

Henry J. Taylor

Fear of Another Dunkirk

WHERE DO WE GO from here in Vietnam? Listen to a silence-breaking warning from former Secretary of State Dean Rusk:

"We can't have it both ways. Some of the very people who insisted that the President rush the troops out of Vietnam will now blame him if the military situation goes wrong."

SENATORS KENNEDY, McGovern, Muskie, etc., call your office!

The French forces were absolutely supreme in Algeria. But President Charles de Gaulle had to capitulate because French public opinion in support of the struggle collapsed. In Vietnam the Communists have not won on the battlefield, but they have won the public opinion contest in the United States.

The result has left us helpless to negotiate successfully at the Paris truce talks. It was — again — the same situation that de Gaulle faced.

North Vietnamese Red leader Ho Chi Minh refused nearly a thousand "peace feelers" — 39 listed as major inside our own State Department — before he consented even to preliminary truce talks that began in Paris on May 13, 1968. And an arrogant Red delegate, Ha Van Lau, even then reminded our representatives "you are lucky" because the Red North Koreans required our delegates to arrive at the 1951 Korean truce talks with a white flag.

Even on the eve of the last session this year, after four meaningless years, Hanoi's

chief negotiator privately told our representatives that the fundamental weakness in our position is that "the United States cannot outlast us in Vietnam and, nevertheless, obviously does not intend to outfight us."

Hanoi could not continue the war for 30 days without the Soviet's artillery, planes, tanks, ammunition, petroleum and management.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, noting the aggressor's "spectacular disregard for the demilitarized zone" separating the two Vietnams, publicly confirmed that Soviet support on April 7. "The prospect for peace rests heavily on the Soviet Union," Laird stated.

Three objectives are self-evident in the Red offensive: (1) to topple, if possible, President Nguyen Van Thieu's Saigon government; (2) prove that President Nixon's keystone policy of Vietnamization has failed and thus help defeat him for reelection through the resulting "What do we do now?" U.S. dilemma; (3) abort the reelection value of the President's May 22 Moscow trip.

BUT BEHIND closed doors the White House fears a fourth objective. If the North Vietnamese are occupying significant areas of South Vietnam by early May, we may actually be confronted by Dunkirk in evacuating our remaining U.S. troops.

Dunkirk! The grim, horrible threat of a Dunkirk is the true anxiety and fear of President Nixon now.