

vention, where he prepared a dossier on the Kennedy campaign apparatus. Ehrlichman was brought into the Nixon campaign that year by his classmate and old friend from U.C.L.A., Bob Haldeman. After the 1960 loss, he went back to practicing land-use law in Seattle, worked briefly in the 1962 campaign, then was the "tour director" of the 1968 campaign. His reputation for hard-nosed efficiency is legendary. At the White House, Ehrlichman served first as counsel to the President, then as the President's chief assistant for domestic affairs. A Christian Scientist who neither smokes nor drinks, he became known as a cool executor of Presidential wishes. One colleague says: "He leaves no more blood on the floor than he has to."

Meanwhile, the publication of the Pentagon Papers was setting off another security crackdown, this one even more stringent and wide-ranging than the hunt for the Cambodia leak. Colson recalls that following the Papers' publication White House staffers held a series of "panic sessions." Several factors caused particular panic. One was the officials' fear that 31 of the 45 documents appearing in *The Times* had come not from the Pentagon Papers but from other secret Government sources. (They were wrong.) Another factor which contributed to the agitation at the White House that month was the knowledge that a copy of the Pentagon Papers had found its way into the hands of the Soviet Embassy only a few days after

The *Times* began publication of the documents. According to Government sources, the papers were delivered to the embassy on June 16 by a man who handed over a letter signed with an alias. Within a few days, the White House became convinced—as the President recently put it—that it was dealing with "a security leak of unprecedented proportions... a threat so grave as to require extraordinary actions." In the first such action, the Justice Department went to court seeking "prior restraint" on continued publication of the Papers (on June 15 and 19, it got temporary restraining orders against *The Times* and *The Post*, but the Supreme Court permitted the newspapers to resume publication of the Papers on June 30).

The Plumbers

Anyone who opposes us, we'll destroy. As a matter of fact, anyone who doesn't support us, we'll destroy.

—Egil Krogh Jr. in a 1969 conversation with Daniel S. Freedman, chairman of the psychiatry department, University of Chicago.

SOMETIME in the spring of 1971, John Caulfield noticed that he and Tony Ulasewicz were getting fewer assignments. "For some reason," a former White House aide recalls, "it was decided that Caulfield couldn't handle the really heavy stuff." Within a week of the Pentagon Papers' publication, the President authorized another "extraordinary action": establishment within the White House of a Special Investigations Unit whose task, as the President later put it, was to "stop security leaks and to investigate other sensitive security matters." In other words, "the heavy stuff."

The President asked John Ehrlichman to supervise the project, and in early July Ehrlichman assigned 31-year-old Egil Krogh Jr., one of his assistants, to head the unit.



Many a noon these past few years, a lone figure in a gray sweatshirt might have been seen jogging around the Ellipse behind the White House. The runner was Egil (Bud) Krogh, who jogged five miles a day to keep in shape. Krogh maintains a similar regimen in the rest of his life. One acquaintance describes him as "a brisk, polite, dynamic young executive—he had all the facts, he'd done his homework. Never mused, never damp, absolutely spic and span." Others called him "straight as an arrow" and "a very spiritual guy" (like Ehrlichman and Haldeman, he is a Christian Scientist), and some liked to call him "evil Krogh," because he was so patently the opposite. Brought to the White House by Ehrlichman, with whom he served in a Seattle law firm, Krogh was assigned to the staff of the President's Domestic Council, specializing in transportation and crime prevention. He was also the White House liaison

man with the District of Columbia, seeking to create "a new psychological climate." Partly, that meant law and order, he said, "but it doesn't mean repression. We're trying to create a respect for authority, not necessarily for power."

The Special Investigations Unit opened offices in Room 16 in the basement of the Executive Office Building next door to the White House. Krogh was assigned an associate—David Young, a 32-year-old lawyer from Kissinger's National Security Council staff—and a secretary, 23-year-old Kathleen Chenow. To insiders, the outfit was often known simply as "the Room 16 Project," but soon it acquired another nickname. Miss Chenow recalls: "David Young's mother-in-law or grandmother or somebody saw in *The New York Times* that Krogh and Young were working on leaks. She called the story to his attention, saying, 'Your grandfather would be proud of you, working on leaks at the White House. He was a plumber.' So David put up a sign on the door which said, 'Mr. Young—Plumber.'"

New urgency was attached to the Plumbers' work as a result of several other developments that summer. One, Krogh recalls, was a report from the C.I.A. that a news story had "put in jeopardy the life of an intelligence agent." But by far the most important came on July 23 when William Beecher produced another of his annoying scoops. This one began: "American negotiators have proposed to the Soviet Union an arms-control agreement that would halt construction of both land-based missiles and missile submarines," and went on to spell out the American proposals at the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation (SALT) talks under way in Helsinki. Author John Newhouse says the Beecher story stirred "rage" in the White House. The U.S. and the Russians had a firm agreement not to release details of their proposals to the press. Not only was Beecher's article full of such details, but it came out the morning before the U.S. delegation was to make its first presentation of the proposal to the Russians in Helsinki. And, worse yet, it disclosed one of the American fallback positions. Nevertheless, some observers believe the Administration was more concerned about domestic considerations, fearing that the proposal would now become the subject of political pulls and counterpulls at home.

In subsequent statements, White House officials

have given the impression that this and other leaks were part of a plot orchestrated by the radical left and abetted by its allies in Government. But the known facts on the SALT leak do not support that premise. The precise identity of Beecher's source has never been revealed. But six Pentagon officials were shifted out of their positions supposedly as a result of the leak. And the State Department asked three of its officials known to have talked to Beecher during this period to take lie-detector tests, administered by the C.I.A. in apparent violation of the statute that bars that agency from domestic operations. A State Department spokesman says the officials still occupy "positions of responsibility" at the department. Some believe Beecher's story came from Pentagon officials who sought to sabotage the SALT talks because they disapproved of any rapprochement with the Soviets; others think it came from those who wanted to "freeze" the United States negotiating position. But it almost certainly came from Government officials with no current ties to Dan Ellsberg or the Weathermen.

By then, it hardly mattered where it came from. That summer of '71, many men in the White House apparently felt events closing in on them, as if somehow all the people on their "enemies list" had joined hands to destroy them. In part, their fears involved national-security considerations. But plainly there were political considerations, too. By that summer, the President knew that he was going to be campaigning for re-election largely in Peking and Moscow. Any obstacles on his road to those two capitals also blocked his parallel campaign trail. Part of the problem in succeeding months may have been the inability of the President and the men around him adequately to distinguish between those two thoroughfares.

Egil Krogh recalls that, following the SALT leak, he and John Ehrlichman met with the President. Mr. Nixon instructed Krogh to move ahead with "the greatest urgency" to determine the source of those leaks.

To meet the Pentagon Papers "crisis," the White House needed more operatives trained in security and intelligence. Chuck Colson, who was then working part-time on the problem, thought of a man whom he had first met five years before at a Brown University party and whom he had since come to know well.

Plumbers (cont.)



"We became lawless in a struggle for the rule of law — semi-outlaws who risk their lives to put down the savagery of others," says Peter Ward, a C.I.A. agent in a book called "Hazardous Duty" by David St. John—also known as John Baxter, Gordon Davis, Robert Dietrich and Howard

Hunt. The 46 published novels Hunt has written under these names reflect the curious amalgam of luxuriant fantasy and actual skulduggery in the life of Everette Howard Hunt Jr. In part, his books are based on his own 20 years as a C.I.A. agent in Paris, Vienna, Mexico City, Madrid and Montevideo. As a specialist in "dirty tricks," he played an active role in the 1954 overthrow of the left-wing Guatemalan Government. In the early sixties, operating under the code name "Eduardo," he was the C.I.A.'s representative to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, in whose name the Bay of Pigs invasion was launched. Blocked from further promotions, Hunt retired from the agency in 1970 and joined Robert R. Mullen & Company, a Washington public-relations firm with strong ties to the conservative wing of the Republican party. But he missed the C.I.A. desperately. "You see, our Government trains people like myself to do these things and do them successfully," he explained later. "It becomes a way of life for a person like me." So, in retirement, he lived out the riper reveries from his own books: French food, wine and the elegant life ("the service plates were Revere gadroon, the crystal was an opaline much favored by the Sun King's sycophants..."), exciting women ("Oh Jake," breathes the Senator's wife in "The Coven." "Oh, you bastard. You brutal goddamn woman killer"), and truly uninhibited espionage (the former C.I.A. agent in "The Berlin Ending" thinks the agency has "grown old and cautious. Prim. Reliant on technology far more than human beings").

Colson says he passed Hunt's name along with several others to Ehrlichman, who interviewed him and ordered him hired. Ehrlichman says he met Hunt only once, on July 7, "the day after Charles Colson hired him." In any case, Hunt was hired July 6 as a \$100-a-day White House consultant and given an office on the third floor of the Executive Office Building (although he retained his job at the Mullen company where he worked, among other things, on a television spot on disturbed children featuring Julie Nixon Eisenhower). Colson says Hunt was assigned to his staff for "internal budget" reasons only. But Hunt says he worked under Colson's direction for the next year on a wide variety of matters, most of which had nothing to do with the Pentagon Papers.

First, he asked Colson to arrange cooperation from Hunt's old colleagues at the C.I.A. Colson concedes that he called Ehrlichman on July 7 and told him that Hunt wanted "to establish liaison with the C.I.A. as well as with other Government agencies." Marine Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., then the C.I.A.'s Deputy Director, says Ehrlichman called him that same day and said, in effect, "Here's Mr. Hunt; he works for us. He'll be around to see you." Cushman has said he assumed that Ehrlichman "spoke with the authority of the President." Ehrlichman says he doesn't have "the faintest recollection" of such a call.

On July 22, Hunt visited Cushman in his office at the C.I.A.'s secluded Langley, Va., headquarters. The two men had known each other for years and once shared an office when Cushman had served previously with the agency. So when Hunt

came to see him, Cushman says, he knew him to be "a highly respected and honorably retired C.I.A. employee." According to Cushman, Hunt said he had "a very sensitive one-time interview that the White House wanted him to hold with a person whose ideology he was not sure of, and that he dare not reveal his [Hunt's] true identity." Therefore, he would need a physical disguise and some false identification.

The next day, a representative of the C.I.A.'s Technical Services Division called Hunt and instructed him to come to a "safe house"—a clandestine C.I.A. meeting place—on Massachusetts Avenue near the National Cathedral. There he was furnished with a wig, glasses and a speech-alteration device (a plate which fits into the mouth and alters the tone of the speaker's voice) as well as a Social Security card, a driver's license and several association membership cards in the name of Edward Joseph Warren.

Those early summer months were a boom time for Senator Ted Kennedy. A Gallup Poll released on May 16 showed that 29 per cent of registered Democrats favored him for the 1972 nomination, with only 21 per cent for Edmund Muskie, the previous front runner. Rumors circulated in Washington that the Kennedy clan was already gathering at Hyannis Port to chart campaign strategy. So the White House—which had earlier assigned Caulfield to dog his steps—once again began a Kennedy watch. But this time with a special intensity.

Chuck Colson harbored an intense dislike of Kennedy (he has said that had he seen Kennedy after the Senator's 1970 denunciations of Nixon, "I might have attacked him physically"). And Hunt, who says Colson assigned him to follow the Kennedy trail, seems to have felt just as strongly. Hunt's latest book, "The Coven," features a Senator—Newbold Vane—who is almost certainly patterned after one or all of the Kennedys. ("The Vanes were nonserious people who demanded to be taken seriously.... Their whole imperious life-style was preposterous. Vane was about as qualified to be President as I was to practice open heart surgery.")

Later in the month, using the disguise furnished him by the C.I.A., he traveled to Providence, R.I., where he met for two hours in a motel room with Clifton DeMotte, a General Services Administration employee who was also known to be a Kennedy watcher by avocation, having followed the family's activities closely ever since he worked in a Hyannis Port hotel in 1960. Hunt asked him about Chappaquiddick, about "any woman-chasing by the Kennedy boys; if I'd heard of any scandal-type material." DeMotte passed along some hearsay on "real swinging parties" and "booze" and some harder information on "hell-raising" by Kennedy staffers. But when Hunt asked him to do some research on Chappaquiddick, DeMotte turned him down, partly because Hunt refused to say whom he was working for.

Hunt then turned his attention to the Pentagon Papers. But he was soon back to Kennedy. During much of July, he and others combed through the Papers, comparing them with the press accounts to see if the stories were accurate. Then, abruptly, he began to zero in on one phase of the vast history: late 1963, when the South Vietnamese generals were hatching a coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem which, the Papers showed, President Kennedy knew of and approved.

In August, the White House asked the State Department to provide classified cables exchanged between Washington and Saigon from April to November, 1963. At a news conference on Sept. 16, President Nixon said in answer to a question, "I would remind all concerned that the way we got into Vietnam was through overthrowing Diem and the complicity in the murder of Diem." A week later, Hunt went to the department's file record room and copied 240 cables from 1963. He says

that Colson, who was "directing" his research on this matter, asked him soon afterward, "Well, what kind of material have you dug up in the files that would indicate Kennedy complicity?" Hunt says he showed Colson three or four legitimate cables "that indicated that they had pretty close to pulled the trigger against Premier Diem's head, but it didn't say so in so many words." According to Hunt, Colson then said, "Do you think you could improve on them?" Not without technical assistance, Hunt said. "Well, we won't be able to give you any technical help," Hunt recalls Colson saying. "This is too hot. See what you can do on your own."

Using a razor blade and a White House Xerox machine, Hunt pieced together two fakes. One, dated Oct. 29, 1963—three days before Diem's death—purported to be a State Department message to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. It began: "At highest level meeting today, decision reluctantly made that neither you or Harkins [Gen. Paul D. Harkins, then commander of United States forces in Vietnam] should intervene in behalf of Diem or Nhu [Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's brother] in event they seek asylum."

Several weeks later, Colson suggested to a friend—William Lambert, an investigative reporter for Life magazine—that he reread Nixon's Sept. 16 news conference; then he sent him over to see Hunt's cable. "Mr. Lambert was quite exultant over the find," recalls Hunt, who let the reporter copy the cable. For many months, before Life magazine folded in late 1972, Lambert was unable to satisfy himself about the cable's authenticity. Only in May, 1973, did Colson tell Lambert that the cable was a fake, although he said he had learned of the fabrication in February, 1972. Colson emphatically denies ordering Hunt to fabricate the cable, although he concedes that "it is entirely possible that Hunt misunderstood something I said to him at the time he was reviewing Pentagon Papers cables with me."

By mid-August, Hunt had shifted over to the Plumbers squad (though still, he says, reporting to Colson). Meanwhile, another investigator had been added to the squad—a man who had been forced out of the Treasury Department only weeks before, after he had vigorously lobbied against the Administration's gun-control legislation and had even delivered a rousing speech against such controls before the 100th-anniversary convention of the National Rifle Association. But all that was no disqualification for work with the Plumbers. He was recommended by Egil Krogh and hired by Ehrlichman on July 19.



G. Gordon Liddy loves guns. An F.B.I. man in the early sixties, he recalls he once "bailed out of a moving car and out-drew" a most-wanted fugitive. As an assistant district attorney in Dutchess County, N.Y., in the mid-sixties, he rode around with a gun strapped to his shoulder, and once, while summing up a robbery case to the jury, he pulled a pistol out of his pocket and fired it at the ceiling. "Gordon's a cowboy," says a former political rival. "He wanted to go back to the days when men were men and life was simpler." A former colleague in the District Attorney's office says: "He could turn the most routine case into an earth-shattering event when it hit the papers." (In 1966, Liddy took public credit for a drug raid on Timothy Leary, which, according to a Poughkeepsie lawyer, "he had very little to do with.") In 1968, Liddy ran in a Republican primary against incumbent Congressman Hamilton Fish Jr.

His campaign literature ("He knows the answer is law and order, not weak-kneed sociology. Gordon Liddy doesn't bail them out—he puts them in") featured a picture of him wielding a police spotlight at a crowd of angry blacks. Although he lost the primary, Liddy had the Conservative party nomination. But he declined to run in the general election, and a few months later Congressman Fish recommended him for his job at Treasury.

If Ted Kennedy was the first of the "them," by June, 1971, Daniel Ellsberg was a very close second. "Because of the extreme gravity of the situation, and not then knowing what additional secrets Mr. Ellsberg might disclose," the President recalls, he told Egil Krogh that "as a matter of first priority the [Special Investigations] unit should find out all it could about Mr. Ellsberg's associates and his motives."

This separate investigation of Ellsberg—outside normal F.B.I. channels—was necessary, Krogh was informed, because Hoover was a close personal friend of Louis Marx, father of Ellsberg's second wife, Patricia. Marx and Hoover were indeed close friends, but the ultraconservative millionaire had little sympathy for his son-in-law's current activities and refused to contribute money to his defense.

In the early stages of the Plumbers' investigation, Krogh recalls, he received "information suggesting that Dr. Ellsberg did not act alone." So the unit concentrated for a while on discovering whether the Papers' disclosure was "an individual act, the act of a small group, or the result of a wider conspiracy to engage in espionage." As part of this effort, the Plumbers were reportedly getting transcripts from a phone tap placed on Ellsberg's home phone sometime in the spring of that year (the F.B.I. is said to have been investigating Ellsberg even before publication of the Pentagon Papers). But the Plumbers themselves apparently initiated wiretaps on two New York Times reporters: Neil Sheehan, the reporter responsible for obtaining the Pentagon Papers, and Tad Szulc, who covered the State Department.

Another suspected conspirator was Mort Halperin, the target of earlier F.B.I. taps. By about this time he had been elevated to the "top 20" of the enemies list with the notation "a scandal would be most helpful." Halperin, who had been in overall charge of the Pentagon Papers project, was then at the Brookings Institution, a private research institute staffed by many former Kennedy and Johnson Administration officials. According to John Dean, Caulfield told him that Chuck Colson had instructed him in June or July to burglarize an office at Brookings (said to be Halperin's) and seize any "leaked documents." Caulfield said Ulasiewicz had "cased" the institution and made "friendly contact" with a security guard there. According to Dean, Caulfield told Colson that security at Brookings was "extremely tight," but Colson said that "if necessary he should plant a firebomb in the building and retrieve the documents during the commotion that would ensue." Dean says he flew to California and persuaded Ehrlichman that the Brookings burglary was "insane." He says Ehrlichman phoned Colson to "call it off." Colson denies the whole story, although an associate says he may have suggested the bombing as a joke.

Gradually, the Plumbers began zeroing in on Ellsberg himself. Hunt explains that there was "concern" in the White House about prosecuting Ellsberg for fear that he would become a martyr. Some officials pressed for information which would allow them to determine Ellsberg's "prosecutability"—presumably not merely his role in publishing the Papers but aspects of his background which would make him vulnerable. Ellsberg had been in psychoanalysis in Los Angeles, and Hunt says the unit soon concluded that the best

"instant source" would be the psychiatrist's files.


Two F.B.I. agents visited the psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, on July 20 in his office at 450 North Bedford Drive in Beverly Hills. Dr. Fielding, a slender man in his mid-50's with a shaved Yul Brynner-style head, recalls that the agents wanted to discuss Dr. Ellsberg. He said he would consult his attorney, and the next day the attorney called the F.B.I. and said his client would not violate the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship.

Krogh recalls that when Dr. Fielding refused to cooperate, Ehrlichman gave the unit "a general authorization to engage in covert activity to obtain a psychological history" of Ellsberg. Hunt recalls that about this time the idea of a burglary—a "bag job"—on the psychiatrist's office became the topic of "low-key conversation around the office." Hunt says that at one point he inquired why the F.B.I. couldn't do the burglary and Liddy told him that in recent years the bureau had ceased training agents for that type of operation. "The agents had been reassigned or lost their skills." He said he then asked why the Secret Service couldn't do it and Liddy said the White House didn't trust them for that kind of job.

Prosecutors are said to have a copy of a memo from Krogh and Young to Ehrlichman, dated some time before Sept. 3, which outlines in detail plans to burglarize Dr. Fielding's office. Young has testified that Ehrlichman saw the memo and approved the burglary. Ehrlichman has refused to confirm or deny this. And John Dean says Krogh told him that orders for the burglary came "directly from the Oval Office." Hunt says those who approved the burglary made clear that "no one with any association with the White House could be involved in any way directly with such an operation. . . . So I was asked whether or not, as a result of my old C.I.A. contacts, I could come up with a team capable of making such an entry."

He immediately thought of an old friend, Ber-

nard Barker, who—under the code name "Macho"—had been his principal assistant in the Bay of Pigs operation. For the past decade, they had kept in touch only through an occasional letter. Then, on April 16, 1971, Hunt and his wife were in Miami for a reunion the next day of the Bay of Pigs veterans. Hunt stopped by Barker's house and pinned a note to his door, saying "if you are the same Barker I once knew," he should contact Hunt at a Miami Beach hotel. A few hours later, Barker called and the two "freedom fighters" and their wives had lunch together in a Cuban restaurant and talked about "old times."



"I was not there to think I was there to follow orders," Bernard Barker was to say later in describing his relationship with Hunt. For most of his life, Bernard Barker has been following orders. Born of American parents in Havana, he spent his youth alternating between schools in Cuba and the United States. As with so many sons of uncertain heritage, he became a fierce patriot. The day after Pearl Harbor, he went to the American Embassy and enlisted in the Army Air Corps—"the first volunteer in the Second World War from Cuba," he proudly proclaims. When his plane went down over Germany, Captain Barker spent 16 months as a prisoner of war. His sense of discipline was reinforced by postwar service in the Cuban police force—during which he once served as a bodyguard for Mrs. Truman and her daughter, Margaret. Castro's seizure of power sent Barker into exile and several years of determined resistance work—in the Bay of Pigs and other clandestine operations. Gradually he settled



Watergate-cash: Some of the bills found on the men arrested in the burglary of D.N.C. headquarters.

Plumbers (cont.)

down to make money in Miami, working as an assistant store manager, studying at night to get a real-estate license, finally opening his own realtor's office—Barker Associates—with a staff of 10 salesmen.

Four months after their Bay of Pigs reunion, Hunt flew to Miami again and spoke with his old comrade in arms. He asked, Barker recalls, "would I be willing to help him in a matter of national security?" Barker says Hunt contended that the "national-security organization" to which he then belonged was "above both the C.I.A. and the F.B.I." He was vague about the specific mission, saying only that it involved "a traitor to this country who had given information to a foreign embassy." Barker eagerly signed on, believing that "Mr. Hunt's position in the White House would be a decisive factor at a later date for obtaining help in the liberation of Cuba."

Hunt then asked him to recruit two others. Barker chose two of his own real-estate salesmen: Felipe DeDiego, 43, who Barker said had taken part in a successful raid to capture Castro Government documents; and Eugenio R. Martinez, 48, whom Barker credits with "over 300 infiltrations into Castro Cuba."

Late in August, Hunt got a Tessina camera concealed in a tobacco pouch from his C.I.A. contact and also arranged for Liddy to be outfitted with false identification and a disguise. On Aug. 25, Liddy and Hunt flew to Los Angeles for what Hunt called "a preliminary vulnerability and feasibility study." Wearing dark glasses, Liddy posed by some bright flowering bushes outside Dr. Fielding's office building, while Hunt, using his photographic tobacco pouch, snapped some pictures of the building, a nondescript three-story structure decorated with blue panels around the windows. Then they walked through the wood-paneled hallways to Fielding's office in Room 212, brushed through the open door and began snapping more pictures. Suddenly, Maria Martinez, the cleaning

man's mother, entered the office. Hunt said calmly in Spanish, "I am a doctor." Mrs. Martinez seemed satisfied and left. That evening, Hunt called the C.I.A. and asked to be met when he and Liddy arrived the next day at Dulles Airport. There they handed a roll of film to an agent who got it developed and returned it to Hunt that same evening.

On "D minus two" (Sept. 2), the two branches of the burglary team converged on Beverly Hills: Barker, Martinez and DeDiego flying directly from Miami to Los Angeles; Liddy and Hunt stopping off in Chicago to pick up several walkie-talkies and other equipment. On the morning of Sept. 3, the Miami men were briefed by Hunt and then made a "visual reconnaissance" of the target. At 9 P.M. that evening, two of them returned dressed in delivery men's uniforms and carrying a large green suitcase addressed to Dr. Fielding and marked with "Air-Express" and "Rush" stickers. Efrain Martinez, the cleaning man, let them into Fielding's office where they placed the suitcase on the floor.

A few minutes past midnight the team swung into action. Hunt stationed himself at Dr. Fielding's residence to make sure the psychiatrist remained at home. Liddy cruised the area in a rented car looking for police, keeping in touch with the others over a walkie-talkie. Meanwhile, the three Miami men returned to the building. Using masking tape and a glass cutter, they broke through a window on the ground floor and forced the door to Fielding's office. There they opened the green suitcase, which contained a 35-mm. camera, a spotlight and film. Barker pried open a wooden cabinet and a steel filing cabinet, strewing their contents around the office as he looked for information on Ellsberg. Here the participants' testimony differs. Barker says they found nothing on Ellsberg except his name in one of the doctor's address books, but DeDiego says they did find Ellsberg's file, and that he held the contents while Martinez photographed them. In any case, by 4 A.M. all five men had returned to the Beverly Hilton.

After their return to Washington, Hunt and Liddy showed Krogh pictures they had taken of

Dr. Fielding's apartment and, apparently believing that the psychiatrist might be keeping some of Ellsberg's records at home, recommended a burglary attempt there. Krogh says that Ehrlichman rejected the proposal. Ehrlichman says that as soon as he heard of the project he told Krogh and Young he "did not agree with this method of investigation" and they should "not do this again."

Following the burglary, the White House apparently renewed a request to the C.I.A. for a "psychological profile" of Ellsberg. Hunt says he knew the agency had a division that did behavioral profiles on world leaders—the most celebrated being the one of Nikita Khrushchev just before President Kennedy met him in Vienna in 1961. The agency had done only one such profile on an American—Capt. Lloyd Bucher of the Pueblo, after he and his crew were captured by the North Koreans in 1968. This, at least, had some direct relation to the C.I.A. mission abroad; but the request for an Ellsberg profile made the agency's two top medical men—Dr. John Tietjen and Dr. Bernard Malloy—"apprehensive." They were overruled by their superiors, among them Director Richard Helms and General Cushman. A final profile on Ellsberg, incorporating classified information from the Justice and State Departments, was delivered to the White House on Nov. 12. Meanwhile, Hunt drew up his own report—a 28-page chronology of Ellsberg's life, later found in Hunt's safe.

The President has said that by the end of 1971 the Plumbers' work had "tapered off" and the unit had begun to disperse. Some of its members were "recalled" to action in January, 1972, when Jack Anderson began printing minutes of secret National Security Council discussions on the India-Pakistan war (later, Krogh sheepishly admitted to Ehrlichman that they had "failed" to find Anderson's source). Hunt maintained a clandestine telephone in the Plumbers' office until March, 1972, for which bills were sent to Kathy Chenow's home and approved by an aide to John Ehrlichman (the phone was used chiefly for calls to Bernard Barker in Miami, Miss Chenow says). But with the approach of the election year, most of the Plumbers were moving on to more overtly political activities.

Dirty Money

I have often thought we had too much money.

—Herbert Porter, testimony to Ervin Committee, June 7, 1973.

FROM the top floor of Irvine Towers, where Herbert Kalmbach has his office, one can watch the sparkling white yachts bobbing in the Pacific along "Millionaire's Row" in Newport Beach, Calif. Within a silver dollar's throw of the twin office towers, some 10 or 12 millionaires live in walled, well-guarded beachfront compounds. And many of those men belong to the Lincoln Club, an exclusive group of California businessmen that over the years has given vast sums of money to Richard Nixon—much of it funneled through the President's longtime personal lawyer, Herb Kalmbach.

By Jan. 28, 1971, Mr. Kalmbach had opened an account in the Newport Beach branch of the Bank of America, which has offices in Irvine Towers East. Over the next year or so, according to Government sources, he maintained up to \$500,000 in that account—many of the deposits coming in cashier's checks which he purchased with cash at a branch of the Security Pacific National Bank, whose office is in Irvine Towers West. Money was transferred back and forth between Irvine Towers East and Irvine Towers West in an apparent effort to blur its trail.

Kalmbach was the chief fund raiser for the Nixon campaign until February, 1972, and thereafter second only to Maurice Stans. His secret fund, established at least two years before the election, set the tone for the financial side of the White House effort.



Since Nixon entered the White House in 1969, a remarkable change has come over the Los Angeles law firm of Kalmbach, De Marco, Knapp & Chillingworth. It began to rise: from the eighth floor of Century City to the 19th floor of a downtown Los Angeles business center to the 44th floor of the city's newest skyscraper (Kalmbach keeps a separate office in Newport Beach). A similar change has come over the firm's clientele, which in 1968 included the likes of the local Newport National Bank and Pacific Lighting—and today includes such companies as United Air Lines,