

AUG 5 1972

Dear Js,

8/2/72

Next in my tonight's Ramparts reading was Horowitz. He is interesting, informed, but strikes me as a candidate for some of Max Lerner's extra shoulders (for carrying literary water). He also seem to me to have horse and cart trouble. Example: Nixon's visit pre-requisite to Chinese entry into UN.

What has yet to be seen is who was really compromised, Nixon of the Sino-Soviets. His own initiatives will, I think, limit his aggressiveness with them. And that of the military everywhere.

If I thought for a minute the USSR or China was about to seel VN out, I'd say they can't. No matter what they do. They are not fighting the war, the VN are. And not about to quit or to settle for less than what to them is victory. I can't conceive of Nixon giving them that.

He can destroy the land and has made a rather extensive beginning. But more he can't do and won't try.

Horowitz' explanation of the offensive is superficially logical but I think not on the point. I think I long ago suggested that they had prepared for this long in advance and at most made minor shifts in timing. My long-ago reading of Mao told me this. Aside from the bombing and the possibility of probability of retaliation, which they had to have anticipated, the time had come to destroy the Thieu military power. That, rather than the taking of territory per se, I think was their central objective.

Lands can be destroyed from the air, made to suffer from the sea. But they can't be conquered this way, and once conquered they must be held. On the other hand, with US withdrawal at the point where return of any significant forces seems impossible, the time had come to really hurt the mercenaries. They did that, to the point where we stopped claiming 10-1 losses and got as low as less than 3-1 as I remember. Thieu losses are admittedly very heavy.

The entire world can't be evaluated on the basis of the awful thing in VN, awful as it is. The new relations with the USSR and China make new VNs much less likely, aside from reducing tensions and making larger war more improbable.

An interesting, to me, sidebar. Each time Kissinger went to Paris on pretended negotiations, the ailing stock-market rose. Last time by an immediate five points. This time by 6 points yesterday and 10 today.

I can remember when the market was seriously depressed and never reacted otherwise at any suggestion of peace. What this says to me is that the business and finance world has come to conclude that it/they can live with peace or less war and war production. Orffols have rushed in. If I am corect, this is a radical change.

Thanks, HW

