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WASHINGTON AP - The Warren Commission leveled sweeping criticism Sunday at Secret Service security measures for President John F. Kennedy's fateful journey to Dallas, Tex., last November. It also censured the FBI.

It proposed a drastic overhaul of presidential protective activities - including formation of a cabinet-level watchdog committee.

It criticized the Secret Service - the agency with prime responsibility - for lapses in planning for the Nov. 22 presidential visit, when Kennedy was shot down by a sniper as he rode in a carefree motorcade.

It raised the possibility of relieving the service of some or all of the job - and suggested the the President and Congress consider such a step.

It called to task the Federal Bureau of Investigation - virtually immune from official criticism in its 40 years under J. Edgar Hoover - for not alert-

ing the Secret Service to the presence in Dallas of Lee Harvey Oswald, named by the commission as Kennedy's assassin.

And it accused both agencies of a breakdown in coordination and a too-narrow understanding of their responsibilities in safeguarding the President.

The FBI and the Secret Service declined to comment on the report. But the commission said each has taken steps since the assassination to correct the deficiencies it attributed to them.

For the agents on the scene at the moment of assassination, the Warren Commission had words of praise: "Their actions demonstrate that the President and the nation can expect courage and devotion to duty from the agents of the Secret Service."

But in dealing with the Dallas police department and its handling of Oswald, the commission was less kind. It said poor security arrangements for Oswald contributed to his slaying at the hands of Dallas nightclub owner Jack Ruby.

Dallas police officials were scored for their blow-by-blow accounts to newsmen of the case against Oswald. These, the commission said, "provided much of the basis for the myths and rumors that came into

being soon after the President's death."

The commission's criticism of Secret Service operations dealt largely with what that agency calls its protective research function—keeping tabs on all persons who might be considered a threat to the President.

But it also censured the service for failing to inspect those buildings along the motorcade that presented the greatest threat of ambush—such as the Texas School Book Depository, where the assassin lurked with his rifle at a sixth-floor window until the 46-year-old President's car appeared in his telescopic sight.

Before the assassination, the report said, the Secret Service's criteria for protective research dealt principally with direct threats to the President.

Although these threats were treated adequately, it went on, the service "failed to recognize the necessity of identifying other potential sources of danger to his security," adding:

"The Secret Service did not develop adequate and specific criteria defining those persons or groups who might present a danger to the President."

Coordination between the Secret Service and other federal

agencies, such as the FBI, was described as insufficient. The report said the FBI had extensive information on Oswald's past and knew he worked in a building on the motorcade route. But the FBI did not, because of its understanding of Secret Service needs, relay this information.

"The FBI took an unduly restrictive view of its role in preventive intelligence work prior to the assassination," the report said. "A more carefully coordinated treatment of the Oswald case by the FBI might well have resulted in bringing Oswald's activities to the attention of the Secret Service."

Noting that the FBI had a file on Oswald dating back to October 1959, the commission reported: "No information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald appeared in Secret Service files before the President's trip to Dallas."

The commission quoted a Secret Service official as testifying that his agency would, indeed, have been quite interested in the FBI data on Oswald's past.

"All of those facts, if we had them altogether, would have added up to pointing out a pretty bad individual," said Special Agent Robert I. Bouck

of the Secret Service, "and I think that, together, had we known that he had a vantage point, would have seemed somewhat serious to us."

But FBI Director Hoover testified: "There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to the President or to the vice president."

The commission, however, took another view:

"There was much material in the hands of the FBI about Oswald: the knowledge of his defection to the Soviet Union, his arrogance and hostility to the United States, his pro-Castro tendencies, his lies when interrogated by the FBI, his trip to Mexico where he was in contact with Soviet authorities, his presence in the School Book Depository job and its location along the route of the motorcade.

"All this does seem to amount to enough to have induced an alert agency, such as the FBI. . . to list Oswald as a potential threat to the safety of the President. This conclusion may be tinged with hindsight, but it is stated primarily to direct the thought of those responsible for the future safety of our pres-

idents to the need for a more imaginative and less narrow interpretation of their responsibilities.”

The commission quoted Secret Service testimony that parade route buildings never are checked when a president is out of Washington - only when he is involved in a parade such as at inauguration, when the route is known publicly long in advance.

The Secret Service's explanation, the commission concluded, "is not persuasive. An attempt to cover only the most obvious points of possible ambush along the route in Dallas might well have included the Texas School Book Depository building.”

The service also was criticized on grounds of poor coordination with local officials - in this case the Dallas police - in outlining their responsibilities for assisting in the presidential visit.

Nine Secret Service agents were chided for violating regulations by visiting the Fort Worth Press Club the night before the assassination and drinking beer or mixed drinks in the early hours of the fateful day. The report didn't name

them. A Secret Service rule prohibits drinking by the White House detail while traveling with the president.

Four of the nine, the report said, were assigned to the service's backup car behind Kennedy's - three on the running board, the fourth in the open car.

“It is conceivable that those men who had little sleep, and who had consumed alcoholic beverages, even in limited quantities, might have been more alert in the Dallas motorcade if they had retired promptly in Fort Worth,” the commission said.

“However, there is no evidence that these men failed to take any action in Dallas within their power that would have averted the tragedy. The instantaneous and heroic response to the assassination of some of the agents concerned was in the finest tradition of government service.”

The commission noted suggestions that “all or parts of the presidential protective responsibilities of the Secret Service be transferred to some other department or agency.”

The FBI, it said, had been put forward as a logical agency to handle the entire investigative end of presidential protection. But the commission backed away from a recommendation, saying:

“If there is to be any determination of whether or not to relocate those responsibilities and functions, it ought to be made by the executive and the Congress, perhaps upon recommendations based on studies by the previously suggested committee.”

That committee, as proposed by the commission, would include the attorney general and the secretary of the Treasury - the department in which the Secret Service is located - or the National Security Council, with those two Cabinet officers sitting in.
