYLOR BRANCH and Charles Peters of the Washington Monthly tried to rally the independent spirit in their book, "Blowing the Whistle." They believe that a new ethic of individual responsibility is emerging, encouraged by people like Ralph Nader. But they concede that the price is steep.

"There is something deep in the temperament of decent people," Branch wrote, "that is revolted by the thought of exposing an employer's failure. Most of those who have done it say that even when you are certain of your position, the shrill of the whistle sounds unseemly, the act pregnant with hero-delusions.

"At the last moment, it seems to reek of theatrics, like a loud shouting in a hushed museum, or of grandstanding. It is associated with scandal sheets, zealots, people who oversimplify the world into good and evil without room for the murky truth, who lack the quality of self-effacement in their enthusiasms for their own views . . ."

In Ibsen's "Enemy of the People," the courageous doctor who warns that his town's health spa is polluted and deadly is denounced as just such an angry zealot. Dr. Stockmann collects the rocks which have been thrown through his window. "I shall keep these stones as sacred relics," he says.

There were no sacred stones thrown at anyone inside Nixon's Organization. To appreciate why, you have to ask what would have happened to one of those minor minions if he had indeed raised his voice. He might have gone to jail and good riddance. Or he might have been quickly dispatched as a traitor, branded unreliable in the world where these men make their livings, business and government. At best, he might have provoked a partisan flurry over the accuracy of his charges.

Conflicting Commandments

SO NOW THEY are all caught in this conflict of two value systems, like two grindstones casting off sparks. They lived by the Organization's insular ethics, yet they are still accountable as individuals. The conflict is summarized inadvertently in the "Code of Ethics for Government Service," a set of 10 commandments formulated by the Congress.

The first commandment is: "Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party or government department."

But the second commandment says: "Uphold the Constitution, laws and legal regulations of the United States and all government therein and never be a party to their evasion." Obedience to the second one—the organizational regulations—may often render the first one inoperative.

America is still trying to live with those two public codes, espousing individual responsibility while society ups the ante for organizational loyalty. As institutions become larger and more complex, as individual options grow smaller, it is hard to envision a general rebellion against group-think.

Which leaves us about where George Orwell thought we would be in 1984.

"Doublethink," he wrote, "means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously and accepting both of them . . . To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient, and then, when it becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just so long as it is needed, to deny the existence of objective reality and all the while to take account of the reality which one denies—all this is indispensably necessary."

As it was with Watergate.

E F F E C T

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Feb. 4—Another meeting is held in Mitchell's office to discuss the Liddy operation. It is reduced in size and sum, and a final decision is postponed. At this meeting a plan is discussed for Liddy to break into a Las Vegas newspaper editor's office to procure presumably damaging material about Sen. Edmund Muskie, according to Magruder.

March—Magruder says Charles Colson, special counsel to the President, calls and tells him to "get on the stick and get the Liddy operation in effect so we can get the material."

March 30—Mitchell, Magruder and Fred LaRue, a Mitchell aide, meet in Key Biscayne, Fla., and the Liddy surveillance and break-in operations are approved. Magruder says Mitchell orders that \$250,000 be given to Liddy for the operations, including the break-in at the Watergate.

April 4—Four bank drafts, totaling \$89,000, are issued by a Mexico City bank. The money comes from Texas donors to the Nixon campaign and is moved through Mexico to insure anonymity.

April 7—The new federal law requiring full disclosure of all campaign contributions goes into effect.

April 10—Robert L. Vesco, an international financier under investigation by a New York grand jury in connection with Securities and Exchange Commission fraud, gives Maurice Stans, the chief Nixon fundraiser, \$200,000 in cash as a campaign donation.

April 20—A \$25,000 check and the \$89,000 in Mexican bank drafts are deposited in the Miami bank account of Bernard L. Barker's firm. Barker later withdraws the money in \$100 bills. It is used for the Watergate operation.

May 27—The Democratic Committee's Watergate headquarters are successfully entered, and eavesdropping devices implanted, by the Hunt-Liddy team.

Early June—Gordon Strachan, Haldeman's aide in the White House, is fully briefed on the intelligence being received from the Watergate break-in.

Early June—Mitchell, according to Magruder, sees the results of Liddy's Watergate break-in operation in the form of transcripts of wiretap logs, and expresses dissatisfaction. This leads, according to Magruder, to a second break-in attempt.

June 17—James McCord, Frank Sturgis, and three Cubans—Barker, Martinez and Virgilio R. Gonzalez—are arrested early in the morning by Metropolitan police inside the Watergate. They are all wearing rubber surgical gloves, and are found with an array of sophisticated eavesdropping equipment and \$2,300 in cash, mostly in \$100 bills, with the serial numbers in sequence. That day, after a long-distance conversation by Nixon reelection officials with Jeb Magruder in California, files are removed from the reelection committee's offices and documents are shredded. Around this time, Hugh Sloan and Maurice Stans of the Finance Committee to Reelect the President, divide approximately \$81,000 in cash in Stans' office safe. Sloan takes \$40,000 in cash home and puts it in a trunk. Stans puts the rest in a sealed envelope into his desk drawer. Both later gave the money to Fred LaRue, through Robert Mardian.

June 18—Haldeman, in Key Biscayne, calls Magruder in California to ask about the break-in. Magruder says Haldeman orders him to return to Washington to handle the problem.

June 19—Mitchell, in a statement, says he was "surprised and dismayed" at news of McCord's arrest.

June 20—Ronald Ziegler, the President's press secretary, says he will not comment on "a third-rate burglary attempt."

Sometime within a "few days" after the Watergate arrests on June 17, President Nixon is "advised that there was a possibility of CIA involvement in some way" and he became concerned that the investigation "could lead to the uncovering of covert CIA operations totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in." He was also concerned that the Watergate investigation "might well lead to an inquiry into the activities of the special investigations unit itself . . . Therefore, I instructed Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman to insure that the investigation of the break-in not expose either an unrelated covert operation of the CIA or the activities of the White House investigations unit—and to see that this was personally coordinated between Gen. Walters, the deputy director of the CIA, and Mr. Gray of the FBI."

June 23—President Nixon, while refusing to comment on a case under investigation, says Ziegler and Mitchell have "stated my position and have also stated the facts accurately." He says "the White House has had no involvement whatever in this particular incident."

June 23—At 1 p.m., CIA Director Richard Helms and Deputy Director Vernon Walters meet with Haldeman and Ehrlichman in Ehrlichman's White House office. According to Walters, Haldeman tells him "the investigation was leading to a lot of important people and this could get worse." And: "Haldeman said the whole affair was getting

embarrassing and it was the President's wish that Walters call on Acting (FBI) Director L. Patrick Gray and suggest to him that, since the five suspects have been arrested, this should be sufficient and that it was not advantageous to have the inquiry pushed, especially in Mexico, etc." And: "Haldeman then stated that I could tell Gray I had talked to the White House and suggested that the investigation not be pushed further."

June 23—At 2:30 p.m. Walters calls on Gray and tells him he has just been talking to "the White House." Walters tells him "I was aware of (Helms') conversation with him the previous day and while the further investigation of the Watergate affair had not touched any current or on-going covert projects of the agency, its continuation might lead to some projects . . . Gray said that he was aware of this and understood what it was conveying. His problem was how to low-key the matter now that it was launched."

June 24—Mitchell, Magruder and Maurice Stans meet in connection with the break-in. Magruder testifies that Stans is told "things have gone wrong," and that Stans was asked to help with the money problem. Stans testifies he does not recall this conversation.

June 26—John Dean calls Walters "about the matter that John Ehrlichman and Bob Haldeman had discussed with me on the 23d of June." After checking with Ehrlichman, Walters sees Dean, who tells him: "The investigation of the Watergate 'bugging' case was extremely awkward and that there were a lot of leads to important people . . ." Dean asks him if he was "sure" the CIA was not involved, and then says "some of the accused were getting scared and 'wobbling.'" He then asks if there isn't some way the CIA could pay bail for the accused and, if they are convicted, pay their salaries while they serve out their sentences.

June 28—Mitchell announces he has fired Gordon Liddy for refusing to answer FBI questions about Watergate.

June 28—Walters meets again with Dean, who says "the problem was how to stop the FBI investigation beyond the five suspects," and asks if Walters can "do anything or had any suggestions."

June 28—Ehrlichman and Dean meet Gray in the White House and give the FBI chief the documents belonging to Howard Hunt. The documents, which Gray is told should "never see the light of day," contain phony cables designed to implicate President John F. Kennedy in the 1963 assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and a dossier on Sen. Edward M. Kennedy's accident at Chappaquiddick.

June 28 or 29—Magruder asks Herbert L. Porter, a reelection committee aide, to perjure himself in connection with Watergate.

June 29—Herbert W. Kalmbach, President Nixon's personal lawyer, urgently calls Maurice Stans. "I'm here on a special mission on a White House project," Stans says. Kalmbach told him. "I need all the cash I can get." He also tells Stans that "I'm asking for it on high authority. You will have to trust me that I have cleared it properly." Stans gives Kalmbach \$75,000 in cash. This money was part of approximately half a million dollars spent to buy the silence of the Watergate conspirators.

June 30—Ziegler repeats the President's public statement that there is "no White House involvement in the Watergate incident."

July 1—Mitchell resigns as the President's campaign manager, citing personal reasons.

July 3—Gray, after keeping the documents given to him by Ehrlichman and Dean in his apartment closet, takes them out, tears them up, and throws the remnants into a "burn bag" at his FBI office, where they are destroyed.

July 5—At 5:50 p.m. Gray calls Walters of the CIA and says "the pressures on him to continue the investigation were great." Unless he gets CIA documents to the effect that the FBI investigation would endanger CIA operations, he will have to proceed with the investigation.

July 6—At 10:05 a.m. Walters goes to Gray's FBI office. Walters says of their conversation: "In all honesty I could not tell him to cease future investigations on the grounds that it would compromise the security interests of the United States. Even less so could I write him a letter to this effect. He said that he fully understood this. He himself had told Ehrlichman and Haldeman that he could not possibly suppress the investigation of this matter." Walters also told Gray: "I had a long association with the President and was as desirous as anyone of protecting him. I did not believe that a letter from the agency asking the FBI to lay off this investigation on spurious grounds that it would uncover covert operations would serve the President. Such a letter

in the current atmosphere in Washington would become known prior to election. What was now a minor wound would become a mortal wound. Gray and Walters both agree they would resign rather than jeopardize the integrity of their organizations. As Walters leaves, Gray tells him "he did not believe that he could sit on this matter and that the facts would come out eventually."

July 6—Shortly after his meeting with Walters, Gray calls Clark MacGregor, who is with President Nixon in California. He tells MacGregor that both he and Walters "feel that people on the White House staff are careless and indifferent in their use of both the FBI and CIA and we have the feeling that this can be injurious to both of our agencies and can be wounding to the President." He asks MacGregor to inform the President. Within 37 minutes, President Nixon calls Gray. Gray tells the President that "Walters and I feel that people on your staff are trying to wound you by using the CIA and FBI and by confusing the question of CIA interest in, or not in, people the FBI wishes to investigate." Gray says the President tells him, "Pat, you just continue to conduct your aggressive and thorough investigation."

In later acknowledging this conversation, the President says he called Gray "to congratulate him on his successful handling of the hijacking of a Pacific Southwest Airlines plane the previous day. During the conversation Mr. Gray discussed with me the progress of the Watergate investigation, and I asked him whether he had talked with Gen. Walters. Mr. Gray said that he had, and that Gen. Walters had assured him that the CIA was not involved. In the discussion, Mr. Gray suggested that the matter of Watergate might lead higher. I told him to press ahead with his investigation."

July 13—Walters meets Gray alone at the FBI. Walters says Gray told him "this case could not be snuffed out and it would lead quite high politically." Gray tells Walters about Mr. Nixon's call to him. He adds further details: that the President asked what his recommendation was on Watergate, and that he told the President the case couldn't be covered up "and would lead quite high and felt that the President should get rid of the people that were involved." Gray says the President then asked: "Then I should get rid of whoever is involved no matter how high?" Gray says that was his recommendation. When the President asked what Walters thought, Gray says, he told him "my views were the same as his."

July 28—Walters calls again on Gray at the FBI. He gives Gray further information on the CIA's role in helping equip Hunt about the time of the Ellsberg psychiatrist's

break-in and burglary. Gray asks if the President had talked to him about Watergate and Walters says no. According to Walters, Gray then told him "a lot of pressure had been brought on him on this matter but he had not yielded."

Aug. 1—The Washington Post reports that a \$25,000 check given personally to Nixon fund-raiser Stans had been deposited in Bernard Barker's Miami bank account.

Aug. 9—Stans denies to federal investigators that \$25,000 in campaign contributions helped to finance the Watergate break-in.

Aug. 11—Clark MacGregor, John Mitchell's successor at the re-election committee, says the entire Watergate case "is being extended by the new media without the regard for the rights of the individuals involved."

Aug. 19—A staff investigation of Watergate is ordered by Wright Patman, chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee.

Aug. 26—The General Accounting Office, Congress' fiscal watchdog, reports "apparent violations" of the Federal Election Campaign Act by the Nixon re-election committee.

Aug. 27—Stans denounces the GAO report and calls for an investigation of Sen. George McGovern's finances.

Aug. 28—Attorney General Richard Kleindienst says that the Justice Department's investigation of Watergate will be "the most extensive, thorough and comprehensive investigation since the assassination of President Kennedy."

Aug. 29—President Nixon, at a press conference, says: "I can state categorically that his (John Dean's) investigation indicates that no one in the White House staff, no one in this administration, presently employed was involved in this very bizarre incident . . ."

Sept. 2—Mitchell, after testifying in a Democratic Party suit against the re-election committee, says he was "in no way involved" in Watergate and "I can swear now that I had no advance knowledge."

Sept. 15—Liddy, Hunt and the five men arrested inside the Watergate on June 17 are indicted by a federal grand jury in Washington.

Sept. 18—Jeb Stuart Magruder denies as "absolutely untrue" reports that he received any money from a secret campaign fund.

Sept. 20—Federal District Judge Charles R. Richey says it will be impossible to bring to trial the Democrats' civil suit against the reelection committee before the election. He halts all depositions until completion of the criminal case proceedings.

Sept. 20—Vice President Spiro Agnew, commenting on Watergate, says: "What I'm

saying is that someone set up these people and encouraged them to undertake this caper to embarrass them and to embarrass the Republican Party."

Oct. 3—By a vote of 20-to-15, the House Banking and Currency Committee rejects an investigation of Nixon campaign finances that would have touched on the funding of the Watergate operation.

Oct. 5—The President reiterates that no one in a responsible position in the White House or in his reelection committee had anything to do with the break-in or bugging of Democratic headquarters.

Oct. 10—Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward report in The Washington Post that FBI agents have established that the Watergate break-in stemmed from a massive campaign of political spying and sabotage conducted on behalf of the President's reelection and directed by White House and reelection committee officials.

Sometime in Oct.—Hugh Sloan, the reelection

committee's treasurer, is called by John Dean in the White House and is told he "could be a real hero around here if he took the 5th" in connection with the Watergate inquiry.

Oct. 15—Bernstein and Woodward report that Donald Segretti was hired by Dwight Chapin, the President's appointments secretary, to engage in espionage and sabotage against the Democrats, and that he was paid by Kalmbach, the President's personal lawyer.

Oct. 25—The Post reports that Haldeman was among the officials authorized to approve payments from a secret espionage and sabotage fund. At the White House, Ziegler denies the story and denounces The Post for engaging in a "political effort" at "character assassination" that he describes as "the shoddiest type of journalism . . . that I do not think has been witnessed in the political process in some time."

Nov. 7—President Nixon is reelected with 61 per cent of the presidential votes cast.

Dec. 8—A plane crashes in Chicago, killing Mrs. E. Howard Hunt. In her purse is found \$10,000 in \$100 bills.

Christmas week—McCord writes a letter which he says was "couched in strong language because it seemed to me at that time that this was the only language the White House understood." The letter, to John J. Caulfield, a former White House aide and security operative, said: "Dear Jack: I am sorry to have to write you this letter. If Helms goes and the Watergate operation is laid at CIA's feet, where it does not belong, every tree in the forest will fall. It will be a scorched desert. The whole matter is at the precipice right now. Pass the message that if they want it to blow, they are on exactly the right course. I am sorry that you will get hurt in the fallout."

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Early Jan.—Magruder says he meets personally with Haldeman and tells him, in capsule form, all he knows about Watergate, including the cover-up and his perjured testimony. He raises the question of getting executive clemency.

Early Jan.—Sloan meets with Haldeman and attempts to explain "how strongly I felt about certain individuals in terms of what they had done that I thought wrong."

Jan. 8—The trial of the seven Watergate defendants begins.


Jan. 9—James McCord receives an anonymous call instructing him "to go to a pay phone booth near the Blue Fountain Inn on Route 355" near his home in Rockville, Md. There, he is read a message from John J. Caulfield, who is acting as a White House go-between, telling him: "Plead guilty. One year is a long time. You will get executive clemency. Your family will be taken care of and when you get out you will be rehabilitated and a job will be found for you. Don't take immunity when called before the grand jury."

Jan. 10—Howard Hunt pleads guilty.

Jan. 11—Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) agrees to head a Senate Watergate investigation.

Jan. 11—Hunt says that to his "personal knowledge" no "higher-ups" in the Nixon administration were involved in Watergate. He also says he has no knowledge of any wider campaign of political espionage than the Watergate case.

Jan. 12—McCord meets Caulfield at night on the second overlook on the George Washington Parkway in Virginia. McCord says Caulfield tells him he has just come from a law enforcement meeting in San Clemente, Calif., and that he is "carrying the message of executive clemency to me 'from the very highest levels of the White House'" and that "the President of the United States" knew of their meeting, would be told of its



results, and that at their next meeting Caulfield may have a message from the President himself. Caulfield, in subsequent public testimony, says he made the offer of executive clemency after a meeting with John Dean in the White House. "Do you want me to tell him (McCord) that it comes from the President?" he says he asked Dean. "No," he says Dean replied, "don't say that. Say that it comes from way at the top."

Jan. 14—DeVan L. Shumway, a reelection committee spokesman, responds to a New York Times report that the defendants are still being paid by the Nixon committee by calling the story "a serious act of journalistic recklessness and irresponsibility."

Jan. 15—Barker, Sturgis, Martinez and Gonzalez all plead guilty in the Watergate case.

Jan. 16—"Are you being paid by anybody for anything?" Judge John Sirica asks the Watergate defendants, "No." they reply in unison.

Around Jan. 16—McCord, in another secret meeting with Caulfield, says Caulfield tells him: "The President's ability to govern is at stake. Another Teapot Dome scandal is possible, and the government may fall. Everybody is on track but you. Get closer to your attorney. You seem to be pursuing your own course of action. Don't talk if called before the grand jury. Keep silent, and do the same if called before a congressional committee."

Jan. 30—The Watergate jury, after deliberating only 90 minutes, convicts Liddy and McCord of all charges against them.

Feb. 2—Judge Sirica says he is "not satisfied" that the full Watergate story has been told at the trial. He suggests the names of "several persons" to be called before the grand jury.

Feb. 7—The Senate votes, 70 to 0, to establish a seven-member select committee to investigate Watergate.

March 19—McCord writes a letter to Judge Sirica, charging that perjury was committed at the Watergate trial, that defendants were pressured to plead guilty and keep quiet, that higher-ups were involved, and that "several members of my family have expressed fear for my life if I disclose knowledge of the facts of this matter."

March 21—President Nixon says that on this day "he began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter" as a result of "serious charges which came to my attention." But he does not announce this publicly.

March 23—Judge Sirica makes public Mc-

Cord's letter of March 19. He postpones sentencing of McCord until June 25 and gives the four Miami defendants "provisional" maximum sentences to encourage them to talk to the grand jury. He sentences Liddy to a prison term ranging from six years and eight months to 20 years and \$40,000 in fines.

March 26—Ziegler, at a Key Biscayne press conference, denies a report that Dean had prior knowledge of Watergate and says: "I should tell you that the President has talked to John Dean this morning, and discussed the story with him, and following that conversation, and based on that conversation, I would again flatly deny any prior knowledge on the part of Mr. Dean regarding the Watergate matter." (On June 11, Ziegler will say he had been wrong about who spoke with the President this day; it had not been Dean, but Haldeman.)

March 27—Magruder says he flies to New York and meets with Mitchell. He says Mitchell advises him to "hold," that he'll take care of everything.

March 28—Haldeman, Mitchell and Magruder meet and discuss Watergate and its

aftermath. Magruder says Haldeman assures him he will help him as a friend, but that he can't speak on behalf of the President.

April 3—Liddy is sentenced to an additional 8 to 18 months for refusing to answer questions by the grand jury.

April 17—President Nixon, in a statement, says "there have been major developments in the (Watergate) case concerning which it would be improper to be more specific now, except to say that real progress has been made in finding the truth." He now tells of learning of "serious charges" on March 21 and of ordering "intensive new inquiries."

April 17—Ziegler says all previous White House statements on Watergate are "inoperative."

April 24—The White House denies that an offer of executive clemency was made to the Watergate defendants to plead guilty and remain silent.

April 27—Gray resigns as acting FBI chief one day after reports are published that he destroyed documents given him by Ehrlichman and Dean that belonged to Hunt. On the same day, Judge W. Matthew Byrne Jr. makes public government information that Liddy and Hunt had broken into and burglarized Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.

April 30—President Nixon, in a nationwide TV address—only hours after it is announced that Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Kleindienst have resigned and Dean has been fired—accepts the responsibility for

Watergate.

May 11—The Ellsberg case is dismissed in Los Angeles.

May 17—The televised Senate Watergate hearings begin.

May 18—Archibold Cox, Solicitor General in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, is appointed special prosecutor in the Watergate investigation. The Nixon administration previously had resisted appointing a special prosecutor.

May 22—President Nixon, in the face of continuing allegations about his personal involvement in the Watergate affair, issues his fullest explanation to date.

May 24—President Nixon, in a speech to liberated American prisoners of war at the White House, says, "It is time to stop making heroes out of those who steal secrets and publish them in the newspaper."

May 30—Ziegler, responding to reports that the prosecutors have told the Justice Department there is justification for calling Mr. Nixon before the grand jury, says the President will neither talk to federal prosecutors nor answer their questions about Watergate because it would be "constitutionally inappropriate."

June 3—The White House, responding to reports that John Dean has told Senate investigators that he discussed aspects of the Watergate cover-up with the President or in his presence on at least 35 occasions between January and April of 1973, says the story is part "of a careful, coordinated strategy by an individual or individuals determined to prosecute a case against the President in the press using innuendo, distortion of fact, and outright falsehood . . . We categorically deny the assertions and implications of this story."

June 4—The White House confirms that the President did talk with Dean a number of times this year, but will not make available the logs of the President's meetings or phone calls with his counsel. Among the subjects they discussed, the White House acknowledges, was Watergate.

June 17—Today, one year after the Watergate break-in, the Senate hearings are in full progress, with Mitchell, Dean, Halde-
man, Ehrlichman and others still to be heard in public testimony.